A. C. SENAPE McDERMOTT

# AN ELEVENTH-CENTURY BUDDHIST LOGIC OF 'EXISTS'

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AN ELEVENTH-CENTURY BUDDHIST LOGIC OF 'EXISTS'

# FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE

## SUPPLEMENTARY SERIES



VOLUME 11

# AN ELEVENTH-CENTURY BUDDHIST LOGIC OF 'EXISTS'

RATNAKĪRTI'S

*KṢAṆABHAṄGASIDDHIḤ VYATIREKĀTMIKĀ*

*Edited, with Introduction, Translation, and Notes*

*by*

A. C. SENAPE McDERMOTT




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The formal logician's role is analogous to that of the theoretician in any science. If the theory is too disparate with the data, his task is to alter the theory, not to abandon theory altogether.

Ruth Barcan Marcus, 'Interpreting Quantification', *Inquiry* 5 (1962) 259

*vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śābda-yonayaḥ.*

Quoted by Helārāja under *Vākya-padīya* III/54 *(Sambandha-Samuddeśa)*

# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work comprises a transliterated text and English translation of Ratnakīrti's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Vyatirekātmikā* together with an introduction and notes analyzing and explaining, from a comparative philosophical point of view, the chief logical and epistemological problems treated therein.

My translation is based on the *devanāgarī* Sanskrit text found on pp. 77–88 of *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* (Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti) (ed. by A. Thakur), Patna 1957. Minor typographical corrections and deviations from the Thakur edition as well as comparisons with a 1910 edition of the same treatise (*Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, ed. by M. M. Haraprasad Shāstri, Calcutta, pp. 54–88) are indicated in footnotes to the appropriate passages of the transliterated text. Within the translation itself, my intercalations (intended to explicate what is strictly present in the Sanskrit) are marked off by square brackets, while Ratnakīrti's own parenthetical remarks are enclosed in ordinary parentheses. So as to reflect the compactness and complexity of structure of certain Sanskrit compounds, I have adopted the expedient of including (within the notes accompanying certain passages) equivalent and more perspicuous symbolic formulations of these compounds, expressed in a suitable restricted predicate logic $R^*$, developed by R. Routley (in his 'Some Things Do Not Exist', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 7 (1966) 251–76).[1]

I wish to express my deepest thanks to Professor J. F. Staal (at the time of my study with him, Director of the Institute for Philosophy, University of Amsterdam) for his stimulating suggestions and his generosity, both as regards his time and his excellent library, during the inception of my work in 1965–66.

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For his painstaking reading of the first draft of my translation, I am also indebted to Professor D. Sharma, Michigan State University. And I am

[1] See my introductory sketch on p. 7.

obligated to the American Association of University Women for their generous financial support, which freed me from my academic duties so that I might deepen my knowledge of Indian epistemology and logic.

Finally, I hardly know how to express my thanks to my husband and my parents, for their patience and constant encouragement during the preparation of this manuscript.

A. C. SENAPE MCDERMOTT

*Milwaukee, Wis.*
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# ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| *BF* | S. Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Calcutta 1935. |
| *BL*I | T. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, vol. I (Dover edition), New York 1962. |
| *BL*II | Idem, vol. II. |
| *JAOS* | *Journal of the American Oriental Society*. |
| *JN* | *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali* (Buddhist Philosophical Works of Jñānaśrīmitra) (ed. by A. Thakur), Patna 1959. |
| *KB*I | *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Anvayātmikā* (Proof of the Concomitance of Existence and Momentariness), in *Ratnakīrtinibandhavālī* (ed. by A. Thakur), Patna 1957, pp. 62–76. |
| *KB*II | *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Vyatirekātmikā* (Proof of Universal Momentariness by Establishing the Contraposition of an Assertion of Concomitance), in *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* (ed. by A. Thakur), Patna 1957, pp. 77–88. |
| *RN* | *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* (Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti) (ed. by A. Thakur), Patna 1957. |
| *S* | *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Vyatirekātmikā*, in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts* (ed. by M. M. Haraprasad Shāstri), Calcutta 1910, pp. 54–88. |

# INTRODUCTION

## I. RATNAKĪRTI. HIS PHILOSOPHICAL CONGENERS AND ADVERSARIES

Ratnakīrti flourished early in the 11th century A.D. at the University of Vikramaśīlā, a member of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school of late Buddhist philosophy. Thakur characterizes Ratnakīrti's writing as "more concise and logical though not so poetical"[1] as that of his *guru*, Jñānaśrīmitra, two of whose dicta are focal points of the present work.[2]

From a translogical or absolute point of view, Ratnakīrti endorses a form of solipsistic idealism. The *Saṁtānāntaradūṣaṇa*[3], his proof of solipsism written from the standpoint of the highest truth (*paramārtha*), concludes that an external nonmental continuum is impossible. In ultimate reality the cognizing subject, its act of awareness, and the cognized object coalesce – all are fabrications superposed on what is really an indivisible evanescent now (*svalakṣaṇa*).[4]

As Ratnakīrti's predecessors have put it:

> There is neither an 'I' nor a 'he' nor a 'you' nor even an 'it'; neither the thing, nor the not-thing; neither a law nor a system; neither the terms nor the relations. But there are only the cognitive events of colourless sensations which have forms but no names. They are caught for a moment in a stream and then rush to naught. Even the stream is a fiction. That sensum of the moment, the purest particular, that *advaya*, the indivisible unit of cognition, that is the sole reality, the rest are all fictions, stirred up by time-honoured convention of language which is itself a grand fiction.[5]

I must emphasize that this ultimate or absolute state is apprehended only by a few seers endowed with paranormal powers of intuition and falls wholly

[1] See *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali* (Buddhist Philosophical Works of Jñānaśrīmitra) (ed. by A. Thakur), Patna 1959, p. 31.

[2] For an account of the life, work, and influence of Ratnakīrti's *guru*, see Thakur's *JN*, pp. 1–42.

[3] See Y. Kajiyama, 'Buddhist Solipsism. A free translation of Ratnakīrti's *Saṁtānāntaradūṣaṇa*', *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* **13** (1965) 435–420.

*N.B.* Solipsism is provable only from the vantage point of the highest truth, and, in his discussion of our knowledge of the everyday world, Ratnakīrti emphatically disavows solipsism. See his *Iśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa*, in *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali* (ed. by A. Thakur), Patna 1957, pp. 29–52.

[4] Thus there can be no *real* relationship (because there is not really any distinction) between the merely fictitious conceptual apparatus of an illusory subject and an absolutely real *svalakṣaṇa*.

[5] H. Ganguli's citation of a conclusion of Prajñākaragupta. H. Ganguli, *Philosophy of Logical Construction*, Calcutta 1963, p. 193.

outside the purview of logic or language. Thus, paradoxically, that which is real in the ultimate sense, the dynamic pure particular, the self-annihilating energy of the moment[6], cannot properly be said to be such. For the attributes 'real' and 'unreal' are both linguistic fictions and (if one is strictly brought up) ought to be used exclusively to discourse about the merely relative (*śūnya*) – viz., the phenomenally real and the phenomenally unreal. As well try to encapsulate the 'essential fluxional nature' of a *svalakṣaṇa* in a label (or characterize it or define it) as to make a plaster of paris mold of the lineaments of a quantity of quicksilver. Discursive language, in its efforts to grasp such a pure particular, can only falsify it by transmuting it into that which is general. Whenever language is employed at all *vis-à-vis* translinguistic 'truths' the words are being used in an extended sense (by courtesy, as it were) and cannot succeed in directly referring to their purported referents. Yet it is humanly impossible to dispense with interpretive intermediaries, so each (absolutely real) *svalakṣaṇa* remains elusive, pristine in its ineffability, while all else – to which our discourse *does* pertain (and that very discourse itself, as well) – has the status of a mere dream.

Now let us shift our attention to the everyday world, the realm of relative truth (*saṃvṛti*), the milieu in which most of *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Vyatirekātmikā* (*KB*II) moves. In order to structure an adequate explanation of our cognition of this world (a world under the sway of a transcendental illusion), Ratnakīrti follows the lead of his spiritual and philosophical mentors in making full use of a modified version of the logic and epistemology of Dharmakīrti[7] – itself an amplification of Dignāga's logic.[8] The approach of

[6] Called by the Yogācāra Buddhists the *svasaṃvedana-svalakṣaṇa* (self-defined self-experience). And, of course, to say that a *svalakṣaṇa* is definable only in terms of itself is tantamount to saying that it is not really definable at all. (See Ganguli, *Philosophy of Logical Construction*, p. 133.) A *svalakṣaṇa* simply, inexplicably, occurs – even this much cannot properly be asserted. It is an indivisible unique unity, the discrete psychic fact of the moment – not a substance at all, but a quantum of energy, *a fortiori* not a material or a spiritual substance. And this unity is falsely bifurcated into aspects by the inveterate illusoriness of the human conceptual apparatus.

[7] The members of Ratnakīrti's philosophical school (as is true of Indian philosophers in general) do not make a sharp distinction between logic and epistemology.

[8] Within the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition, Ratnakīrti belongs to the subschool of interpretation of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika* begun by Prajñākaragupta (whose probable *floruit* was in the early part of the 8th century A.D.). The *Pramāṇavārtika*, written by Dharmakīrti in the 7th century A.D. is a highly original recasting of the basic tenets of the great Buddhist logician Dignāga (ca. 480 A.D.) into a system of logic and epistemology which became the point of departure for all subsequent developments in Buddhist logic. See *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary* (ed. by R. Gnoli), Rome 1960. See also T. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II (Dover edition), 1962, which is a translation of Dharmakīrti's short logical treatise, the *Nyāyabindu*. M. Nagatomi's doctoral thesis (which I have not seen) is also pertinent: *A Study of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika. An English Translation and Annotation of the Pramāṇavārttika, Book I (Pramāṇasiddhi)*, Harvard University, 1957.

the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādins to this world of phenomena has been aptly characterized as pan-fictional. The import of this characterization will be made clear in the next few paragraphs.

On the one hand, Ratnakīrti and his fellow Buddhist logicians do not advocate abandoning the well-entrenched locutions of ordinary speech; nor do they – in their extra-philosophical moments, in their practical dealings with the world around them – have any quarrel with the tacit metaphysical assumptions of the man on the street. On the other hand, Ratnakīrti and his preceptors do differ radically, both from the man in the street and from epistemologists with a 'realistic' bent, as concerns the philosophically correct interpretation to be given statements about 'external' objects.

To speak of such objects is to employ terms which do not directly refer to any extra-mental entities, but rather to a complex nexus of interrelated mental constructions – i.e., to concepts (which have the status of logical fictions).[9] And these concepts in turn do not copy, grasp, describe, or directly relate to the inherent nature of any transconceptual reality.[10]

It is true, however, that certain of our concepts seem to project themselves 'outwards' – to 'externalize' themselves, as it were, thus engendering the whole as if world of phenomena, of ships, sealing wax, cabbages and kings, and jugs too.[11] Other concepts – not concepts of objectively existing things – are not so projected; they remain the barest of logical fictions. Such is the case with the key concept of the present treatise, the concept of a nonmomentary entity. The phrase 'nonmomentary entity' is, according to late Buddhist tenets, a mere abbreviation for denied objective reality, all real existents being momentary. But whether our constructs are such that we do or do not impute objective reality to them, they are (alike in either case) tools or 'handles' and the question of their meaning can only be answered in terms of their functionality in a variety of contexts.

Finally, while no conceptual network is strictly entailed by experience (nor does the converse relationship hold), the network as a whole *does* affect the things we say and do, and can therefore be evaluated as an instrument. Thus Ratnakīrti is advocating a rather exotic brand of pragmatism, set against a

[9] Here any psychologistic overtones which sometimes accompany the word 'concept' must be ruled out. Ratnakīrti construes a concept as a *logical* construction, a synthesis (see p. 76), not as the private adjunct of some individual mind.

[10] As has been said (p. 1, footnote 4), from the standpoint of *paramārtha* there can be no *real* relationship between an only apparently existent concept and an absolutely existent *svalakṣaṇa*. Nonetheless, in assuming the standpoint of *saṃvṛti* (spawned and pervaded as it is by a primordial illusion), Ratnakīrti perforce attempts the analysis and pragmatic assessment of the fabricated and merely indirect 'relationship' between a fictitious conceptual construct and a sequence of self-annihilating staccato bursts of energy. (See p. 76, footnote 94.)

[11] A jug, qua stock example of phenomenon in *KB*I, is also alluded to in *KB*II.

background of extreme subjective idealism and culminating in a mystically intuited trans-phenomenal solipsism of the present moment.

Whether or not this miscellany meshes together into a coherent whole, it will not be the business of the present conspectus to decide.[12] Nor do I intend to review the catalog of woes endemic to philosophies which (like Ratnakīrti's) deny the ultimate existence of an enduring conscious subject. I also claim the privilege of abstaining from further comment on the problem[13] of the ontological commitments of the various Buddhist logicians from Dharmakīrti onwards. Despite its not inconsiderable intrinsic interest, such a discussion is not germane to our present purpose. For Ratnakīrti's logic is primarily concerned with explicating the structure of mind-fabricated interrelationships among the concepts to which our language refers, and with determining the inferential force of certain premisses in which these concepts co-function. In other words, the ambitus of his logic is restricted to what is relative, to what is expressible via language; the 'perseity' of what is non-relative lies wholly beyond that logic's range and ought not to bear directly on the defensibility of Ratnakīrti's logical innovations. Accordingly, in what follows it will be possible (and preferable) to maintain a neutral attitude towards the absolute status of Ratnakīrti's staccato-point 'atoms' and concern ourselves instead with whether accounts ultimately based on them are simple, consistent, and adequate to solve the problems which exercise him in *KB*II.

Having done with all the synoptic preliminaries, there remains the task of setting forth and appraising the details of *KB*II, wherein Ratnakīrti provides a unique logico-epistemological buttress for the contraposed version of the proof of his school's central thesis – viz., the thesis that all real existents

[12] Does it, for instance, make any sense to seek a *raison d'être* for the primordial, dichotomizing illusion? I leave it to a more metaphysically oriented study of Yogācāra philosophy to render intelligible that school's received doctrine that there is nothing except for staccato discrete cognitions – i.e., that "knowledge alone exists; the projection of an external world is an illusion of knowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire (*vāsanā*) associated with it" (S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 411). Such a study ought also to resolve (if, indeed, they are resolvable) the ambiguities in the notion of dynamism (*arthakriyākāritva*), the dynamism of each staccato point (*svalakṣaṇa*) being, according to Ratnakīrti, the hallmark of its real existence.

[13] The disparate opinions of the critics are legion. To a certain extent the problem is a pseudo-problem, engendered by a failure on the part of critics and commentators to distinguish a pan-fictional idiom from a literal one. In addition, some critics have a tendency to extrapolate full-blown metaphysical doctrines from incidental remarks in treatises primarily concerned with logic. Apropos, see the insightful observations of A. B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, pp. 308–9. To the extent that the problem is a real one, the first step towards solving it would seem to be a clarification of some of the more refractory material in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika*. M. Nagatomi's soon to be published translation and exegesis of this extremely difficult work promises to dispel much of the obscurity and confusion which surround it.

are momentary.[14] *KB*II stands in an intimate relationship to the corpus of Ratnakīrti's other writings – most obviously to its companion treatise *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Anvayātmikā* (*KB*I), the uncontraposed (*anvaya*) version of the proof of the same thesis. But *KB*II is also closely linked to the *Citrādvaitaprakāśavādaḥ* and to the *Apohasiddhiḥ*, both of which propound in more detail Ratnakīrti's theory of the formation of concepts, their relation to one another and to 'extra-conceptual' entities. *KB*II rather than any of Ratnakīrti's other treatises attracted my attention because of the topicality of its central logical issue – viz., the possibility of extending systematic treatment to terms which refer to concepts of entities which are phenomenally unreal.[15]

In addition to the aggregate of Ratnakīrti's works, *KB*II must be understood in the light of the philosophy of Jñānaśrīmitra (Ratnakīrti's preceptor).[16] *KB*II also presupposes a passing acquaintance with certain pertinent doctrines of Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyika opponents[17], for whom (in some cases) citations by Buddhist logicians constitute the only extant source. Too, scholars have noted that Ratnakīrti's view is proleptic of the theory of *antarvyāpti* (inner concomitance), a theory first *explicitly* articulated, as far as we know, by Ratnakīrti's disciple, Ratnākaraśānti.[18]

[14] *Yat sat tat kṣaṇikam* (Reality is essentially cinematographic). See p. 9 for a formal symbolic expression of this thesis. The contrapositive of the foregoing is, of course, the thesis that whatever is nonmomentary does not exist (expressed in symbols on p. 9).

[15] Contemporary Western philosophical literature abounds in discussions of the same sort. To name a few: B. Russell, 'On Denoting', *Mind* **14** (1905) 479–93; P. Strawson, 'On Referring', *Mind* **59** (1950) 320–44; K. S. Donnellan, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', *The Philosophical Review* **75** (1966) 281–304; W. V. O. Quine, *Word and Object*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

[16] See pp. 1 and 36.

[17] Although Ratnakīrti expressly mentions philosophers of the Mīmāmsaka, Yoga, and Cārvāka schools in his other writings, in *KB*II he is concerned to rebut Śaṃkara, Bhāsarvajña, Trilocana, and Vācaspati Miśra, all of whom are members of the Nyāya school ('Naiyāyikas'). The Nyāya school is generally conceded to have bred the logicians *par excellence* of the six orthodox Hindu philosophical schools. Inimical scholarly encounters between the heterodox Buddhist and the orthodox Brahmanical logicians have fructified systematic logical developments on both sides ever since the dawn of Buddhist logic. S. Dasgupta gives an account of the earliest beginnings of Nyāya philosophy in *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge 1922, pp. 274–310. For a detailed discussion of Nyāya epistemology and logic, see S. C. Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, Calcutta 1939. A. Thakur details the parallel growth and mutual influence of pre-Ratnakīrti Hindu and Buddhist systems in his *JN*, pp. 15–23, and in his *RN*, pp. 23–7. For post-Buddhistic developments in Nyāya philosophy see D. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951. See also K. Potter, *The Padārthatattvanirūpanam of Raghunātha Śiromani*, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, pp. 1–20. C. Goekoop's Introduction to *The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintāmani*, Dordrecht 1967, is also informative.

[18] See Ratnākaraśānti's *Antarvyāptisamarthana* in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, Calcutta 1910. See also p. 55. Antarvyāpti is a late Buddhist modification of the traditional notion of *vyāpti* (concomitance, pervasion). For details on the ascertainment of *vyāpti* as the basis of valid inference, see p. 12.

Finally, as a 'flux' philosopher, Ratnakīrti bears undeniable resemblances to both Heraclitus and to Bergson in the West. Other doctrines Ratnakīrti maintains bring to mind at one time passages in Whitehead, at another remarks of Leibniz, at another comments made by Kant, and at still another, statements of Bishop Berkeley. All of these comparisons are mere *sotto voce* suggestions, recorded at present for their probable utility in subsequent explorations of other aspects of Ratnakīrti's philosophy. Here, however, these surface similarities must be noted and as quickly de-emphasized so as to avoid distorting Ratnakīrti's ideas by forcing them into inappropriate molds.

## II. NOTATION

Ratnakīrti's primary task in *KB*II is to present the rudiments of a theory broad enough to accommodate statements with 'unreal' subjects (e.g., 'A hare's horn is not sharp', 'Whatever is nonmomentary does not exist') as well as statements with 'real' subjects (e.g., 'This jug is blue'). In order to accomplish this task he must perforce expose the latent self-contradiction in the fiat of his Naiyāyika opponents which categorically bars from discourse all referring noun expressions which lack suitable referents. In particular, the discussion focuses on Ratnakīrti's defense of the use of the allegedly maverick term 'nonmomentary entity'[19] as subject of a certain class of statements.

Ratnakīrti's theory of concept formation (mentioned in Section I of this Introduction and presented in greater detail in the notes to (85.22)) will prove adequate to encompass both the concept of a phenomenally unreal nonmomentary entity and the concept of a phenomenally real jug as special subcases. Hence if the cardinal Buddhist doctrine:

(1) All real existents are momentary

be demonstrable[20], so also (Ratnakīrti's analysis assures us) is its contrapositive:

(2) Whatever is nonmomentary is nonexistent.

The fact that an 'unreal' term stands as subject of (2) will not alone suffice to disqualify (2). Ratnakīrti goes on to explain how in his system[21] the ascription of the term 'nonexistent' to an appropriate subject term no more

[19] Referring, as it does, to a concept not explicable in terms of actual existents.

[20] And *KB*I purports to provide a demonstration for (1).

[21] To say that Ratnakīrti's speculations constitute a system is perhaps to wax hyperbolic, since Ratnakīrti does not make a sharp enough distinction between what is presystematic and what falls within the confines of his system. But this piecemeal attacks on a related class of problems do amount to (at the very least) 'systematizing', if not to a fullfledged system.

commits him to the hypostatization of dubious entities than does the ascription of the term 'blue' to the subject term 'jug'.

In what follows a modification of the usual quantification theory similar to that developed by R. Routley[22] is employed as a heuristic device for rendering Ratnakīrti's reasoning (and the logical and philosophical consequences thereof) more perspicuous.[23] The aptness of this choice of interpretative instrument rests – among other things – on the not unjustified assumption that the concept of a nonmomentary entity is not inconsistent – merely unexampled.[24]

The symbolic expressions which appear in the present discussion and throughout the notes accompanying my translation contain the following improper symbols, which bear their customary meanings:

$$\supset \quad \sim \quad \vee \quad \cdot \quad ( \quad ).$$ [25]

In addition there is the universal quantifier ($\Pi$), whose usual interpretation must, however, be altered. Henceforward the domain of $\Pi$ will include both merely possible as well as actual individuals. (To be more precise – it will include both possible and actual individual *loci*.[26]) '$\Pi$' is to be read 'for all possible'.

Consider now a typical atomic sentence such as 'The jug is blue'. (The Sanskrit sentence is '*ghaṭo nīlaḥ*': '*ghaṭa*' $=_{df}$ 'jug'; '*nīla*' $=_{df}$ 'blue'.) This

[22] Routley's system $R^*$ appears in its entirety in his article 'Some Things Do Not Exist', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 7 (1966) 251–76. Note that while crucial similarities between portions of *KB*II and $R^*$ make $R^*$ a tool par excellence for elucidating certain passages of *KB*II, I am far from claiming a point-for-point correspondence between Ratnakīrti's results and the more sophisticated full-blown system of Routley.

[23] The writings of e.g., J. F. Staal, S. Schayer, I. M. Bocheński, D. H. Ingalls, and C. Goekoop comprise the most cogent arguments I know of in favor of utilizing formal structures to trace out the logic in both Nyāya and late Buddhist texts.

[24] Should this assumption prove to be ill-founded, perhaps a variant of Lesniewski's 'ontology' (see, e.g., A. N. Prior, *Formal Logic*, pp. 293–9) might be more profitably applied as an analytical intermediary. The trouble is that late Buddhist epistemology sorts out entities via a more or less 'psychologistic' possibility criterion, which effects the following trifurcation of entities: (1) phenomenally real (for example, a jug); (2) 'conceivable' but not phenomenally real (for example, a nonmomentary entity, a hare's horn, the son of a barren woman); (3) inconceivable (for example, Nirvāṇa). Whether or not there are significant differences between the subvarieties of kind (2) must be gleaned from the context, which, as I have said (pp. 69 and 80) seems to warrant making a distinction between the (nonactualized) nonmomentary entity and the (inconsistent) son of a barren woman. Though there is a modicum of arbitrariness in holding Ratnakīrti to a distinction only *implicit* in his writings, it seems to me preferable to do so, if necessary (despite the *longueurs* of qualifications and reservations), than to abandon altogether the enterprise of explicating his theory.

[25] As in, e.g., W. V. Quine, *Mathematical Logic*, New York 1940, or A. Church, *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, Vol. I, Princeton 1956.

[26] See below, p. 8.

might be construed as involving the ascription of the term 'blueness' to the term 'jug'. More commonly, however, such a sentence is analyzed by Indian logicians in general and by Ratnakīrti in particular as a description of the conditions under which the attribute *nīlatva* may be said to 'occur in' a 'locus' of *ghaṭatva*.[27] Accordingly, the present study utilizes a relation '$0(f, a)$' to be read '$f$ occurs in locus $a$'.[28] And thus, while our language is equipped with a stock of individual variables $x, y, \ldots$, these must here be understood to range over actual and possible individual loci.[29]

Various other constants will be introduced where needed but special mention must be made of the predicate constant '$E$' (to be read 'exists')[30] which is governed by the following formation rule: If $x$ is an individual variable (or constant) then $E(x)$ is well-formed. The definition to be given 'exists' is the one common to Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda epistemological treatises. I.e., to say '$x$ exists' (written '$E(x)$') is equivalent to saying that $x$ is efficacious, which means simply that the term '$x$' refers to a concept indirectly coordinated with a series of ineffable self-annihilating quanta of energy (*svalakṣaṇāni*). Hence a jug, qua phenomenally real entity is a 'locus' of (*causal*) *efficacy* (*arthakriyākāritva*)[31] in addition to *jugness* (and whatever other special attributes happen to co-occur with these). For the Buddhists, all the attributes play perfectly symmetrical roles. Moreover, a correct analysis discloses no autonomous locus in addition to (and in support of) the totality of attributes. In short, a phenomenally real (unreal) entity re-

[27] '*nīla*' + '*tva*' $=_{\text{df}}$ 'blueness'; '*ghaṭa*' + '*tva*' $=_{\text{df}}$ 'jug-ness'.

[28] While Ratnakīrti makes free use of this format in his paraphrases of ordinary sentences, both the 'locus' and the 'attribute' dissolve in the course of his reductive analysis, so that his employment of these locutions amounts to a mere *façon de parler*, which does not, in the long run, commit him to any perduring entitative correlates thereof. See pp. 64ff.

[29] This means that loci characterized by the occurrence of logically *inconsistent* combinations of attributes will not be possible substituents for variables – i.e., our quantifiers will not take account of such loci. Hence the relatively unimportant example of the son of a barren woman must be excluded from our analysis. (Alternatively, perhaps one might employ a *constant* to refer to the son of a barren woman.) This constitutes a very minor (and it seems to me unavoidable) distortion of Ratnakīrti's thought.

[30] The by now familiar point that no *logical* obstacles stand in the way of taking 'exists' as a predicate need not be belabored. See, e.g., G. Nakhnikian and W. Salmon, '"Exists" as a Predicate', *Philosophical Review*, 1957, 535–42. But it must be kept in mind that there are significant differences between ascribing the term 'exists' (or 'does not exist') to a certain subject term and ascribing a more mundane attribute term such as 'blue' to that same subject term. In fact, in Buddhist epistemology 'exists', 'is efficacious', and 'is momentary' all require special handling, since none of the three refers to an ordinary qualitative property. What is important is that Ratnakīrti's theory is capable of handling them.

[31] In the absolute sense, neither a phenomenally real nor a phenomenally unreal entity exists. Hence, even a phenomenally real jug possesses whatever efficacy it has in a merely derivative sense, by virtue of the jug's indirect relation to *svalakṣaṇāni*. The latter, while efficacious in the primary sense are also translinguistic and cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be efficacious at all.

duces to a congeries of attributes including (excluding) *arthakriyākāritva*. Alike in either case analysis is a tracing out of compatibility relationships among these conceptual attributes.

Further quantifiers are defined as follows:

D1: $(\Sigma x)\, 0(f, x) =_{\mathrm{df}} \sim(\Pi x) \sim 0(f, x)$
D2: $(\exists x)\, 0(f, x) =_{\mathrm{df}} (\Sigma x)\, (0(f, x).E(x))$
D3: $(\forall x)\, 0(f, x) =_{\mathrm{df}} \sim(\exists x) \sim 0(f, x)$.[32]

'$\Sigma$' is read 'for some possible', '$\exists$' is read 'for some actually existing', and '$\forall$' is read 'for all actually existing'. Any standard axiomatization of the propositional calculus will do, if supplemented by the usual rules of inference and by postulates governing $\Pi$. For convenient reference, I reproduce here in all essentials the postulate set given by Routley (p. 254) for his $R^*$.

*R*0: If $A$ is truth-functionally valid, then $A$.
*R*1: $(\Pi x)\,(A \supset B) \supset (A \supset (\Pi x)\, B)$, provided individual variable $x$ does not occur free in $A$.
*R*2: $(\Pi x)\, A \supset \check{S}^{x}_{y} A|$, where $y$ is an individual variable or an individual constant.
*RR*1: $A,\, A \supset B \rightarrow B$ (modus ponens).
*RR*2: $A \rightarrow (\Pi x)\, A$ (generalization).[33]

Where '*kṣaṇikatva*' $=_{\mathrm{df}}$ 'momentariness' and '*akṣaṇikatva*' $=_{\mathrm{df}}$ 'nonmomentariness', consider the following case by way of illustration. 'All existents are momentary' is formalizable as follows:

(i) $(\Pi x)\,(E(x) \supset 0(k\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x))$.[34]

The contraposed version of (i) (and the focal point of Ratnakīrti's efforts in *KB*II) is:

(ii) $(\Pi x)\,(\sim 0(k\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x) \supset \sim E(x))$.

Equivalently:

(iii) $(\Pi x)\,(0(ak\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x) \supset E(x))$.

And (ii) and (iii) are logically equivalent because the nonoccurrence of momentariness in $x(\sim 0(k\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x))$ is logically equivalent to the oc-

[32] $(\forall x)\, 0(f, x)$ can also easily be shown to be logically equivalent to $(\Pi x)\,(E(x) \supset 0(f, x))$.
[33] Notation, terminology and abbreviations are adapted from A. Church, *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, Vol. I, Princeton 1956.
[34] Equivalently, $(\forall x)\,(0(k\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x))$.

currence of nonmomentariness in $x(0(ak\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x))$.[35] To be more explicit, Ratnakīrti takes the disjunction of momentariness and nonmomentariness to be exhaustive of all *possible* entities (i.e., $(\Pi x)$ $(0(k\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x) \vee 0(ak\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x)))$, whence the nonoccurrence of momentariness in any locus is tantamount to the occurrence of nonmomentariness in that locus.

Finally, there is one portion of my commentary (viz., the notes to (82.1)) which requires a more complicated system than my adaptation of $R^*$ for its formalization. For details on an *extended function calculus* adequate to the expression of the material explicating (82.1), see e.g., Church's *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, Vol. I, Princeton 1956. Here it suffices to note that '$(P)\,\mathrm{N}(P)$ (formula (1), p. 67) is read 'All attributes $P$ are characterized by N'.

## III. *VYĀPTI*

On the level of relative truth (*saṃvṛti*), late Buddhist epistemologists countenance two (and *only two*) means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) – viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).[36] Nor need any additional *pramāṇa* be posited to account for our cognition of 'unreal' entities such as nonmomentary entities, hare's horns, etc.[37]

[35] *N.B.* The same equivalence relationship decidedly does *not* obtain between e.g., '*krama*' and '*akrama*'. On the contrary, neither the occurrence of succession (*krama*) nor the occurrence of nonsuccession (*akrama*) can be affirmed of a nonmomentary locus. (See p. 46.) This is because the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession is exhaustive of the realm of *efficacious* entities but not of the realm of *possible* entities. (I.e., $(\forall x)$ $(0(krama, x) \vee 0(akrama, x))$. By D3, we also have: $(\Pi x)$ $(E(x) \supset [0(krama, x) \vee 0(akrama, x)])$; but we do *not* have: $(\Pi x)$ $(0(krama, x) \vee 0(akrama, x))$.)What is nonefficacious is not properly classifiable as either successive or nonsuccessive. It is, in fact, one of the main points of *KB*II to limit the ascription of both the term 'succession' and the term 'nonsuccession' to phenomenally real entities and to use this limitation as a criterion for setting off what is phenomenally real from what is phenomenally unreal. Hence, for a nonmomentary subject, both these statements are true:

(a) $(\Pi x)$ $(0(ak\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x) \supset \sim 0(krama, x))$
(b) $(\Pi x)$ $(0(ak\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x) \supset \sim 0(akrama, x))$.

And therefore $(\forall x)$ $(\sim 0(ak\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x))$ may be concluded, but *not* $(\Pi x)$ $(\sim 0(ak\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x))$. [Again borrowing from Routley ('On a Significance Theory', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 1966, pp. 193, 194), *the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession* might be said to be a 'universal' predicate, whereas the *disjunction of momentariness and nonmomentariness* might be said to be 'ultimate'; and Ratnakīrti might be credited with an inchoate 'significance' theory.] For details, see notes to (81.23).

[36] *N.B.*, 'relative truth'. Yogic intuition, providing (as it does) access to absolute truth (*paramārtha*), need not be considered further in this discussion. Here again the parsimonious tendencies of late Buddhism are in evidence, for Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyika adversaries posit *four* means of valid knowledge.

[37] Nonperception (*anupalabdhi*), the source of our knowledge of what is 'unreal', is not a separate means of cognition at all; rather, it is inferential in character. Nor does *anupalabdhi* involve the apprehension of any peculiar sort of 'negative' entity. See the notes to (85.5) and those to (85.15).

This section is devoted to an examination of the *inferential* basis of Ratnakīrti's defense. Determination that, for example, a particular occurrence of fire may be *validly inferred* from an occurrence of smoke, rests on the ascertainment that the occurrence of *fieriness* is *invariably concomitant* with the occurrence of *smokiness*. Equivalently (and more simply) one can say that smoke is *pervaded by* (i.e., is *necessarily accompanied by*) fire. In general, the fact that a relationship of pervasion (*vyāpti*) obtains between the components of its major premiss constitutes the ground for any logically sound inference. The following technical terms (and variants thereof) figure in both late Buddhist and in Nyāya definitions (and attempted definitions) of pervasion.

'*pakṣa*' (or '*āśraya*') $=_{\mathrm{df}}$ 'subject', 'locus', 'substratum'.
'*hetu*' (or '*liṅga*') $=_{\mathrm{df}}$ 'reason', 'mark', 'sign'.
'*sādhya*' $=_{\mathrm{df}}$ 'that which is to be proved'.

The *hetu* ($H$) functions as probans (*sādhana*) with respect to the *sādhya* ($S$) as probandum. Roughly speaking, $S$ is traditionally said to be 'invariably concomitant with' $H$ or to 'pervade' $H$ (or to stand in a relationship of pervasion to $H$) if and only if *every* locus of $H$ is a locus of $S$.[38] Hence if $S$ is known to pervade $H$, from this fact as major premiss, one can infer the occurrence of $S$ in any particular locus where $H$ is known to occur.[39]

To tighten the preceding analysis, a more precisely formulated criterion for determining invariable concomitance is needed. The stock-in-trade of Buddhist logicians ever since the time of Vasubandhu (ca. 280–360 A.D.) has been the set of strictures called the 'three-aspected logical mark'; thus the articulation of these strictures is an important step in the direction leading to Ratnakīrti's *vyāpti* criterion.

*The Three-Aspected Logical Mark:*

(a) The *hetu* must indeed be present in the given *sādhya*.
(b) The *hetu* must be present only in cases where the *śādhya* is also present[40], though not necessarily in all such cases. In symbols: $(\forall x)\,(0(hetu, x) \supset 0(s\bar{a}dhya, x))$.

[38] In the case involving fire and smoke, *fieriness* serves as *sādhya* and *smokiness* as *hetu*.

[39] In a given inference, $S$ may also be termed the 'pervader' ('*vyāpaka*') relative to $H$, which is then termed the 'pervadendum' ('*vyāpya*'), whereupon, in the contraposed (*vyatireka*) version of that same inference, the nonoccurrence of $S$ (i.e., the nonoccurrence of the *vyāpaka*) is pervaded by the nonoccurrence of $H$ (i.e., by the nonoccurrence of the *vyāpya*). For alternative symbolizations of this relationship employing the correlatives '*hetu*'–'*sādhya*', '*vyāpya*'–'*vyāpaka*', respectively, see conditions (d′) and (d″) below and formulae (1) and (2) of the notes to (80.29).

[40] These cases are called '*sapakṣa*' or 'similar' or 'homologous'.

(c) The *hetu* must be absent in all cases where the *sādhya* is absent.[41] In symbols:
$(\forall x)\,(\sim 0(s\bar{a}dhya,\, x) \supset \sim 0(hetu,\, x))$.

As is easily seen, (b) and (c) are logically equivalent, (c) being the contrapositive of (b).[42]

Notice that (b) and (c) make reference to (similar and dissimilar) cases. The earliest Buddhist (and Naiyāyika) logicians tended to regard inductive enumerations of cases as probative. Realizing that there is no *logical* (though there may well be a *psychological*) utility in an examination of homologous and heterologous cases[43], late Buddhist logicians regard invariable concomitance as resting on an *internal* logical relationship between the *hetu* concept and the *sādhya* concept.[44] Hence the above three case-oriented strictures coalesce and are subsumed by Ratnakīrti[45] under the demand that for an inference to be valid its *hetu* concept must be logically incompatible with the contradictory of its *sādhya* concept. Formalizing this yields:

(d) $\sim(\Sigma x)\,(0(hetu,\, x) . \sim 0(s\bar{a}dhya,\, x))$.

By the definitions of '$\Sigma$' and '$\supset$', (d) is 1-equivalent to:

(d′) $(\Pi x)\,(0(hetu,\, x) \supset 0(s\bar{a}dhya,\, x))$.

And the (1-equivalent) contrapositive of (d′) is:

(d″) $(\Pi x)\,(\sim 0(s\bar{a}dhya,\, x) \supset \sim 0(hetu,\, x))$.

Applying D3 in the form given in footnote 32 on p. 9, it becomes clear that (b) and (c) above are special subcases covered by (d′) and (d″) respectively.

A fallacy is incurred and a proffered inference thereby invalidated if, for any reason, the stipulations expressed in (d′) are not met. The enormous catalog of fallacies compiled by earlier logicians is discarded by the later

[41] So-called 'heterologues' – '*vipakṣa*' or 'dissimilar' cases.

[42] This fact has been noted by J. F. Staal in 'Contraposition in Indian Logic', in *Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science*, Stanford 1962, pp. 634–9.

[43] I.e., realizing that deductive necessity cannot be arrived at by a mere inductive compilation of experienced examples and counter-examples. Here, perhaps, Stcherbatsky's Kantian reading of late Buddhist logic seems less far-fetched than it usually does. One *almost* wants to say that, for Ratnakīrti, inference represents the mind's constructive activity and is, to that extent, *a priori*.

[44] It goes without saying that neither is a concept reducible to a mere compilation of the instances which fall under it; otherwise one would have to resort to tallying homologues and heterologues after all. I.e., *blueness* is not to be identified with the class of all blue things. Rather, *blueness* is a rule of synthesis in the sense explained on p. 76.

[45] In Ratnakīrti's anticipation of Ratnākaraśānti's theory of *antarvyāpti*.

Buddhists, for whom all fallacies are seen as essentially reducible to one or another of the following three faults of the reason (*hetudoṣa* or *hetvābhāsa*).

(1) The reason's presence in a given locus is unproved (*asiddha*). This case is further subdivided into three cases:

(a) the locus is unreal (*āśrayāsiddha*) as in the example of (83.11);

(b) the location of the locus is in doubt (*sandigdhāśraya*) as in the example involving the peacock in (83.14);

(c) the very nature of the reason precludes the possibility of its occurrence in the putative locus (*svarūpāsiddha*) as in saying, for example, that sound is a quality because of its visibility.

(2) The reason is uncertain (*anaikāntika*). I.e., the reason's absence in dissimilar cases has not been determined. E.g., 'Sound is eternal because it is cognizable'. Here 'cognizability' is disqualified, since its referent occurs in both similar and dissimilar cases.

(3) The reason is contradictory (*viruddha*). I.e., the alleged reason is present in certain dissimilar cases and absent in all similar cases. E.g., 'Sound is eternal because it is a product'.

# TRANSLITERATED TEXT

## *KṢAṆABHAṄGASIDDHIḤ VYATIREKĀTMIKĀ*

Namastārāyai

(77.4) vyatirekātmikā vyāptir ākṣiptānvayarūpiṇī. vaidharmyavati dṛṣṭānte sattva[1]-hetor ihocyate.

(77.6) yat sat tat kṣaṇikam. yathā ghaṭaḥ. santaścāmī vivādāspadībhūtāḥ padārthā iti svabhāva-[2]hetuḥ.

(77.8) na tāvad asyāsiddhiḥ sambhavati. yathāyogaṃ pratyakṣānumānapramāṇapratīte dharmiṇi sattvaśabdenābhipretasyārthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇasya sādhanasya pramāṇasamadhigatatvāt.

(77.10) na ca viruddhānaikāntikate. vyāpakānupalambhātmanā viparyaye bādhakapramāṇena[3] vyāpteḥ prasādhanāt.

(77.11) yasya kramākramau na vidyete na tasyārthakriyāsāmarthyam. yathā śaśaviṣāṇasya. na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramākramāviti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ.

(77.12) na tāvadayamasiddho hetuḥ. akṣaṇike dharmiṇi kramākramasadbhāvāyogāt. tathāhi prāptāparakālayorekatve nityatvam. tasya kramākramayoge kṣaṇadvayepyavaśyaṃ bhedaḥ. bhedābhedayośca parasparavirodhāt kuto 'kṣaṇike kramākramasambhavaḥ. kṣaṇadvaye 'pi bhede kramākramayogaḥ. abhede hi prathama eva kṣaṇe śaktatvād. bhāvino 'pi kāryasya karaṇaprasaṅge kathaṃ kāryāntarakaraṇe kramāntarāvakāśaḥ. na cākṣaṇikasyākrameṇaiva sakalasvakāryaṃ kṛtvā svāsthyam. kṣaṇāntare 'pi śaktatvāt punastatkāryakaraṇaprasaṅgāt.

(77.18) tasmādakṣaṇikamiti pūrvāparakālayorabhedaḥ. kramākramayoga iti pūrvāparakālayorbhedaḥ. anayośca parasparaparihārasthitilakṣaṇo virodhaḥ.

(77.20) tadayamakṣaṇike dharmiṇi kramākramābhāvalakṣaṇo hetur nāsiddho vaktavyaḥ. kramākramayogitvākṣaṇikatvayorvirodhādeva.[4]

[1] sattve *S*.
[2] svabhavo *S*.
[3] viparyayabādhakapramāṇena *S*. For reasons of internal consistency, I have here used *S*'s reading rather than that of the Thakur edition in my translation.
[4] For (77.11)–(77.20), *S* reads as follows:
vyāpakañcārthakriyākāritvasya kramākramikāryaviṣayatvameva. na punaḥ kāraṇagatau kāryagatau vā kramākramāvasya vyāpakau. kṛtvā karaṇalakṣaṇasya kramasya kṣaṇike 'sambhavāt. kāryagatābhyāṃ kramākramābhyāṃ kāraṇaśaktervyāptyayogāt. tasmāt kāraṇagatayā kramākramikāryaviṣayatayā vyāpyamānā kāraṇaśaktiḥ kramākramavyāpte-

(78.1) nāpi viruddhaḥ. sapakṣe bhāvāt.

(78.2) nacānaikāntikaḥ. kramākramābhāvasyārthakriyāsāmarthyābhāvena vyāptatvāt.

(78.3) yenaiva hi pratyakṣātmanā pramāṇenāparaprakārābhāvādvidhibhūtābhyāṃ kramākramābhyāṃ vidhibhūtasyārthakriyāsāmarthyasya vyāptiḥ prasādhitā, tenaivārthakriyāsāmarthyābhāvena kramākramābhāvasya vyāptiḥ prasādhiteti svīkarttavyam. nahi dahanādinā dhūmādervyāptisādhakapramāṇādaparaṃ dhūmādyabhāvena dahanādyabhāvasya vyāptisādhakaṃ kiñcit pramāṇaṃ śaraṇabhūtamasti. tasmādvidhyoreva vyāptisādhakaṃ pramāṇamabhāvayorapi vyāptisādhakamiti nyāyasya duratikramatvāt sattvābhāvena kramākramābhāvo vyāpta eveti nānaikāntika ityanavadyo vyāpakānupalambhaḥ. tadayamakṣaṇikād vinivartamāṇaḥ svavyāpyaṃ sattvaṃ nivartya kṣaṇike viśrāmayatīti sattvahetoḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhirapyanavadyā.[5]

(78.10) nanu vyāpakānupalambhataḥ sattvasya kathaṃ svasādhyapratibandhasiddhiḥ, asyāpyanekadoṣaduṣṭatvāt. tathāhi na tāvadayaṃ prasaṅga[6]-hetuḥ. sādhyadharmiṇi pramāṇasiddhatvāt, parābhyupagamasiddhatvābhāvāt, viparyayaparyavasānābhāvācca. atha svatantraḥ, tadāśrayāsiddhaḥ. akṣaṇikasyāśrayasyāsambhavāt. apratītatvādvā. pratītirhi pratyakṣeṇānumānena vikalpamātreṇa vā syāt.

(79.1) prathamapakṣadvaye sākṣātpāramparyeṇa vā svapratītilakṣaṇār-

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tyucyate. viṣayena viṣayinirdeśāt. vyavahāralāghavārtham. tataśca yadyapi sarvatra kramākramau sattvasya vyāpakāvityādyucyate. tathāpi kramākramikāryaviṣayatvam eva vyāpakaṃ boddhavyaṃ.

nanu yadaikameva kāryamaṅkurādikamutpadyate, tadā kathaṃ kāryagatakramākramavyavastheti cet.

ucyate. yadyapyekameva kāryaṃ bhinnakālakāryamapekṣya kramastadbhāvāccākramastatkāritvameva kramākramakāritvaṃ. tathāpyapekṣaṇīyaviṣayabhedāt kramākramayorasāṅkaryameva. pitṛputratvavat.

kaḥ punarasau vyāptiprasādhake vyāpakānupalambha iti cet.

ucyate. yasya kramākramikāryaviṣayatvannāsti, na tat śaktaṃ, yathā śaśaviṣāṇaṃ. nāsti ca nityābhimatasya bhāvasya kramākramikāryaviṣayatvamiti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ. na tāvadayamasiddho vaktavyaḥ. nityasya dharmiṇaḥ kramākramikāryaviṣayatvena vyāpakena saha virodhasadbhāvāt, tathā hi pūrvāparakālayorekatve nityatvaṃ kṣaṇadvayepi bhede kramākramitvaṃ. tataśca nityatvaṃ kramākramitvañcetyabhinnatvaṃ bhinnatvañcetyuktaṃ bhavati. etayośca parasparaparihārasthitilakṣaṇatayā virodhaḥ. tat kathaṃ nitye kramākramasambhavaḥ.

[5] For 78.3–9, *S* reads as follows:

tathā hi na tāvat kramākramābhyāmanyaḥ prakārosti, yenārthakriyāsambhavanāyāṃ kramākramābhyāmarthakriyāvyāptirna syāt. tasmādarthakriyāmātrānubaddhatayā tayoranyataraprakārasya. ubhayorabhāve cābhāvādarthakriyāmātrasyeti tābhyāṃ tasya vyāptisiddhiḥ. pakṣīkṛte ca tayorabhāvenārthakriyāśaktyabhāvasiddhau kathamanekāntah. na hi vyāpyavyāpakayorvyāpyavyāpakabhāvasiddhimuddhūyavyāpyābhāvena vyāpakābhāvasya vyāptisiddhau, upāyāntaramastīti nirvadyovyāpakānupalambhaḥ. sattvasya kṣaṇikatvena vyāptiṃ sādhyatyeva.

[6] *S* has prasaṅgo.

thakāritve maulaḥ sādhāraṇo hetuḥ vyāpakānupalambhaśca svarūpāsiddhaḥ syāt. arthakriyākāritve kramākramayoranyatarasyāvaśyambhāvāt.

(79.4) antimapakṣe tu na kaściddheturanāśrayaḥ syāt. vikalpamātrasiddhasya dharmiṇaḥ sarvatra sulabhatvāt.

(79.6) api ca, tat kalpanājñānaṃ pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvi vā syāt, liṅgajanma vā, saṃskārajaṃ vā, sandigdhavastukaṃ vā, avastukaṃ vā.

(79.8) tatrādyapakṣadvaye 'kṣaṇikasya sattaivāvyāhatā. kathaṃ bādhakāvatāraḥ.

(79.9) tṛītye tu na sarvadā 'kṣaṇikasattāniṣedhaḥ. tadarpitasaṃskārābhāve tat smaraṇāyogāt.

(79.10) caturthe tu sandigdhāśrayatvaṃ hetudoṣaḥ.

(79.11) pañcame ca tadviṣayasyābhāvo na tāvad pratyakṣataḥ sidhyati. akṣaṇikātmanaḥ sarvadaiva tvanmate 'pratyakṣatvāt na cānumānatastadabhāvastat[7]-pratibaddhaliṅgānupalambhādityāśrayāsiddhistāvaduddhatā. evaṃ dṛṣṭāntopi pratihantavyaḥ.

(79.14) svarūpāsiddho 'pyayaṃ hetūḥ. sthirasyāpi kramākramisahakāryapekṣayā kramākramābhyām arthakriyopapatteḥ. nāpi kramayaugapadyapakṣoktadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ. tathāhi kramisahakāryapekṣayā kramikāryakāritvan tāvadaviruddham.

(79.17) tathā ca śaṃkarasya saṃkṣipto 'yamabhiprāyaḥ. sahakārisākalyaṃ hi sāmarthyam. tadvaikalyancāsāmarthyam. na ca tayorāvirbhāvatirobhāvābhyān tadvataḥ kācit kṣatiḥ. tasya tābhyāmanyatvāt. tatkathaṃ sahakāriṇo 'napekṣa[8] kāryakaraṇaprasaṅga iti.

(79.20) trilocanasyāpyayaṃ saṃkṣiptārthaḥ. kāryameva hi sahakāriṇamapekṣate. na ca[9] kāryotpattihetuḥ. yasmāt dvividhaṃ sāmarthyaṃ nijamāgantukaṃ ca sahakāryantaram, tato 'kṣaṇikasyāpi kramavatsahakārinānātvādapi kramavatkāryanānātvopapatteraśakyaṃ bhāvānām pratikṣaṇaṃanyonyatvamupapādayitum iti.

(79.24) nyāyabhūṣaṇo 'pi lapati. prathamakāryotpādanakāle hi uttarakāryotpādanasvabhāvaḥ. ataḥ prathamakāla evāśoṣāṇi[10] kāryāṇi kuryāditi cet.

(79.26) tadidaṃ mātā me bandhyetyādivat svavacanavirodhādayuktam. yo hi uttarakāryajananasvabhāvaḥ sa kathamādau tat kāryaṃ kuryāt. na tarhi tatkāryakaraṇasvabhāvaḥ. nahi nīlotpādanasvabhāvaḥ pītādikamapi karotīti.

(80.1) vācaspatirapi paṭhati. nanvayamakṣaṇikaḥ svarūpeṇa kāryaṃ janayati. taccāsya svarūpaṃ tṛtīyādiṣiva kṣaṇeṣu dvitīye 'pi kṣaṇe saditi tadāpi

[7] ...abhāvaspratibaddha... *S.*
[8] 'napekṣya *S.*
[9] Omitted in *S.*
[10] Read: evāśeṣāṇi.

janayet. akurvan vā tṛtīyādiṣvapi na kurvīta. tasya tādāvasthyāt. atādavasthye vā tadevāsya kṣaṇikatvam.

(80.4) atrocyate. satyaṃ svarūpeṇa kāryaṃ janayati na tu tenaiva. sahakārisahitādeva tataḥ kāryotpattidarśanāt. tasmād vyāptivatkāryakāraṇabhāvo'pyekatrānyayogavyavacchedena.anyatrāyogavyavacchedenanāvaboddhavyaḥ.[11] tathaiva laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṃ sampratipatteriti na kramikāryakāritvapakṣoktadoṣāvasaraḥ.

(80.8) nāpyakṣaṇike yaugapadyapakṣoktadoṣāvakāśaḥ. ye hi kāryamutpāditavanto dravyaviśeṣāsteṣāṃ vyāpārasya niyatakāryotpādanasamarthasya niṣpādite kārye 'nuvartamāneṣvapi teṣu dravyeṣu nivṛttārthādūnā sāmagrī jāyate. tatkathaṃ niṣpāditaṃ niṣpādayiṣyati. nahi daṇḍādayaḥ svabhāvenaiva kartāro yenāmi niṣpatterārabhya kāryaṃ vidadhyuḥ. kiṃ tarhi vyāpārāveśinaḥ. na ceyatā svarūpeṇa na kartāraḥ. svarūpakārakatvanirvāhaparatayā vyāpārasamāveśāditi.

(80.13) kiṃ ca kramākramābhāvaśca bhaviṣyati. na ca sattvābhāva iti sandigdhavyatireko 'pyayaṃ vyāpakānupalambhaḥ. na hi kramākramābhyāmanyasya prakārasyābhāvaḥ siddhaḥ. viśeṣaniṣedhasya śeṣābhyanujñāviṣayatvāt.

(80.16) kiṃ ca prakārāntarasya dṛśyatve nātyantaniṣedhaḥ. adṛśyatve tu nāsattāniścayo viprakarṣiṇāmiti na kramākramābhyāmarthakriyāsāmarthyasya vyāptisiddhiḥ. ataḥ sandigdhavyatireko 'pi vyāpakānupalambhaḥ.

(80.19) kiṃ ca dṛśyādṛśyasahakāripratyayasākalyavataḥ kramayaugapadyasyātyantaparokṣatvāt tena vyāptaṃ sattvamapi parokṣameveti na tāvatpratibandhaḥ pratyakṣataḥ sidhyati. nāpyanumānataḥ. tatpratibaddhaliṅgābhāvāditi.

(80.22) api ca kramākramābhyāmarthakriyākāritvaṃ vyāptamityatisubhāṣitam. yadi krameṇa vyāptaṃ kathamakrameṇa, athākrameṇa na tarhi krameṇa. kramākramābhyāṃ vyāptimiti tu bruvatā vyāpterevābhāvaḥ pradarśito bhavati. nahi bhavatyagnirdhūmabhāvābhāvābhyāṃ vyāpta iti. ato vyāpteranaikāntikatvam.

(80.26) api ca kimidaṃ bādhakamakṣaṇikānāmasattāṃ sādhayati. utasvidakṣaṇikāt sattvasya vyatirekam. atha sattvakṣaṇikatvayoḥ pratibandham.

(80.28) na pūrvo vikalpaḥ. uktakrameṇa hetorāśrayāsiddhatvāt.

(80.29) na ca dvitīyaḥ. yato vyāpakanivṛttisahitā vyāpyanivṛttirvyatirekaśabdasyārthaḥ. sā ca yadi pratyakṣeṇa pratīyate tadā taddhetuḥ syāditi sattvamanaikāntikam. vyāpakānupalambhaḥ svarūpāsiddhiḥ. atha sā vikalpyate tadā pūrvoktakrameṇa pañcadhā vikalpya vikalpo dūṣaṇīyaḥ.

(81.1) ata eva na tṛtīyo 'pi vikalpaḥ. vyatirekāsiddhau sambandhāsiddheḥ.

[11] ... vyavacchedenāvaboddhavyaḥ *S*. *S* also omits punctuation after the first occurrence of 'vyavacchedena'.

(81.2) kiṃ ca na bhūtalavadatrākṣaṇiko dharmi dṛśyate. na ca svabhāvānupalambhe vyāpakānupalambhaḥ kasyacit dṛśyasya pratipattimantareṇāntarbhāvayituṃ śakyata[12] iti.

(81.4) kiṃ cāsyābhāvadharmatve āśrayāsiddhatvamitaretarāśrayatvaṃ ca. bhāvadharmatve viruddhatvaṃ ca. ubhayadharmatve cānaikāntikatvam iti na trayīṃ doṣajātimatipatati.

(81.6) yat punaruktam akṣaṇikatve kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhāditi. tatra virodhasiddhimanusaratā virodhyapi pratipattavyaḥ. tatpratītināntarīyakatvād virodhasiddheḥ. yathā tuhinadahanayoḥ sāpekṣadhruvabhāvayośca.

(81.8) pratiyogī cākṣaṇikaḥ pratīyamānaḥ pratītikāritvāt sanneva syāt ajanakasyāprameyatvāt.

(81.10) saṃvṛtisiddhenākṣaṇikatvena virodhasiddhiriti cet. saṃvṛtisiddhamapi vāstavaṃ kālpanikaṃ vā syāt.

(81.12) yadi vāstavaṃ kathaṃ tasyāsattvam. kathaṃ cārthakriyākāritvavirodhaḥ. arthakriyāṃ kurvaddhi vāstavamucyate.

(81.14) atha kālpanikam. tatra kiṃ virodho vāstavaḥ, kālpaniko vā. na tāvad vāstavaḥ. kalpitavirodhivirodhatvāt, bandhyāputravirodhavat. atha virodho 'pi kālpanikaḥ. na tarhi sattvasya vyatirekaḥ pāramārthika iti kṣaṇabhaṅgo dattajalāñjaliriti.

(81.17) ayameva codyaprabandho 'smad gurūbhiḥ[13] saṃgṛhītaḥ.

(81.18) nityaṃ nāsti na vā pratītiviṣayastenāśrayāsiddhatā hetoḥ svānubhavasya ca[14] kṣatirataḥ kṣiptaḥ sapakṣo 'pi ca.

śūnyaṃca dvitayena sidhyati na cāsattāpi sattā yathā

no nityena virodhasiddhirasatā śakyā kramāderapi. iti (kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāye).

(81.23) atrocyate. iha vastunyapi dharmidharmavyavahāro dṛṣto yathā gavi gotvam, paṭe śuklatvam turage gamanamityādi. avastunyapi dharmidharmavyavahāro dṛṣto yathāśaśaviṣāṇe tīkṣṇatvābhāvo bandhyāputre vaktṛtvābhāvo gaganāravinde gandhābhāva ityādi. tatrāvastuni dharmitvaṃ nāstīti kiṃ vastudharmeṇa dharmitvaṃ nāsti. āhosvidavastudharmeṇāpi.

(81.27) prathamapakṣe siddhasādhanam. dvitīyapakṣe tu svavacanavirodhah. yadāhurguravaḥ.

(81.28) dharmasya kasyacidavastuni mānasiddhā bādhāvidhivyavahṛtiḥ kimihāsti no vā kvāpyasti cet kathamiyanti na dūṣaṇāni nāstyeva cet svavacanapratirodhasiddhiḥ.

[12] śakya *S*.

[13] jñānaśrīmitraiḥ.

[14] This line is quoted on p. 81.19 as: "... cākṣatirataḥ ..." and on p. 88.9 as: "... ca kṣatirataḥ ..."

(82.1) avastuno dharmitvasvīkārapūrvakatvasya vyāpakasyābhāvād[15]-āśrayāsiddhidūṣaṇasyānupanyāsaprasaṅga ityarthaḥ. yenaiva hi vacanenāvastuno dharmitvaṃ pratiṣidhyate. tenaivāvastuno dharmitvābhāvena dharmeṇa dharmitvamabhyupagatam.[16] parantu[17] pratiṣidhyata itivyaktamidamīśvaraceṣṭitam. tathāhyavastuno dharmitvaṃ nāstīti vacaneva[18] dharmitvābhāvaḥ kimavastuni[19] vidhīyata, anyatra vā, na vā kvacidapīti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ.

(82.6) prathamapakṣe 'vastuno na dharmitvaniṣedhaḥ. dharmitvābhāvasya dharmasya tatraiva vidhānāt.

(82.7) dvitīye 'vastuni kimāyātam. anyatra dharmitvābhāvavidhānāt.

(82.8) tṛtīyastu pakṣo vyartha eva nirāśrayatvāditi katham avastuno dharmitvaniṣedhaḥ. tasmādyathā pramāṇopanyāsaḥ prameyatvasvīkāra[20] pūrvakatvena vyāptaḥ, vācakaśabdopanyāso vā vācyasvīkārapūrvakatvena vyāptastathā 'vastuno dharmitvaṃ nāstīti vacanopanyāso 'vastuno dharmitvasvīkārapūrvakatvena vyāptaḥ. anyathā tadvacanopanyāsasya vyarthatvāt.

(82.11) tadyadi vacanopanyāso vyāpyadharmastadā 'vastuno dharmitvasvīkāro 'pi vyāpakadharmo durvāraḥ. atha na vyāpakadharmaḥ, tadā vyāpyasyāpi vacanopanyāsasyāsambhava iti mūkataivātra balādāyāteti kathaṃ na svavacanapratirodha[21] siddhiḥ.

(82.15) yadāhācāryaḥ.[22] nahyabruvan paraṃbodhayitumīśaḥ. bruvan[23] vā doṣamimaṃ parihartumiti mahati saṃkaṭe praveśaḥ.

(82.17) avastuprastāve sahṛdayānāṃ mūkataiva yujyate iti cet. aho mahadvaidagdhyam. avastuprastāve svayameva yathāśakti valgitvā bhagno mūkataiva nyāyaprāpteti paribhāṣayā niḥsartumicchati. na cāvastuprastāvo rājadaṇḍena vinā caraṇamardanādinānīṣṭimātreṇa vā pratiṣeddhuṃ śakyate. tataścātrāpi kramākramabhāvasya sādhanatve sattvābhāvasya ca sādhyatve sandigdhavastubhāvasyāvastvātmano vā kṣaṇikasya[24] dharmitvaṃ kena pratiṣidhyate.[25]

(82.22) trividho hi dharmo dṛṣṭaḥ. kaścit vastuniyato nīlādiḥ. kaścidavastuniyato yathā sarvopākhyāvirahaḥ. kaścidubhayasādhāraṇo yathā 'nupalabdhimātram. tatra vastudharmeṇāvastuno dharmitvaniṣedha iti yuktam. na tvavastudharmeṇa. vastvavastudharmeṇa vā. svavacanasyānupanyāsa-

[15] vyāpakasyābhāve *S*.
[16] Defective in *S*: vacanenāvastuno ... abhyupagatam.
[17] parastu *S*.
[18] I have used *S*'s reading: vacanena.
[19] kimavastu *S*.
[20] prameyasvīkāra *S*.
[21] svavacanavirodha *S*.
[22] Omitted in *S*.
[23] Read: abruvan.
[24] Read: akṣaṇikasya.
[25] pratihanyate *S*.

prasaṅgādityakṣaṇikasyābhāve sandehe 'pi[26] vā 'vastudharmeṇa dharmitvamavyāhatamiti nāyamāśrayāsiddho vyāpakānupalambhaḥ.

(82.27) akṣaṇikāpratītāvāśraya[27]-siddho heturiti yuktamuktām. tadapratītau tadvyavahārāyogāt. kevalamasau vyavahārāṅgabhūtā pratītirvastvavastunorekarūpā na bhavati. sākṣātpāramparyeṇa vastusāmarthyabhāvinī hi vastupratītiḥ. yathā pratyakṣamanumānaṃ pratyakṣapṛṣṭabhāvi ca vikalpaḥ. avastunastu sāmarthyābhāvādvikalpamātrameva pratītiḥ. vastuno hi vastubalabhāvinī pratītiryathā sākṣātpratyakṣam, paramparayā tatpṛṣṭhabhāvī vikalpo 'numānaṃ ca. avastuno[28] na vastubalabhāvinī pratītistatkārakatvenāvastutvahāniprasaṅgāt. tasmādvikalpamātramevāvastunaḥ pratītiḥ.

(83.4) nahyabhāvah kascidvigrahavān yaḥ sākṣātkartavyo 'pi tu vyavahartavyaḥ. sa ca vyavahāro vikalpādapi sidhyatyeva. anyathā sarvajanaprasiddho 'vastuvyavahāro na syāt. iṣyate ca.

(83.6) taddharmitvapratiṣedhānubandhādityakāmenāpi vikalpamātrasiddho 'kṣaṇikaḥ svīkartavya iti nāyamapratītatvādapyāśrayāsiddho heturvaktavyaḥ. tataścākṣaṇikasya vikalpamātrasiddhatve yaduktam.

(83.9) na kaściddheturanāśrayaḥ vikalpa[29]-mātrasiddhyasyadharmiṇaḥ sarvatra sulabhatvād iti.

(83.10) tadasaṅgatam. vikalpamātrasiddhasya dharmiṇaḥ sarvatra sambhave 'pi vastudharmeṇa dharmitvāyogāt. vastudharmahetutvāpekṣaya āśrayāsiddhasyāpi hetoḥ sambhavāt.

(83.11) yathā ātmano vibhutvasādhanārthamupanyastaṃ sarvatropalabhyamānaguṇatvāditi sādhanam. vikalpaścāyaṃ hetūpanyāsāt. pūrvaṃ sandigdhavastukaḥ. samarthite tu hetāvavastuka iti brūmaḥ.

(83.14) na cātra sandigdhāśrayatvaṃ nāma hetudoṣaḥ. āstāṃ tāvat. sandigdhasyāvastuno 'pi vikalpamātrasiddhasyāvastudharmāpekṣayā dharmitvaprasādhanāt. vastudharmahetvapekṣayaiva sandigdhāśrayasya hetvābhāsasya vyavasthāpanāt. yatheha nikuñje mayūraḥ kekāyitāditi. avastukavikalpaviṣayasyāsattvaṃ tu vyāpakānupalambhādeva prasādhitam. evaṃ dṛṣṭāntasyāpi vyomotpalāderdharmitvaṃ[30] vikalpamātreṇa pratītiścāvagantavyā. tadevamavastudharmāpekṣayā 'vastunodharmitvasya vikalpamātreṇa pratīteścāpahnotumaśakyatvānnāyamāśrayāsiddho hetuḥ. Na ca[31] dṛṣṭāntakṣatiḥ.

(83.20) na caiṣa svarūpāsiddhaḥ. akṣaṇike dharmiṇi kramākramayor vyāpakyorayogāt. tathāhi yadi tasya prathame kṣaṇe dvitīyādikṣaṇabhāvi

[26] Omitted in *S*.
[27] ... pratītāvayamāśraya *S*.
[28] avastunastu *S*.
[29] syādvikalpa *S*.
[30] vyomāderddharmitvaṃ *S*.
[31] Omitted in *S*.

kāryakaraṇasāmarthyamasti tadā prathamakṣaṇabhāvikāryavat dvitīyādikṣaṇabhāvyapi kāryaṃ kuryāt. samarthasya kṣepāyogāt.

(83.22) atha tadā sahakārisākalyalakṣaṇasāmarthyaṃ nāsti. tadvaikalyalakṣaṇasyāsāmarthyasya sambhavāt. nahi bhāvaḥ svarūpeṇa karotīti svarūpeṇaiva karoti. sahakārisahitādeva tataḥ kāryotpattidarsanāt iti cet.

(83.24) yadā tāvadamī militāḥ[32] santaḥ kāryaṃ kurvate tadaikārthakaraṇalakṣaṇaṃ sahakāritvameṣamastu ko niṣeddhā. militaireva tu tatkāryaṃ karttavyamiti kuto labhyate. pūrvāparakālayorekaṣvabhāvatvād bhāvasya. sarvadā jananājananayoranyataraniyamaprasaṅgasya dūrvāratvāt.[33] tasmāt sāmagrī janikā naikaṃ janakamiti sthiravādināṃ manorājyasyāpyaviṣayaḥ.

(83.29) kiṃ kurmo dṛśyate tāvadevamiti cet. dṛśyatāṃ kiṃ tu pūrvasthitādeva paścāt sāmagrīmadhyapraviṣṭād bhāvāt kāryotpattiranyasmādeva viśiṣṭasāmagrīsamutpannāt kṣaṇāditi vivādapadametat. tatra prāgapi sambhave sarvadaiva kāryotpattir[34]-na vā kadācidapīti virodhamasamādhāya tat eva kāryotpattiriti sādhyānuvādamātrapravṛttaḥ kṛpāmarhati.

(84.3) na ca pratyabhijñānādevaikatvasiddhiḥ. tat pauruṣasya lūnapunarjātakeśakuśakadalīstambādau nirdalanāt. vistareṇa ca pratyabhijñādūṣaṇamasmābhiḥ sthirasiddhidūṣaṇe pratipāditamiti tat evāvadhāryam.

(84.6) nanu kāryameva sahakāriṇamapekṣate. na tu kāryotpattihetuḥ. yasmād dvividhaṃ sāmarthyaṃ nijamāgantukaṃ ca sahakāryantaraṃ, tato 'kṣaṇikasyāpi kramavat sahakārinānātvādapi kramavatkāryanānātvamiti cet.

(84.8) bhavatu tāvat nijāgantukabhedena dvividhaṃ sāmarthyam. tathāpi tat prātisvikaṃ vastusvalakṣaṇaṃ sadyaḥ kriyādharmakamavaśyābhyupagantavyam. tadyadi prāgapi, prāgapi kāryaprasaṅgaḥ. atha paścādeva, na tadā sthiro bhāvaḥ.

(84.11) na ca kāryaṃ sahakāriṇo 'pekṣata iti yuktam, tasyāsattvāt. hetuśca sannapi yadi svakāryaṃ na karoti, tadā tatkāryameva tanna syāt. svātantryāt.

(84.13) yaccoktam. yo hi uttarakāryajananasvabhāvah. sa kathamādau kāryaṃ kuryāt. na tarhi tatkāryakaraṇasvabhāvaḥ. na hi nīlotpādanasvabhāvaḥ pītādikamapi karotīti.

(84.15) tadasaṅgatam. sthirasvabhāvatve bhāvasyottarakālamevedaṃ na[35] pūrvakālamiti kuta etat. tadabhāvācca kāraṇamapyuttarakāryasvabhāvamityapi[36] kutaḥ.

(84.17) kiṃ kurmaḥ. uttarakālameva tasya janmeti cet. sthiratve tadanupapadyamānamasthiratāmādiśatu. sthiratve 'pyeṣa eva svabhāvastasya

[32] militāḥ *S.*
[33] Read: durvāratvāt.
[34] ... otpatter *S.*
[35] kāryanna *S.*
[36] ... kāryakaraṇasvabhāvamityapi *S.*

yaduttarakṣaṇa eva kāryaṃ karotīti cet. na, pramāṇabādhite svabhāvābhyupagamāyogāditi na tāvadakṣaṇikasya kramikāryakāritvamasti. nāpyakramikāryakāritvasambhavaḥ. dvitīye 'pi kṣaṇe kārakasvarūpasadbhāve punarapi kāryakaraṇaprasaṅgāt.

(84.21) kārye niṣpanne tadviṣayavyāpārābhāvādūnā sāmagrī na niṣpāditaṃ niṣpādayediti cet. na, sāmagrīsambhavāsambhavayorapi sadyaḥ kriyākārakasvarūpasambhave janakatvamavadhāryamiti[37] prāgeva pratipādanāt. kāryasya hi niṣpāditatvāt punaḥ kartumaśakyatvameva kāraṇamasamarthamāvedayati.

(84.23) tadayamakṣaṇike kramākramikāryakāritvābhāvo na siddhaḥ. na ca kramākramābhyāmaparaprakārasambhavo yena tābhyāmavyāptau sandigdhavyatireko hetuḥ syāt. prakārāntaraśaṅkāyāṃ tasyāpi dṛśyatvādṛśyatva[38]-prakāradvayadūṣaṇe 'pi svapakṣe 'pyanāśvāsaprasaṅgāt. tasmādanyo 'nyavyavacchedasthitir[39] nāparaḥ prakāraḥ sambhavati. svarūpāpraviṣṭasya vastuno 'vastuno vā 'tatsvabhāvatvāt.[40] prakārāntarasyāpi kramasvarūpāpraviṣṭatvāt. tathātīndriyasya sahakāriṇo 'dṛśyatve 'pyayogavyavacchedena dṛśyasahakārisahitasya[41] sattvasya dṛśyakramākramābhyāṃ vyāptiḥ pratyakṣādeva sidhyati. evaṃ kramākramābhyāmarthakriyākāritvaṃ vyāptamiti kramākramayoranyo 'nyavyavacchedena sthitatvādetatprakāradvayaparihāreṇārthākriyakāritvamanyatra na gatamityarthaḥ. ata evaitayorvinivṛttau nivartate.[42]

(85.4) trilocanasyāpi vikalpatraye prathamadūṣaṇamāśrayāsiddhidoṣaparihārato nirastam.

(85.5) dvitīyaṃ cāsaṅgatam. vikalpajñānena vyatirekasya pratītatvāt. nahyabhāvaḥ kaścidvigrahavān yaḥ sākṣatkartavyaḥ, apitu vikalpādeva vyavahartavyaḥ. na hyabhāvasya vikalpādanyāpratipattirapratipattirvā sarvathā. ubhayathāpi tadvyavahārahāniprasaṅgāt. evaṃ vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntasya hetuvyatirekasya ca vikalpādeva pratipattiḥ.[43]

(85.9) tṛtīyamapi dūṣaṇamasaṅgatam. vyāpakānupalambhena[44] nirdoṣeṇa[45] sattvasya kṣaṇikatvena vyāpteravyāhatatvāt.

(85.11) tadayaṃ vyāpakānupalambho 'kṣaṇikasyāsattvam. sattvasya tato vyatirekaṃ kṣaṇikatvena vyāptiṃ ca sādhayatyekavyāpārātmakatvāditi sthitam.

[37] ... tvamavāryamiti *S*.
[38] drśyādṛśyatva *S*.
[39] sthitayor *S*.
[40] 'nyatvāt *S*.
[41] Inserted in *S* at this point: dṛśyasyaiva.
[42] nivarteta *S*.
[43] pratītiḥ *S*.
[44] vyāpakānupalambhe *S*.
[45] nirdoṣatvasya *S*.

(85.13) nanu vyāpakānupalabdhiriti yadyanupalabdhimātraṃ tadā na tasya sādhyabuddhijanakatvamavastutvāt. na cānyopalabdhirvyāpakānupalabdhirabhidhātuṃ śakyā bhūtalādivadanyasya kasyacidanupalabdheriti cet.

(85.15) tadasaṅgatam. dharmyupalabdherevānyatr[46]-ānupalabdhitayā vyavasthāpanāt. yathā hi[47] neha śiṃśapā vṛkṣābhāvādityatra vṛkṣāpekṣayā kevalapradeśasya dharmiṇa upalabdhirvṛkṣā[48]-nupalabdhiḥ. śiṃśapāpeksayā ca kevalapradeśasya dharmiṇa upalabdhireva śiṃśapāyā[49] abhāvopalabdhiriti svabhāvahetuparyavasāyivyāpāro vyāpakānupalambhaḥ. tathā[50] nityasya dharmiṇo vikalpabuddhyavasitasya[51] kramikāritvākramikāritvāpekṣayā kevalagrahaṇādeva[52] kramikāritvākramikāritvānupalambhaḥ. arthakriyāpekṣayā ca kevalapratītirevārthakriyā'yoga[53]-pratītiriti vyāpakānupalambhāntarādasya na kaścidviśeṣaḥ.

(85.22) adhyavasāyāpekṣayā ca bāhye 'kṣaṇike vastuni[54] vyāpakābhāvād vyāpyābhāvasiddhivyavahāraḥ. adhyavasāyaśca samanantarapratyayabalādāyātākāra[55]-viśeṣayogādagṛhīte 'pi pravartanaśaktirbodhyavyaḥ.[56] īdṛśaścādhyavasāyo 'smaccitrādvaitasiddhau nirvāhitaḥ. sa cāvisaṃvādī vyavahāraḥ parihartumaśakyaḥ. yad vyāpakaśūnyaṃ tadvyāpyaśūnyamiti. etasyaivārthasyānenāpi krameṇa pratipādanāt. ayaṃ ca nyāyo yathā vastubhūte dharmiṇi tathā 'vastubhūte 'pīti ko viśeṣaḥ.

(85.27) tathāhyekajñānasaṃsargyatra vikalpya[57] eva. yathā ca hariṇaśirasi tenaikajñānasaṃsargiśṛṅgamupalabdhaṃ. śaśaśirasyapi tena sahaikajñānasaṃsargitvasambhāvanayaiva śṛṅgaṃ niṣidhyate, tathā nīlādāvapariniṣṭhitanityānityabhāve kramākramau svadharmiṇā sārdhamekajñānasaṃsarginau dṛṣṭau, yadi nitye[58] bhavataḥ nityagrāhijñāne[59] svadharmiṇā nityena sahaiva gṛhyeyātāmiti sambhāvanaya ekājñānasaṃsarga[60]-dvārakameva pratiṣidhyate. kathaṃ punaretasmin[61]-nityajñāne kramākramayor-

[46] Inserted in *S*: apy.
[47] Omitted in *S*: hi.
[48] upalabdhirdṛśya *S*.
[49] In *S* this word is compounded with the next as follows: śiṃśapābhāvopalabdhiriti.
[50] Inserted in *S*: hi.
[51] ... adhyavasitasya *S*.
[52] kevalagrahaṇam *S*.
[53] viyoga *S*.
[54] 'vastuni *S*.
[55] ... pratyayavalāyātākāra *S*.
[56] Here I have used *S*'s reading in my translation: ... saktirboddhavyaḥ.
[57] ... jñānamātravikalpa *S*.
[58] nitye 'pi yadi *S*.
[59] nityagrāhiṇā jñānena *S*.
[60] ... saṃsargi *S*.
[61] punaretan *S*.

asphuraṇamiti yāvatā kramākramakroḍikṛtameva nityaṃ vikalpayām iti cet. ataeva bādhakāvatāro viparītāropam[62]-antareṇa tasya vaiyarthyāt.

(86.6) kālāntare 'pyekarūpatayā[63] nityatvam. kramākramau ca kṣaṇadvaye bhinnarūpatayā. tato nityatvasya kramākramikāryaśakteśca parasparaparihārasthiti[64] lakṣaṇatayā durvāro virodha iti kathaṃ nitye kramākramayorantarbhāvaḥ. anantarbhāvācca suddhanityavikalpena dūrīkṛtakramākramasamāropeṇa kathamullekhaḥ. tataśca pratiyogini nitye 'pi vikalpyamāne[65] ekajñānasaṃsargilakṣaṇaprāpte nityopalabdhireva nityaviruddhasyānupalabhyamānasya kramākramasyānupalabdhiḥ. tata eva cārthakriyāśakteranupalabdhiḥ.[66] tasmād vyāpakavivekidharmyupalabdhitayā na vyāpakānupalambhāntarādasya viśeṣaḥ.

(86.13) nanvetadavastudharmikopayogi vastv[67] adhiṣṭhānatvāt pramāṇavyavasthāyā iti cet. kimidaṃ vastvadhiṣṭhānatvam nāma. kiṃparamparayā 'pi vastunaḥ sakāśādāgatatvam, atha vastuni kenacidākāreṇa vyavahārakāraṇatvam, vastubhūtadharmipratibaddhatvaṃ vā.

(86.16) yadyādyaḥ pakṣastadā kramākramasyārthakriyāyāśca vyāptigrahaṇagocaravastupratibaddhatvamasyāpi.[68] na kṣīṇam.

(86.18) na[69] dvitīye 'pi pakṣe dosah sambhavati. kṣaṇabhaṅgivastu sādhanopāyatvādasya.[70]

(86.19) na cāntimo 'pi vikalpaḥ kalpyate. tasyaiva nityavikalpasya vastuno dharmibhūtasya kramākramavad bāhyanityopādānaśūnyatvenārthakriyāvad bāhy[71]anityopādānaśūnyatve[72] prasādhanāt. paryudāsavṛttyā buddhisvabhāvabhūtākṣaṇikākāre vastubhūte dharmiṇi pratibaddhatvasambhavāt.

(86.23) ayameva nyāyo na vaktā bandhyāsutaścaitanyābhāvādityādau yojyaḥ. etena yathā vṛkṣābhāvādir[73] antarbhāvayituṃ śakyate[74] na tathāyamiti trilocano 'pi nirastaḥ.

(86.25) na ca kramādyabhāvastrayīṃ doṣajātiṃ nātikrāmati, abhāvadharmatve 'pi āśrayāsiddhidoṣaparihārāt.

[62] viparītarūparopam *S.*
[63] kālāntareṇāikarūpatayā *S.*
[64] ... sthita *S.*
[65] kalpyamāne *S.*
[66] vārthakriyāśakteranupalabdheh *S.*
[67] ... kopayogikastv *S.*
[68] ... baddhatvamapi *S.*
[69] na ca *S.*
[70] ... vastusādhanopāyatvādasya *S.*
[71] Read: "kramākramavadbāhyanityopādānaśūnyatvenārthakriyāvadbāhy ...", as *S* does.
[72] ... śūnyatvaprasādhanāt *S.*
[73] vṛkṣābhāvādityādy *S.*
[74] śakyo *S.*

(86.26) yattvanena pramāṇāntarānnityānāmasattvasiddhau kramādivirahasyābhāvadharmatā[75] sidhyatītyuktam, tadvālasyāpi durabhidhānam. nityo hi dharmi. asattvaṃ sādhyam. kramikāryakāritvākramikāryakāritvaviraho hetuḥ. asya cābhāvadharmatvaṃ nāma asattvalakṣaṇasvasādhyāvinābhāvitvamucyate. tacca kramākrameṇa sattvasya vyāptisiddhau sattvasya vyāpyasyābhāvena kramākramasya vyāpakasya viraho vyāptaḥ sidhyatītyabhāvadharmatvaṃ prāgeva vidhyorvyāptisādhanāt[76] pratyakṣādanumānādekasmādvā[77] pramāṇāntarāt siddhamiti netaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ.[78]

(87.7) na ca sattāyāmivāsattāyāmapi tulyaḥ prasaṅgo bhinnanyāyatvāt. vastubhūtaṃ hi tatra sādhyaṃ sādhanaṃ ca. tayordharmyapi vastveva[79] yujyate.

(87.9) vastunastu pratyakṣānumānābhyāmeva siddhiḥ. tayorabhāve niyamenāśrayāsiddhiriti yuktam. asattāsādhane tvavastudharmo heturavastu[80]-vikalpamātrasiddhe dharmiṇi nāśrayāsiddhidoṣeṇa dūṣayituṃ śakyaḥ. tathā 'kṣaṇikasya kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhaḥ sidhyatyeva.

(87.13) tathā vikalpādevākṣaṇiko virodhī siddhaḥ. vikalpollikhitaścāsya svabhāvo nāpara ityapi vyavahartavyam. anyathā tadanuvādena kramākramādirahitatvādiniṣedhādikamuktam.[81] tatsvarūpasyānullekhādanyasyollekhā[82]-dityakṣaṇikaśaśaviṣāṇādiśabdānuccāraṇaprasaṅgaḥ. asti ca. ato yathā pramāṇābhāve 'pi vikalpasiddhasya[83]-bandhyāsutādeḥ saundaryādiniṣedho 'nurūpastathā vikalpopanītasyaivākṣaṇikarūpasya tat eva[84] pratyanīkākāreṇa saha virodhavyavasthāyāṃ kīdṛso doṣaḥ syāt. yadi cākṣaṇikānubhavābhāvāt virodhapratiṣedhastarhi bandhyāputrādyanubhavādeva[85] saundaryādiniṣedho 'pi mābhūt.

(87.20) nanvevaṃ virodhasyāpāramārthikatvam. taddvāreṇa kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhirapyapāramārthikī syāditi cet.

(87.21) nahi virodho nāma vastvantaraṃ kiñcitubhayakoṭidattapādasambandhābhidhānam-[86]iṣyate, 'smābhirupapadyate vā. yenaikasambandhino vastutvābhāve 'pāramārthikaṃ[87] syāt. yathā tviṣyate tathā pāramārthi-

[75] Inserted in *S*: na.
[76] ... sādhakāt *S*.
[77] pratyakṣādanumānātmakādvā *S*.
[78] ... āśrayatvadoṣaḥ *S*.
[79] vastubhūta eva *S*.
[80] heturavastuni *S*.
[81] ... ādikamayuktaṃ *S*.
[82] Omitted in *S*: danyasyollekhā.
[83] vikalpasatvasya *S*.
[84] ... kṣaṇikasvaṃrūpasya tat *S*.
[85] ... ananubhavādeva *S*.
[86] ... dattapādaṃ sambaddhābhidhānam *S*.
[87] 'paramārthikaḥ *S*.

ka eva. viruddhābhimatayoranyo 'nyasvarūpaparihāramātraṃ virodhārthaḥ. sa ca[88] bhāvābhāvayoḥ pāramārthika eva.[89] na bhāvo 'bhāvarūpamāviśati. nāpyabhāvo bhāvarūpaṃ praviśatīti yo 'yamanayorasaṃkaraniyamaḥ sa eva pāramārthiko virodhaḥ. kālāntaraikarūpatayā hi nityatvam. kramākramau kṣaṇadvaye 'pi bhinnarūpatayā. tato nityatvakramākramikāryakāritva[90]-yorbhāvābhāvavad virodho 'styeva.

(88.1) nanu nityatvaṃ kramayaugapadyavattvaṃ[91] ca viruddhau dharmau vidhūya nāparo virodho nāma, kasya vāstavatvamiti cet.

(88.2) na, na hi dharmāntarasya sambhavena virodhasya pāramārthikatvaṃ brūmaḥ. kintu viruddhayordharmayo[92] sadbhāve. anyathā virodhanāmadharmāntarasambhave 'pi yadi na viruddhau dharmau kva pāramārthikavirodhasambhavaḥ.[93] viruddhau ceddharmau[94] tāvataiva tāttviko virodhavyavahāraḥ. kimapareṇa pratijñāmātrasiddhena virodhanāmnā vastvantareṇa.

(88.7) tadayaṃ pūrvapakṣasaṃkṣepaḥ. nityaṃ nāsti na vā pratītiviṣayastenāśrayāsiddhatā hetoḥ svānubhavasya ca kṣatirataḥ kṣiptaḥ sapakṣo 'pi ca. śūnyaśca dvitayena sidhyati na vā 'sattā 'pi[95] sattā yathā no nityena virodhasiddhirasatā śakyā kramāderapi. iti.

(88.12) atra siddhāntasaṃkṣepaḥ. dharmasya kasyacidavastuni[96] mānasiddhā bādhāvidhivyavahṛtiḥ[97] kimihāsti no vā. kvāpyasti[98] cet kathamiyanti na dūṣaṇāni nāstyeva cet svavacanapratirodhasiddhiḥ.[99]

(88.17) tadevam nityaṃ na kramikāryakāritvākramikāryakāritvayogīti paramārthaḥ.[100] tataśca sattāyuktamapi naiveti paramārthaḥ.[101] tataśca kṣaṇikākṣaṇikaparihāreṇa rāśyantarābhāvādakṣaṇikānnivartamānamidaṃ[102] sattvaṃ kṣaṇika[103] eva viśrāmyatvena vyāptaṃ sidhyatīti sattvāt kṣaṇikatvasiddhiravirodhini.[104]

88 tacca *S*.
89 pāramārthikameva *S*.
90 ... kāryakārakatva *S*.
91 nityatvakramayaugapadyavattvaṃ *S*.
92 ... dharmayoḥ *S*.
93 ... sadbhāvah *S*.
94 ca dharmau *S*.
95 vā sattāpi *S*.
96 *S* has an obvious misprint: kasyacivadastuni.
97 Another error in *S*: bādhāvidhivyavakṛatiḥ.
98 kāpyasti *S*.
99 ... siddhiriti *S*.
100 ... ayogiparamārthaḥ *S*.
101 nāiva paramārthataḥ *S*.
102 ... akṣaṇikādvinivartamānamidaṃ *S*.
103 kṣaṇikatva *S*.
104 *S* has an obvious error in this sentence.

(88.21) prakṛtiḥ[105] sarvadharmāṇaṃ yadbodhānmuktiriṣyate. sa eva tīrthyanirmāthī kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasāditaḥ.[106]

(88.23) iti kṛtiriyaṃ ratnakītaḥ.[107]

[105] prakṛteḥ *S*.

[106] *S* adds the following:

vipakṣe bādhanāddhetoḥ sādhyātmatvam prasidhyati. tat siddhau dvividhā vyāptisiddhiratrābhidhīyate. iti vāidharmyadṛṣṭānte vyatirekarūpavyāptyā kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ samāptā.

kṛtiriyaṃ mahāpaṇḍitaratnakīrtipādānām.

[107] Omitted in *S*.

# ENGLISH TRANSLATION

## PROOF OF UNIVERSAL MOMENTARINESS BY ESTABLISHING THE CONTRAPOSITION OF AN ASSERTION OF CONCOMITANCE

### Homage to Tārā

(77.4) Pervasion involving contraposed premisses[1] is characterized by implicit reference to the [corresponding][2] direct (or positive)[3] form. If a heterogeneous example of that which has reality as a reason is given, [the proof] is regarded as being of this [contraposed] kind.

(77.6) Whatever exists is momentary[4] – as, for instance, a jug. And the objects[5] under dispute are existent; thus the reason is identity.[6]

(77.8) Indeed it is not possible that this proof is inconclusive. It is valid because, if there is a subject[7] known through perception or inference (the means of valid knowledge)[8], then a probans[9] whose essence is causal efficiency[10], which is synonymous with reality [or real existence], is obtained from the means of valid knowledge.

(77.10) And there is neither uncertainty nor logical incompatibility[11] since there is proof by a *pramāṇa* refuting the opposite [of the generalization that whatever exists is momentary], [which *pramāṇa* is] defined on the basis of nonperception of a pervader.

(77.11) Whatever is not successive or nonsuccessive does not have the capacity for causal efficiency – as, for instance, a hare's horn. And a nonmomentary entity is neither successive nor nonsuccessive – hence no pervader is perceived.

(77.12) It is not the case – insofar as this is so – that such a reason is inconclusive[12], because it is impossible for succession or nonsuccession to

[1] *vyatirekātmikā.*
[2] '*ākṣipta*' means 'implicitly referred to', 'suggested', but can also mean 'withdrawn from', 'dispersed'.
[3] *anvaya.*
[4] *kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya*, p. 1.
[5] '*padārtha*' =dt 'denotatum', 'object'.
[6] *svabhāva.*
[7] '*dharmin*' =dt 'subject', 'substratum'.
[8] '*pramāṇa*' =dt 'means of valid knowledge', 'evidence'.
[9] '*sādhana*' =dt 'proving instrument', 'probans'.
[10] *arthakriyākāritva.*
[11] *viruddhānaikāntikate.*
[12] '*asiddho*' =dt 'inconclusive'.

exist in a nonmomentary subject. For thus [it has been said], in the case of unity[13] between present and [future moments], there is permanence. If succession or nonsuccession is possible – even between two moments – those two are necessarily different. And since difference and identity[14] are mutually contradictory, how is succession or nonsuccession possible in the case of a nonmomentary entity? Furthermore, if there is a difference between two moments, succession or nonsuccession is possible; whereas, in the case of identity, since the very first moment has potency[15], if this [first] moment results in the production of the nascent effect, how can there be occasion for another succession, in case another effect is produced? Nor is it satisfactory [to assume] that a nonmomentary entity produces its entire effect just by means of nonsuccessive [operation], for, since there would be efficacy in other moments as well [as the first], that effect would be produced repeatedly.

(77.18) Thus a nonmomentary entity is one which [retains its] identity throughout prior and subsequent times. If succession or nonsuccession is possible, there is nonidentity between prior and subsequent times. And between these two [viz., identity and nonidentity] there is [logical] opposition[16], which is defined as the state of their mutual confutation.

(77.20) Hence it must be admitted[17] that the reason, whose essence is the absence of either succession or nonsuccession in that nonmomentary subject, is not inconclusive.[18] [This is true] precisely because there is a contradiction between being nonmomentary and being related to either succession or nonsuccession.

(78.1) Nor is it [i.e., the reason] self-contradicting[19], since it actually exists in a positive example.[20]

(78.2) Nor is [the reason] uncertain[21], since the absence of either succession or nonsuccession is pervaded by the absence of the capacity for causal efficiency.

(78.3) The following must be accepted: precisely by that *pramāṇa* (grounded in perception) which proves the pervasion of the capacity for causal efficiency (a positive term) by succession or nonsuccession (another positive term) – just by that [*pramāṇa*], the pervasion of the absence of

[13] '*ekatva*' = 'unity', 'identity'.
[14] *bhedābhedayośca.*
[15] '*śaktatva*' =$_{\mathrm{df}}$ 'potency', 'efficacy'.
[16] *virodhaḥ.*
[17] '*vaktavya*' literally means 'it must be said'.
[18] *asiddho.*
[19] *viruddhaḥ.*
[20] '*sapakṣa*' = 'supporting instance', 'homogeneous example'.
[21] *anaikāntikaḥ.*

succession or nonsuccession by the absence of the capacity for causal efficiency is proved, because there is no other qualifying term[22] [than succession or nonsuccession]. For there is not any auxiliary[23] *pramāṇa* proving the pervasion of the absence of fire by the absence of smoke, other than the *pramāṇa* proving the pervasion of smoke, etc. by fire, etc. There is an inviolable rule that precisely the *pramāṇa* proving pervasion between two positive terms is also the *pramāṇa* proving pervasion between these two terms negated [in the contraposition of the original assertion]. From this rule, therefore, it follows that the absence of succession or nonsuccession is pervaded by the absence of reality. Thus there is *no uncertainty* and hence the nonperception of a pervader is unobjectionable. Therefore, the reality proved lacking in a nonmomentary entity rests as pervadendum[24] in the transient momentary entity.

(78.10) [Objection.] But, since no pervader is perceived, how can there be proof of the invariable concomitance[25] of a real entity with its own probandum[26], since just such [a proof] would contain many faults and hence be defective?

[Not an Indirect Proof.] For, it is surely not an indirect proof[27] since: (i) there is proof by a *pramāṇa* only if there is a substratum for the probandum[28]; (ii) there is no establishment of agreement with the opponent, and (iii) there is no conclusion of the contradictory position.

[An Independent Proof?] But if it is an independent [proof][29], then it is inconclusive because of its locus.[30] For a nonmomentary locus is either impossible or unknown. Indeed knowledge of such a locus would be either (i) by perception, (ii) by inference, or (iii) by mere conceptual construction.[31]

(79.1) If either of the first two alternatives obtains, the reason (which has its basis in a causal efficiency whose essence is knowledge of the nonmomentary entity by direct or indirect means) will be too broad.[32] Moreover, the nonperception of a pervader will be inconclusive because the nature of the

[22] *prakāra* (N.B. A qualifying term when construed extensionally is a class and intensionally, a qualifier. Ratnakīrti's use of the word is equivocal – extensional in its import in some passages, intensional in others).
[23] '*śaraṇabhūtam*' literally means 'existing for protection or help'.
[24] '*svavyāpya*' $=_{df}$ 'that which is to be pervaded', 'the included or contained term'.
[25] *pratibandha.*
[26] *svasādhya.*
[27] *prasaṅgahetuḥ.*
[28] *sādhya.*
[29] *svatantraḥ.*
[30] '*āśrayāsiddha*' = 'inconclusive because the substratum or locus is problematic'.
[31] '*vikalpa*' = 'conceptual construction', 'ideation'.
[32] *sādhāraṇo.*

reason will be incompatible with that of the locus.[33] [This is so] because, if causal efficiency is operative, it must necessarily be either[34] successive or nonsuccessive.

(79.4) But in case the last alternative obtains, then no reason will be locusless[35], since a subject proved to be a mere conceptual construction is trivially available.[36]

(79.6) Moreover, conceptual cognition[37] is either (i) dependent upon perception, (ii) produced by a sign, (iii) engendered by memory, (iv) a doubtful real, or (v) an unreal entity.

(79.8) But in that case, as regards the first two [of the immediately preceding theses], the *mere* existence of the nonmomentary is uncontradicted. How can it be refuted?

(79.9) But in the case of the third [alternative], the existence of the nonmomentary is never denied, since, if there is no engraved memory trace of something, it is impossible to remember it.

(79.10) Then, as concerns the fourth [viz., the contention that the nonmomentary is a doubtful real], a reason which has a doubtful locus[38] is fallacious.[39]

(79.11) And in the fifth case, the nonexistence of that object [*qua irrealium*] is not proved by perception, since the nonmomentary is never perceived at all, according to your[40] theory. Nor is the nonexistence of that [viz., the nonmomentary] the result of an inference, since no invariably concomitant reason[41] for such [an inference] is perceived. Therefore, insofar as this is so, *āśrayāsiddhi*[42] is engendered. Thus, even the example must be opposed.

(79.14) Such a reason will also be inconclusive because the nature of the reason is incompatible with the nature of its locus.[43] [This is true] because – there is proof that even a permanent entity – with due consideration of its successive and nonsuccessive cooperating agents – can produce effects successively or nonsuccessively. Nor does this entail a logical flaw[44] in the

[33] This fallacy is called '*svarūpāsiddhi*'.
[34] *anyatara*.
[35] *anāśrayaḥ*.
[36] '*sarvatra sulabhatvāt*': (literally) 'is easily attained at all times'.
[37] *kalpanājñānaṃ*.
[38] *sandigdhāśrayatvaṃ*.
[39] *hetudoṣaḥ*.
[40] I.e., the Buddhist theory.
[41] *pratibaddhaliṅga*.
[42] The inference is illegitimate because based on a problematic or nonexistent locus or substratum.
[43] *svarūpāsiddho*.
[44] *doṣa*.

said thesis[45] of succession or simultaneity.[46] For, [as has been said] in the case of successive cooperating, the [mere] production of a successive effect is indeed not contradictory.

(79.17) The preceding is a conspectus of the opinion of Śaṃkara. Indeed, 'capacity for [causal efficiency]'[47] $=_{df}$ 'possession of the totality of cooperating factors'; and 'lack of [such] capacity' $=_{df}$ 'an insufficiency of those factors'. Nor is there any confusion of [their] locus[48] with the absence or presence of those two, since that [locus] is different from the two. How can one conclude, in that case, that an effect is produced disregarding cooperating factors?

(79.20) That is a summary of Trilocana's position as well. For he regards the effect alone as depending on cooperating factors – not the cause[49] of the production of the effect. There are two kinds of capacity [for causal efficiency], (1) the innate[50] and (2) the adventitious[51], which comprises supplementary cooperating factors. Thus, since a variety of different successive effects arise, and moreover, since a nonmomentary entity also has a variety of [different] successive cooperating factors, it is not possible to justify the mutual dependence[52] of beings at every moment.

(79.24) The *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* also says[53] that at the moment in which the first effect is produced, the inherent disposition[54] to produce a subsequent effect certainly exists.

(79.26) But then, if it be argued that the first moment will thereby produce all effects, the author of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*'s rejoinder is that such [an objection] is meaningless[55], because it is a self-contradictory assertion. For how can an entity which has the inherent disposition to produce a *subsequent* effect produce that effect at first? There is no inherent disposition to produce such [a future] effect at that [present] moment. For surely the inherent disposition to produce blue does not also thereby produce yellow.

(80.1) Vācaspati also teaches such a doctrine. [He considers the following] objection.[56]

[45] N.B. *'pakṣa'* may mean 'thesis' or 'that which is to be concluded'. It may also mean 'the subject (or substratum) of a conclusion'.
[46] *kramayaugapadya.*
[47] *sāmarthyam.*
[48] *tadvataḥ.*
[49] *hetuḥ.*
[50] *nija.*
[51] *āgantukaṃ.*
[52] *anyonyatvam.*
[53] *'lapati'*: (literally) 'prates'.
[54] *'svabhāva'* $=_{df}$ 'inherent disposition', 'nature'.
[55] Literally: 'I shall prove that to be useless'.
[56] *'nanu'* (here written 'nanv' because of *saṁdhi*) is used to introduce an adverse argument.

A permanent entity produces an effect by its own nature, and its nature [*qua* permanent] ought also at the moment [of production] to produce what exists in the second moment – likewise, what exists in the third moment, etc. Otherwise, not producing [these], it would not accomplish them in the third, etc. moments either. This is so because either a nonmomentary entity remains in the state X[57] or, if it reverts to the state *not*-X[58], just that change constitutes the entity's impermanence.[59]

(80.4) Vācaspati's response[60] to this objection is that while reality by its own nature causes an effect to be produced, the effect is not produced just by that nature alone. It follows from the observation of the production of effects that the effect results just from the real entity's conjunction with cooperating factors. Therefore, the very presence of a cause and effect, between which a relation of pervasion subsists, must be understood as involving a distinction[61] with dependence[62] on others on the one side [viz., on the effect's side], as well as a distinction with independence on the other.[63] [Understood] in just this manner, the said thesis concerning the production of a *successive* effect is irrefutable, because it agrees with the observations of everyday experience.

(80.8) Moreover, there is no scope for a reproach directed towards the thesis of *simultaneity*[64] in the case of a nonmomentary entity. For, given an accomplished effect of an action [or operation] capable of producing a definite effect, if there are also concurring substances whose qualities have produced the effect, the totality [of these], exclusive of the completed objective, produces. But how will that [totality] bring about the accomplished [effect]? For surely those agents such as a stick, etc., will not produce an effect which begins by being derived just from [its cause's] own inherent nature. How, then, does this production[65] transpire? Neither is there such through [the cause's] nature [alone] nor is it [due to] the agent's [nature alone]; rather it is because of their simultaneous occurrence[66] in production, with the absolute sufficiency of that whose essence is to produce.

(80.13) Moreover, there will be absence of succession or nonsuccession, yet not the absence of reality. Hence the aforementioned nonperception of a pervader will be a mere doubtful negative.[67] For there is no proof of the

[57] *tādavasthyāt.*
[58] *atādavasthyāt.*
[59] *kṣanikatvam.*
[60] Literally: 'In this matter it is said ...'
[61] *vyavacchedena.*
[62] *yoga.*
[63] For this sentence I have adopted *S*'s reading.
[64] *yaugapadya.*
[65] '*vyāpāra*': (literally) 'performance', 'operation'.
[66] *samāveśa.*
[67] *sandigdhavyatireko.*

nonexistence of a qualifying term[68] other than succession or nonsuccession, since the denial of a particular [term][69] is an assent to its complement.[70]

(80.16) Further, if [this] other term [defines a class which] is visible, it is not absolutely denied. But if it is invisible, then there is uncertainty[71] as to the existence of inaccessible entities.[72] Thus there is no proof of the pervasion of the capacity for causal efficiency by succession or nonsuccession. Hence the nonperception of a pervader is surely just a doubtful negative.

(80.19) Moreover, because both succession and simultaneity are absolutely unperceivable[73] in that which possesses a totality of cooperating factors (visible or invisible), the reality pervaded by them is also unperceivable. Insofar as this is so, it is not the case that invariable concomitance[74] is proved by perception, nor even by inference, since there is no three-aspected mark[75] of connection in that case.

(80.22) Furthermore, according to an oft-quoted maxim, the operation of causal efficiency is pervaded by succession or nonsuccession. If pervaded by succession, how [can it be pervaded] by nonsuccession? And, if at any moment $x$ [it is pervaded] by nonsuccession, then during $x$ it is not [pervaded] by succession. But then, by saying that it is pervaded by succession or nonsuccession, precisely the lack of pervasion is truly indicated. For surely fire is not pervaded by the absence or by the presence of smoke. Hence pervasion is uncertain.[76]

(80.26) In addition it is asked whether (i) that opposition[77] proves the nonexistence[78] of nonmomentary entities. (ii) On the contrary, perhaps [it proves] the negation[79] [or removal] of reality[80] from a nonmomentary entity; (iii) or perhaps there is an invariable concomitance of momentariness with reality.

(80.28) The first horn of the trilemma must be rejected[81], since the reason will be *āśrayāsiddha* in the said manner.[82]

[68] *prakārasya.*
[69] *viśeṣa.*
[70] '*śeṣa*': (literally) 'that which remains'.
[71] *aniścayo.*
[72] *viprakarṣiṇām.*
[73] *atyantaparokṣatvāt.*
[74] *pratibandhaḥ.*
[75] '*liṅga*' here abbreviates '*trirūpa liṅga*'.
[76] *anaikāntikatvam.*
[77] Viz., between a permanent entity and successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency.
[78] *asattām.*
[79] *vyatirekam.*
[80] *sattvasya.*
[81] *na pūrvo vikalpah.*
[82] *uktakrameṇa.*

(80.29) Nor does the second [hold], since the meaning of the word 'negation' is that the denial of the pervadendum[83] is entailed by the denial of the pervader.[84] And if that [denial of the pervader] results from perception, then there will be a real reason. Hence the reality [of a nonmomentary] entity will be uncertain. The nonperception of a pervader will be inconclusive because the nature of the reason will be incompatible with the supposed locus.[85] Hence that [denial] must be called into question, since a conceptual construction[86] ascertainable in five ways – according to the methods mentioned earlier[87] – is liable to be defective.

(81.1) For this very reason the third[88] horn of the trilemma is also vitiated, since in the absence of proof of the contraposition of an assertion of concomitance[89], there is no proof of [that concomitance] relationship.

(81.2) A nonmomentary entity never manifests itself as a substratum in this case, as does, for example, the surface of the ground. Nor, in case an entity's inherent nature[90] is unperceived, can the nonperception of a pervader engender an internal image[91] without any visible object's being discerned.

(81.4) Moreover, if the intrinsic nature[92] of that [viz., the nonmomentary entity] is nonexistence[93], there will be *āśrayāsiddhi* and also a vicious circle.[94] And if it has existence (qua real presence) as its nature, there will be a contradiction; and if both [existence and nonexistence] there will be uncertainty. Thus the three faults cannot be circumvented.

(81.6) As was said before: "There is a contradiction if either successive or simultaneous production occurs in a nonmomentary entity." It would seem to follow that the very *contradicting*[95] is to be assumed as a consequence of the proof of contradiction, since the knowledge of that is inherent in the proof of contradiction. Consider, for example, the case of snow and fire or that of dependent and independent being.

(81.8) And although a nonmomentary entity may not be a real entity[96],

[83] *vyāpya.*
[84] *vyāpaka.*
[85] *svarūpāsiddhiḥ.*
[86] *vikalpo.*
[87] Vide (79.6).
[88] Viz., the hypothesis of invariable concomitance.
[89] '*vyatireka*' $=_{df}$ 'negation' (in the sense defined above – viz., the denial of the pervadendum follows from the denial of the pervader).
[90] *svabhāva.*
[91] *antarbhāvayitum.*
[92] *dharmatve.*
[93] '*abhāva*': (literally) 'absence'.
[94] *itaretarāśrayatvam.*
[95] '*virodhyapi*' = '*virodhin*' + '*api*'.
[96] *sanneva syāt* = *sat* + *na* + *iva* + *syāt.*

it is known as an object of negation[97], because it is able to produce knowledge, since whatever is absolutely unproductive is unknowable.[98]

(81.10) If it be argued that there is proof of contradiction through non-momentariness proved of a mere phenomenon[99], even this will be proved of the phenomenon as either real[100] or fictitious.[101]

(81.12) If real, how can it be devoid of real existence? And how can it be logically incompatible[102] with the operation of causal efficiency? To be real is to act with causal efficiency.

(81.14) But what if it is fictitious? Under those circumstances, is the contradiction real or imaginary? Since the contradiction is based on a fictitious locus of contradiction, to that extent it is not real – as, for instance, the contradiction in the case of the son of a barren woman. Thus, the contradiction is also imaginary. Hence, the negation[103] of real existence is not, in this case, real.[104] Thus universal momentariness has to be renounced.[105]

(81.17) Now we shall discuss that commentary communicated by our venerable teacher.[106]

(81.18) There is no nonmomentary entity – neither is it a real object for knowledge[107], nor does the reason have the defect of being *āśrayāsiddha* on that account. And thus even the supporting instance[108] may be dispensed with. Moreover, relative [reality][109] is proved by two means. Strictly speaking, Existence and non-Existence are not [proved]. Really there cannot be proof of the logical opposition of succession, etc. with a permanent entity which is an [absolute] nonentity.[110]

(81.23) [At this point Ratnakīrti begins an explication and defense of] his own theory.[111] Surely in the case of a real entity[112] an attribute may be ascribed to a subject[113]; for instance, *cowness* [as ascribed] to a cow, *white-*

97 *'pratiyogin'* $=_{df}$ 'object of negation', 'counterpositive of an absence', negatum.
98 *'ajanakasyāprameyatvāt'*: (literally) 'because of the not being an object of knowledge of that which is unproductive'.
99 *'saṃvṛti'* $=_{df}$ 'illusion', 'phenomenal veil', 'surface reality'.
100 *vāstavaṃ.*
101 *kālpanikaṃ.*
102 *virodhaḥ.*
103 *vyatirekaḥ.*
104 *kṣaṇabhaṅgo.*
105 *dattajalāñjalir.*
106 I.e., by Jñānaśrīmitra.
107 *pratītiviṣayas.*
108 *sapakṣo.*
109 *śūnya.*
110 Quoted from Jñānaśrīmitra's *Lecture on Universal Momentariness*, p. 89. See also *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*, p. 565, line 2.
111 *atrocyate.*
112 *vastunyapi.*
113 *dharmidharmavyavahāro dṛṣṭo.*

*ness* to a cloth, motion to a horse, etc. Just so [mutatis mutandis] an attribute may be ascribed to a subject which is an unreal entity – for instance, *absence of sharpness* [ascribed] to the horn of a hare, *absence of power of speech*[114] [ascribed] to the son of a barren woman, *absence of fragrance* [ascribed] to a sky lotus, etc. According to one view, an unreal entity cannot function as the subject of an assertion.[115] Does it [viz., the unreal entity] then lack subjecthood with respect to [the ascription] of a *real* attribute? But even if this were so, [would it] also [be the case] with respect to [the ascription of] an unreal attribute?

(81.27) As regards the first thesis [viz., the denial that a *real* attribute may be ascribed to an *unreal* subject], it is tautological.[116] But as regards the second [the denial that an *unreal* attribute may be predicated of an *unreal* subject], it is self-contradictory. As our revered teachers have said[117]:

(81.28) One can discuss (i) whether or not in this case there is an irregularity[118] or contradiction proved in the conception of an arbitrary attribute [ascribed] to[119] an unreal entity. (ii) Are there any significant objections extant? (iii) Is it certain that there is no counterproof?

(82.1) Since an unreal entity, to whose subjecthood there is prior agreement, lacks a pervader, this means one can demonstrate that the objection of *āśrayāsiddhi* is unfounded.[120] For, by whatever words the subjecthood of an unreal entity is disallowed, just by those very words the subjecthood [of that unreal entity] with respect to the attribute *nonsubjecthood*[121] is admitted. But the preceding[122] is disallowed – it is manifestly the caprice of Īśvara in its arbitrariness. For the assertion that an unreal entity truly lacks subjecthood admits of three alternative [interpretations]. Either nonsubjecthood is [established] (i) in an unreal entity, (ii) or elsewhere, (iii) or nowhere at all.

(82.6) The first alternative does not involve the denial of an unreal entity's subjecthood, since the very [assertion] of the statement in question[123] ascribes the attribute *nonsubjecthood*.

(82.7) How could the second alternative be directed towards an unreal entity, since it asserts that nonsubjecthood is elsewhere?

114 *abhāvo*.
115 Literally: 'There is no subjecthood of an unreal entity'.
116 '*siddhasādhanam*' =dt (literally) 'the proving of something already proved'.
117 Jñānaśrīmitra, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya*, p. 89.
118 *avidhi*.
119 (literally): existing in.
120 See (82.22).
121 *dharmitvābhāvena dharmeṇa*.
122 Viz., the proposition that an unreal entity cannot serve as subject for *any* predicate.
123 *tatra*.

(82.8) But the third alternative is simply meaningless, because there is no locus[124] at all. Hence, how could it involve the denial of an unreal entity's subjecthood? Thus, just as the establishment of a *pramāṇa* presupposes an object of knowledge[125], and just as the establishment of an expression as designative[126] presupposes the entity which is designated[127] – in the same way, the establishment of the assertion that an unreal entity lacks subjecthood presupposes the subjecthood of that unreal entity. The reason for this is that otherwise the assertion of that statement would be meaningless.

(82.11) [Objection.] But in that case, if the establishment of that statement involves a pervadendum[128], then assent to the subjecthood of an unreal entity necessarily involves a pervader[129] as well. But there is no pervader.[130] Thus it is impossible to prove even the assertion of a pervadendum, and therefore mere silence must necessarily be resorted to in this matter. Under these circumstances, how can one avoid proof of self-contradiction?

(82.15) As [one] teacher has said, one cannot, indeed, communicate the highest knowledge without speaking. [And yet] speaking gives rise to the [foregoing] objections. Thus one enters into great difficulty.

(82.17) [Ratnakīrti's rejoinder.] It might be argued that precisely the silence of the sages is appropriate for making allusion to an unreal entity. Such sublime sagacity! [Our opponent] wishes to withdraw by means of the following explanatory rule[131]: *If reference is made to an unreal entity, silence alone is entirely appropriate, insofar as one is able* (according to a rule of Nyāya). Neither can reference to an unreal entity be prohibited without absolute authority nor [can it be prohibited] by a mere [arbitrary] decree of [its] undesirability[132], by annihilating [it] in dealing with [it], etc. And, therefore, in this case, if the absence of succession or nonsuccession is the probans, and if the absence of reality[133] is the probandum, how can one disallow subjecthood of a nonmomentary entity, whether [it be construed] as an unreality or as a doubtful reality?

(82.22) Indeed it is obvious that there are three kinds of attributes. (i) Certain attributes are established as [wholly] real – for instance, *blue*. (ii)

[124] *nirāśrayatvād.*

[125] '*prameyatvasvīkāra pūrvakatvena vyāptaḥ*' (devolves on pervasion by a prior agreement to an object of knowledge).

[126] *vācaka.*

[127] *vācya.*

[128] *vyāpya.*

[129] *vyāpaka.*

[130] Vide, e.g., (77.11).

[131] '*paribhāṣā*': 'meta-rule', 'interpretative rule'.

[132] '*aniṣṭi*': (literally) 'a nondesideratum', 'nonseeking'.

[133] *sattvābhāva.*

Others are [wholly] unreal – e.g., *the negation of all that is discernable.* (iii) Still others are partly real and partly unreal[134] – such as mere *nonperception.*[135] Thus, denial of the subjecthood of an unreal entity with respect to [the ascription] of any *real* attribute is valid, but not [denial] with respect to [the ascription] of an *unreal* attribute, nor, again, denial in the case of an attribute [partly] *real* and [partly] *unreal.* Hence it follows that whether in the case of the nonexistence of a nonmomentary entity or even in the case of doubt [as to its existence], its subjecthood with respect to an *unreal* attribute is not contradictory, since [if it were], this would entail the indeterminacy[136] of one's own assertion. Therefore nonperception of a pervader does not engender an argument which is *āśrayāsiddha.*

(82.27) But it is a well-established[137] fact that if there is no knowledge[138] of a nonmomentary entity, then the reason will be *āśrayāsiddha*. This is because, if knowledge of it [viz., a nonmomentary entity] is wholly lacking, it is impossible to make use of[139] it at all. But knowledge, which is a [crucial] part of such usage, is not uniform with respect to what is real and what is unreal. For, because it has real capacity[140], there is both direct and indirect knowledge of a *real* entity – in perception, inference, and conceptual construction[141] (which is based on perception). But, because of the lack of real capacity in the case of an *unreal* entity, knowledge in this case comprises conceptual construction alone. For, knowledge of a real entity is engendered through [its] real potency[142], directly in perception and indirectly in inference and in conceptual construction based on perception. [But] knowledge of an unreal entity is not engendered through [its] real potency, since it would relinquish [its] unreality by producing that [knowledge]. Hence, knowledge of an unreal entity consists of mere conceptual construction alone.

(83.4) Nor, indeed, is absence[143] anything autonomous.[144] Rather, it is that which is amenable to direct consideration and use – and this use[145], albeit grounded in a conceptual construction, is indeed valid. Otherwise one

134 '*ubhayasādhāraṇo*': (literally) 'having something of both'.
135 '*anupalabdhi*' = 'the negation of the hypothetically assumed presence of something'.
136 *svavacanasyānupanyasa.*
137 *yuktam.*
138 *pratītau* (here written '*pratītāv*' because of *saṁdhi*).
139 '*vyavahāra*': 'use in communication'. Vide J. F. Staal's 'Review of R. Gnoli's critical edition of the first chapter of Dharmakirti's *Pramāṇavārttikam*', *JAOS* **84** (1964) 92.
140 *vastusāmarthya.*
141 '*vikalpa*': 'conceptual construction', 'logical fiction', 'idea'.
142 *vastubala.*
143 '*abhāva*': 'nonbeing', 'negation', 'absence'.
144 *vigrahavān.*
145 *vyavahāra.*

would not be able to deal with an unreal entity at all, as everyone knows. And [being able to deal with[146] an unreal entity] is a desideratum.[147]

(83.6) And because negation[148] is invariably connected with its subjecthood, a nonmomentary entity should be accepted as established through mere conceptual construction, even by our reluctant [opponents]. Hence one ought not to say that the reason is *āśrayāsiddha*, since knowledge of that [conceptual construction] is surely not lacking. And the foregoing is our explanation[149] of the nonmomentary's being established from a mere conceptual construction.

(83.9) The objection is raised that, because a merely conceptual subject is trivially available, no reason will ever be locusless.[150]

(83.10) This objection is unfounded because, even if a subject proved to be a mere concept can occur under any circumstances, [its] subjecthood with respect to a [positive] *real* attribute is impossible. As regards an inference which has a [positive] *real* attribute as reason, the reason may surely be *āśrayāsiddha*.

(83.11) Consider the example whose probans is: "because its properties are universally apprehended" (mentioned for the purpose of proving the omnipresence of the *ātman*). And since the reason is alluded to, [the subject] is [entertained as] a conceptual construct – at first as a doubtful real, but, after the reason is carefully considered, we declare [the subject] to be unreal.

(83.14) And certainly this [viz., the case of a nonmomentary entity] does not involve the fallacy[151] of a doubtful subject.[152] (In a certain sense the two really existed [–namely, as concepts].) For there is proof that what is determined to be a mere conceptual construct – a doubtful or an unreal entity – may serve as subject for an *unreal* attribute. The fallacy of a doubtful subject [can be] established only when considering a case having a [positive] *real* attribute as reason. For example: "Here in the thicket there is a peacock, since there are cries." But the unreality[153] of that which has an unreal conceptual construct as its object is proved just from the nonperception of a pervader. Thus the subjecthood of the heavenly entities, hell, etc. and also of the example [under consideration] is mere conceptual knowledge and is intended to be understood as such. The reason is not one which is *āśrayāsiddha* because knowledge (via mere conceptual construction) of an *unreal*

[146] 'to deal with' here means 'to use in communication'.
[147] *iṣyate.*
[148] *pratiṣedha.*
[149] '*yaduktam*': (literally) 'what is said'.
[150] Vide (79.4).
[151] *hetudoṣaḥ.*
[152] *sandigdhāśrayatvaṃ.*
[153] *asattvaṃ.*

subject qualified by an *unreal* attribute, is impossible to deny. Nor is the example defective.[154]

(83.20) Nor is this [inference] inconclusive because the nature of the reason is incompatible with that of the locus or subject, because, if there is a nonmomentary subject, it is *impossible* to have either succession or non-succession as pervaders. For thus, if the first moment of that [nonmomentary entity] has the capacity for producing an effect which is to exist in the second, etc., moments, then an entity whose effect exists in the first moment might accomplish an effect which is to exist in the second, etc., moments as well. For delay of potential[155] is impossible.

(83.22) [The Realists' Counter-Argument.] But at that time [viz., in the first moment], capacity (defined as 'possession of the totality of cooperating factors')[156] is lacking, since incapacity (defined as 'the insufficiency of those factors') will prevail. An entity produces through its own nature, but not, to be sure, through its own nature alone. For the production of an effect is experientially observed to follow just in consequence of a conjunction of cooperating factors.

(83.24) [Ratnakīrti's reply.] Meanwhile, whenever those factors have combined[157], what would serve to prevent their cooperation (which in its essence is their acting with unity of intention for the purpose of producing an effect)? But then that effect must be produced just through the agency of the combined [factors] – thus how does it follow? For a [permanent] entity [supposedly] has a single intrinsic nature in prior and subsequent times, which would necessarily involve either[158] its producing or its not producing at all times. Therefore it is the totality which produces – not one [entity]. Thus the object of the advocates of permanence[159] is surely a fanciful one.

(83.29) If it be asked whether it is truly proved to be such, how do we proceed? Is it to be proved just because, since [a permanent entity] remains in its former condition afterwards as [one] entity existing in a totality, the effect is really produced by another entity, engendered by the particular totality immediately? This is the matter under dispute. [But] even if the previously mentioned situation were possible – viz., that an effect is produced either at all times or never at all – the mere explanatory repetition[160] of the thesis to be proved[161] (viz.: "Production of an effect is nothing more

[154] *dṛṣṭāntakṣatiḥ.*
[155] *samarthasya.*
[156] Vide (79.17).
[157] *amī militāḥ santaḥ.*
[158] *anyatara.*
[159] *sthiravādinām.*
[160] *anuvāda.*
[161] *sādhya.*

than not assembling mutually opposed phenomena"[162]) would deserve pity.

(84.3) Nor is there proof of [the permanent's] self-identity[163] just from recognition. For [there is spurious recognition even] of the destroyed and regenerated fragments of plant hair and grass in a thicket of banana trees, etc. And by an appropriate ramification we prove that the refutation of recognition is [inherent] in the refutation of the proof of permanence. Hence precisely this must be understood.

(84.6) [Objection.] Doesn't the effect alone require a cooperating agent, whereas the cause of the production of the effect does not? For there are two kinds of [causal] capacity: the innate and the adventitious.[164] Thus, since even a nonmomentary entity has a variety of successive cooperating factors, there are a variety of successive effects.

(84.8) Indeed, let there be two kinds of [causal] capacity, with a distinction between the innate and the adventitious. Even so, it has to be admitted that an entity characterized by production in a given moment has a real specific nature[165], uniquely individual. And if this be prior, it entails the priority of the effect as well. But [if this exists] only afterwards, then there is no *permanent* being.

(84.11) And since [a nascent] effect is not [yet] really existent[166], this proves that the effect does not require a cooperating factor [or agent]. Moreover, the cause albeit existent[167], if it doesn't produce its own effect, then the effect will not be truly an effect of that [cause], since [the effect] will be independent [of the cause].

(84.13) Of course [it may be objected] that whatever has an inherent disposition to produce a *later* effect may not produce that effect at first, since, at that [earlier] moment the inherent disposition to produce that effect is lacking. For thus the inherent disposition to produce blue does not also produce yellow, etc.[168]

(84.15) The objection is unfounded. For if an entity has a *permanent* inherent disposition [to produce an effect], why does this [effect] exist just at the later time and not at an earlier time? And since this [effect] is absent earlier, how can there possibly be a cause whose inherent disposition is [to produce] a later effect?

[162] *virodhamasamādhāya.*
[163] *ekatva.*
[164] Vide (79.20).
[165] *vastusvalakṣaṇaṃ.* See p. 52 for a discussion of the *svalakṣaṇa's* role in Buddhist epistemology.
[166] *tasyāsattvāt.*
[167] *sannapi.*
[168] Vide (79.26).

(84.17) What if it be said that that effect is produced just in the later time? If there is [supposed to be] permanence, the earlier nonproduction of that – viz., the effect – shall point to impermanence. If, in addition, our opponents say that in the case of a permanent entity, there is an inherent disposition whose last moment alone produces the effect, this is impossible.[169] Since it is impossible to assent to an inherent disposition [or nature] which is contradictory to means of valid knowledge, a nonmomentary entity cannot, indeed, produce successive effects. Nor can it produce nonsuccessive effects, since if an entity whose inherent nature is production exists in a second moment as well [as in a first], this will entail producing its effect again.

(84.21) Suppose it be argued that, in the case of a completed effect, the totality minus the operation which has that [effect] for its object may not bring about that which is effected.[170] This will not do! Since there is production just previously, it follows that production [of the effect] must be understood whenever the self-identical productive agent exists, whether or not the totality [of co-factors] is possible. But of course, since the effect is [already] completed, the impotent cause presents the mere inability to produce it again.

(84.23) Now let us consider the objection that the absence of the production of a successive or nonsuccessive effect is not proved in the case of a nonmomentary entity.[171] But there cannot be a qualifying term[172] different from the [disjunction of] succession and nonsuccession[173] because, if this disjunction is not pervasive[174], the reason [in the inference in question] will be a doubtful negative. For if one assumes that there is another term and that, moreover, there is an objection whether [the class defined by] this term be visible or invisible[175], the unreliability of this assumption follows. A class other than that [viz., the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession], which is a state of mutual exclusion of these alternatives[176], is impossible – since an inherent nature different from either the real or the unreal will have no form [or essence] of its own. In particular, succession cannot be the essence of this [supposed] other class. Thus pervasion of a real entity (together with [its] visible cooperating agents, with [its] distinction from because of [its] independence of a transcendent[177] cooperating agent, if [that agent be] in-

[169] '*abhāvādūnā*': (literally) 'deficient by the absence of'.
[170] Vide (80.8).
[171] Vide (80.13).
[172] *prakāra*. (See p. 59, footnote 33.)
[173] *kramākramābhyāmapara.*
[174] *tābhyāmavyāptau.*
[175] Vide (80.16).
[176] *anyo 'nyavyavacchedasthitir.*
[177] *atindriyasya.*

visible) by visible succession or nonsuccession is proved precisely by direct ocular evidence. Thus causal efficiency is pervaded by succession or nonsuccession; this means that causal efficiency is not established other than by [proving] its exclusion[178] from the state which mutually excludes succession and nonsuccession. Hence, it [viz., causal efficiency] does not exist if those two [succession and nonsuccession] are wanting.

(85.4) Moreover, as regards Trilocana's trilemma[179], the first adverse argument[180] is refuted by excluding [the possibility] of the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhi.*

(85.5) And the second is improper, since negation[181] is known through cognition of a conceptual construct [i.e., a concept]. For absence[182] does not possess any separate form which can be made fully perceptible – rather it ought to be dealt with just from its concept because both the discernment and nondiscernment of absence are always grounded in its concept. Surely in both cases [under consideration] a minus[183] is deduced by using that [concept]. Thus discernment of that which employs a negative reason[184] and of an instance which is heterogeneous follows from a mere concept.

(85.9) The third adverse argument is also improper, since the pervasion of reality by momentariness, [established] through a logically sound nonperception of a pervader, is noncontradictory.

(85.11) Just such nonperception of a pervader [establishes] the unreality of a nonmomentary entity. The situation is as follows: from a state characterized by a production[185], one proves pervasion by momentariness and thereupon the negation of [a nonmomentary entity's] reality.

(85.13) [Objection.] [It has been said] that it is the nonperception of a pervader. But if it is a case of mere nonperception, which is something unreal, then no cognition[186] of the probandum will be generated. Nor can one explain the nonperception of a pervader as the apprehension of something other [than the pervader] such as the ground, etc., since no other is perceived.[187]

(85.15) The foregoing objection is unfounded, since [our proof's being] established by means of nonperception elsewhere[188] is tantamount to the

178 *etatprakāradvayaparihāreṇa.*
179 *vikalpatraye.*
180 Vide (80.28).
181 *vyatirekasya.*
182 *abhāvaḥ.*
183 *hāni.*
184 *hetuvyatirekasya.*
185 *ekavyāpārātmakatvād.*
186 *buddhi.*
187 See (81.2).
188 *anyatra.*

apprehension of a substratum.[189] In the example involving a tree, the nonperception of a tree is the apprehension of a substratum – a mere place.[190] As, for instance: "Surely there is no *śiṃśapā*[191] here because there is no tree here." And, as regards the *śiṃśapā*, the apprehension of its absence is just the apprehension of a substratum, a mere place. Thus, nonperception of a pervader amounts to [the inference's] having self-identity as a reason.[192] So also the nonperception of successive or nonsuccessive production is grounded in the mere grasping[193] of a permanent subject (ascertained through cognition of a concept)[194] in relation to successive or nonsuccessive production. And, as regards causal efficiency, the knowledge of [a nonmomentary entity's] incompatibility[195] with causal efficiency is just mere knowledge. Hence this does not really differ from the other [case of] nonperception of a pervader.

(85.22) And, subject to the condition that an [imagined as] real[196], externalized nonmomentary entity depends on a noetic judgmental synthesis[197], the lack of a pervader proves that there is no pervadendum. And an act of judgmental synthesis ought to be recognized as the potency for [noetic] construction even when nothing is grasped [in sensation]. Such a synthesis is generated by an immediately preceding cognizance[198] of something connected with a particular present mental image.[199] Moreover, this noetic judgmental synthesis is described by us in the *Citrādvaitasiddhi*, and its noncontradictory establishment is impossible to refute. Hence, "Whatever lacks a pervader also lacks a pervadendum." For just this rule is also explained by our method. And the rule holds as well in the case involving an *unreal* substratum as it does in the case involving a *real* substratum. There is no difference.[200]

(85.27) For thus in the case being considered, [an attribute] is to be conceived as related [to its substratum] through cognition alone. For example, in the case of a deer's head, the apprehension of a horn is related through a mere cognitive act to that [deer's head]; moreover the horn is denied of a hare's head just through the assumption of a mere cognitional relationship with that [hare's head]. [Still other examples are attributes] such as non-

[189] *dharmyupalabdher*. See (86.10)–(86.11).
[190] *kevalapradeśasya*.
[191] '*śiṃśapā*' =$_{df}$ 'the Aśoka tree'.
[192] *svabhāvahetu*. See p. 75, footnote 89.
[193] '*grahaṇa*' =$_{df}$ 'grasping'.
[194] *vikalpabuddhyavasitasya*.
[195] *ayoga*.
[196] *vastuni*.
[197] *adhyavasāya*.
[198] *pratyaya*.
[199] *ākāra*.
[200] (Literally): 'What is the difference?'

absolute[201] [or empirical] permanence or impermanence, blue, etc. In like manner [the disjunction of] succession and nonsuccession is observed to be related through cognition alone with its own substratum. Let us assume[202] that the [disjunction of] the two [viz., succession, nonsuccession] can occur in a *permanent* entity, with a cognition grasping this permanent entity, whence the [disjunction of the] two will be situated in that which is grasped[203], with the permanent entity as substratum. The denial[204] that [such a situation] can be brought about by a mere cognition relating [succession or nonsuccession to a permanent substratum] follows [immediately]. Inasmuch as our opponents conceive of a permanent entity precisely as one [whose concept] is included in[205] [that of] succession or nonsuccession, how [can they explain that], although a permanent entity is cognized, neither succession or nonsuccession is manifested? It is for this very reason that the refutation emerges, for the preceding [assumption] is useless because it involves the imposition[206] of a form contradictory[207] [to the supposed substratum].

(86.6) Indeed permanence is associated with uniformity[208] throughout different times, while succession and nonsuccession are accompanied by distinct forms[209] in different moments. Thus it follows that there is an irresistible contradiction (whose essence consists of a state of mutual confutation) between the capacity[210] for successive or nonsuccessive effects and the state of permanence. Hence, given [the concept] of a permanent entity how can there [also] be an internal image[211] of succession or nonsuccession? And since such an image is lacking, [there remains the problem of] explaining how the superimposition[212] of repelled succession or nonsuccession is associated with the concept of a pure permanent entity. And consequently, even if a permanent entity be conceived as an object of negation[213] whose essence is attained through a mere cognitional relationship, it is precisely the nonperception of succession or nonsuccession[214] – the not being perceived of that which is incompatible with permanence – which is tantamount to the apprehension of the permanent. And this [in turn] is merely the nonper-

201 *apariniṣṭhita.*
202 *sambhāvanayā.*
203 '*gṛhya*': (literally) 'that which is to be grasped'.
204 '*pratiṣidhyate*': (literally) 'it is disallowed'.
205 *kroḍikṛtam.*
206 *āropam.*
207 *viparīta.*
208 *ekarūpatayā.*
209 *bhinnarūpatayā.*
210 *śakteśca.*
211 *antarbhāvaḥ.*
212 *samāropeṇa.*
213 See (81.8).
214 *kramākramasyānupalabdhiḥ.*

ception of the capacity for causal efficiency. Hence one cannot distinguish this [case] from other [cases of] nonperception of a pervader, which involve apprehension of a separate substratum for the pervader.

(86.13) Suppose it be objected that since the establishment of a *pramāṇa* requires a real basis, an unreal substratum will not be compatible with such a [requirement]. But what, exactly does this [requirement] of a real basis entail? (1) Does it involve origin from a real being, albeit indirectly; (2) or must there be a causal relationship, in some form or another with activity[215] involving a real entity; (3) or is there invariable concomitance in a real substratum?

(86.16) If the first alternative obtains, in that case the invariable concomitance of [the concepts of] succession or nonsuccession and causal efficiency is grounded in real data, attained by grasping a relation of pervasion.

(86.18) Likewise if the second thesis holds no fault is possible, since that [viz., a nonmomentary entity] is the means of proving that what is real is transient.[216]

(86.19) Nor is the last to be considered as a horn of a trilemma[217], since if the unreality[218] of an external, permanent material basis[219] which is successive or nonsuccessive entails the unreality of an external permanent material basis which is causally efficient – this much proves the existence of a substratum, real merely qua *concept* of that permanent entity. A rule of exclusion[220] is employed, since invariable concomitance is possible in a nonmomentary form which exists as a mere idea, real as a substratum.

(86.23) Just this rule [is to be used] in examples such as that of the barren woman's son not speaking because intellect is lacking, etc. By [a further application] of this [rule] to examples in which absence (such as that of a tree, etc.) is supposedly incapable of engendering internal images, Trilocana is refuted as well.

(86.25) Nor does the absence of succession, etc., give rise to the [aforementioned] three fallacies.[221] For, *āśrayāsiddhi* can be avoided even in cases characterized by absence.[222]

(86.26) But it is suggested that, in the proof of the unreality of permanent entities, absence[223] is established as the essential nature of the lack of suc-

[215] *vyavahāra.*
[216] *kṣaṇabhaṅgivastu.*
[217] Here '*vikalpa*' is used in its original sense. See also (80.28) and (85.4).
[218] '*śūnyatva*': (literally) 'lack of *absolute* reality'.
[219] *upādāna.*
[220] In this case the '*paryudāsa*' or 'rule of exclusion' applies to what is *other than* momentary and *exists qua* concept.
[221] Literally: 'Nor does the absence of succession, etc., fail to circumvent the three faults'. Vide (81.4).
[222] Literally: '... even if there is a case whose intrinsic nature is absence'.
[223] '*abhāva*': 'absence', 'negation'.

cession, etc., by means of a different *pramāṇa*. This is erroneous. For a permanent entity is the substratum [of our proof], unreality is the probandum, and the reason or [probans] is the nonproduction of either a successive or a nonsuccessive effect. And, indeed, absence as the intrinsic nature of that [reason] is shown to be necessarily connected with its own probandum – viz., unreality.[224] Thus, in the proof of the pervasion of reality by succession or nonsuccession, the absence of a pervader (succession or nonsuccession) is proved pervaded by the absence of a pervadendum (viz., reality [or real existence]).[225] Hence a reason whose intrinsic nature is absence is established correlatively with the proof of pervasion involving two positive terms, based on either one *pramāṇa* or the other – viz., perception or inference. Hence the proof is not circular.[226]

(87.7) And, since different logical rules [are employed][227], deduction in the case of [the concept of] a nonexistent object is not the same as [deduction] in the case of [the concept of] an existent object. For in the latter case both the probandum and the probans are [concepts of what is] real; their substratum is also real.

(87.9) But [the presence] of an [objectively] real entity is established by perception or inference. If those two fail to yield evidence, under certain conditions *āśrayāsiddhi* can be proved. But in a case having [the concept of] what is nonexistent as probans, if there is a substratum proved to be a mere concept, [objectively] *unreal*, an *unreal* attribute as reason cannot invalidate the proof by engendering *āśrayāsiddhi*. [In fact] it is precisely under circumstances of this sort that the contradiction of causal efficiency (either successive or simultaneous) with a nonmomentary entity is proved.

(87.13) So a nonmomentary entity is proved as contradicting [successive or simultaneous causal efficiency] just from its concept. Its nature is wholly circumscribed[228] [or delineated] by its concept and this is also the source of its pragmatic value. Otherwise, when referring to such [a nonmomentary entity], one could deny the lack of either succession or nonsuccession, etc.; for [the act of referring to the nonmomentary entity] would not clearly delineate the entity's own form, but that of another. All of this would render reference to a nonmomentary entity, a hare's horn, etc. impossible.[229] But [surely] such [reference] is made. Hence, just as, notwithstanding the lack

[224] '*asattva*': 'unreality', 'lack of real existence'.
[225] Vide (78.3).
[226] Literally: 'There is not the fault of mutually dependent loci'.
[227] *bhinnanyāyatvāt*.
[228] *ullikhitaścasya svabhāvo*.
[229] Literally: '... deduction of the nonarticulation of sound in the case of a nonmomentary entity, a hare's horn, etc.'.

of empirical evidence[230], one can [legitimately] deny that the son of a barren woman (proved to be a mere concept) is handsome; so also no fallacy is involved[231] [in asserting that] a contradiction arises from the superimposition of a form incompatible with the nature of a nonmomentary entity (also presented as a concept). And if [an opponent] wishes to disallow this contradiction, on the grounds that a nonmomentary entity is nonexperiential[232], he may not do so and simultaneously predicate the denial of handsomeness, etc. of the [equally] nonexperiential[233] son of a barren woman.

(87.20) [Objection.] Is not [this] contradiction lacking in ultimate reality[234]? Then the proof of universal momentariness based on this contradiction will also lack ultimate reality.[235]

(87.21) But surely we neither prescribe nor produce a contradiction as an [*independent*] relationship[236] whose foundation is erected on each of two alternative terms (not wholly real) which jointly act as its basis[237]; because then, if one of the terms related[238] happens to be unreal, the contradiction will lack ultimate reality. Rather, the contradiction [in this case] is ultimately real, just as is prescribed. The word 'contradiction' merely means 'the mutual confutation of natures of the two entities supposed contradictory' and just this is the ultimate reality in the case of '*p* and not-*p*'.[239] Absence cannot assume the form of presence, nor conversely. Precisely the rule of their mutual exclusion[240] is the true essence of a contradiction. Now permanence is a state of uniformity throughout different times, whereas [the disjunction of] succession and nonsuccession involves different forms in different moments. Thus a contradiction (viz., '*p* and not-*p*') does indeed exist between successive or simultaneous causal efficiency and permanence.

(88.1) [Objection.] But is not a contradiction something more than the mere repulsion between two mutually opposed attributes, succession or simultaneity [on the one hand] and permanence on the other; is it not something independently real?

(88.2) We answer that the ultimate reality of a contradiction does not consist in the occurrence of an additional attribute, but rather in the simul-

230 *pramāṇābhāve.*
231 Literally: 'Of what sort would the fault be?'
232 *anubhavābhāvād.*
233 Instead of '*anubhavād*' read '*ananubhavād*', as *S* does.
234 *apāramārthikatvam.*
235 Vide (81.14).
236 *sambandha.*
237 Literally: '... the assemblage of a relationship moving on both alternatives somewhat other than real'.
238 *yenaikasambandhino.*
239 *bhāvābhavayoḥ.*
240 *'yamanayorasaṃkaraniyamaḥ.*

taneous presence of the two mutually opposed attributes. Otherwise, even if there were an additional attribute (viz., *logical opposition*) in the absence of the two mutually opposed attributes, there would not really be a contradiction. Whenever the two mutually opposed attributes are simultaneously present, just then there is a true contradiction. [The foregoing answers the question of whether,] by the mere act of asserting it, a contradiction refers to another real attribute superadded [to the two mutually opposed attributes].

(88.7) Thus we have explicated our revered teacher's dictum:

There is no nonmomentary entity – neither is it a real object for knowledge nor does the reason have the defect of being *āśrayāsiddha* on that account. And thus even the supporting instance may be dispensed with. Moreover, relative [reality] is proved by two means. Strictly, Existence and nonExistence are not [proved]. Really there cannot be proof of the logical opposition of succession, etc. with a permanent entity which is an [absolute] nonentity.[241]

(88.12) This, then, is a summary of the established conclusion.

One can discuss (i) whether or not in this case there is an irregularity or contradiction proved in the conception of an arbitrary attribute predicated of an unreal entity. (ii) Are there any significant objections extant? (iii) Is it certain that there is no counter-proof?

(88.17) Thus a permanent entity is not connected with the production of either successive or nonsuccessive effects – this is the real import[242] [of our proof]; nor is it proved to have existence in the absolute sense.[243] And thus if one excludes [the extension of] succession or nonsuccession, there is no other class.[244] Hence that reality shown to be lacking in a nonmomentary entity is proved pervaded by virtue of its dependence on a momentary entity.[245] Thus by reason of real existence, the proof of universal momentariness is consistent.

(88.21) Knowing the fundamental nature[246] of all attributes, one desires salvation. The proof of universal momentariness is indeed a refutation of our opponents' [beliefs].

(88.23) This concludes the work of Ratnakīrti.

241 Vide (81.17). See also *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*, p. 565, line 2: *"na sattāsādhanaṃ kvāpi śaktiḥ sattā tu laukikī"*.
242 *paramārthaḥ*.
243 *sattāyuktam*.
244 *rāśyantarābhāvād*.
245 Vide (78.9).
246 *prakṛtiḥ*.

# NOTES

Ratnakīrti purports to defend a theory of instantaneous cyclic perishability and renewal. In this treatise the very word '*kṣaṇa*' or 'moment' acquires the meaning of 'that which is self-annihilating and therefore momentary'. Comparisons with flux philosophers of the West are, of course, apposite, and have been noted in the Introduction.

The crux of the proof employed herein is the principle of contraposition, accepted by both the Naiyāyika and Buddhist logicians. In (80.29) '*vyatireka*' is defined as:

(1) $(\Pi x)\,(\sim 0(vy\bar{a}paka, x) \supset \sim 0(vy\bar{a}pya, x))$.[1]

This, according to *KB*I (see, e.g., p. 65, lines 17–23) is logically equivalent to the *anvaya* or uncontraposed assertion of concomitance[2]:

(2) $(\Pi x)\,(0(vy\bar{a}pya, x) \supset 0(vy\bar{a}paka, x))$.

Now the *anvaya* version of the proof of universal momentariness has been established in *KB*I; hence (since (1) and (2) are supposed to be equivalent), the *vyatireka* version would seem to follow at once. However, Ratnakīrti deems the examination of the contraposed proof worthy of a separate study because the very possibility of such a proof devolves on the use of statements whose subject terms refer to concepts of 'unreal' or fictitious entities. This circumstance, according to Ratnakīrti's opponents, engenders the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhi*, thus vitiating the Buddhist argument. An adequate analysis of the ascription of attributes to subjects in general, leading to a precise delineation of the legitimate role of 'unreal' subjects, is therefore necessary if the Buddhist position is to stand.

First Ratnakīrti invokes Tārā[3] for an auspicious beginning.

[1] Here '$0(y, x)$' is read '*y* occurs in locus or substratum *x*', quantifier '$\Pi$' is read 'for all possible', '$\supset$' is read '(materially) implies'. See Introduction, p. 7. Hence, to say that invariable concomitance or pervasion (*vyāpti*) obtains is to say that the nonoccurrence of the pervader (*vyāpaka*) (in all possible loci) is pervaded by (implies) the nonoccurrence of the pervadendum (*vyāpya*) (in all these loci).

[2] See also Stcherbatsky, *BL*II, p. 143. (1) expresses *vyāpti* as the pervasion of the occurrence of the pervadendum by the occurrence of the pervader.

[3] See A. Danielou, *Hindu Polytheism*, pp. 276–7, for a brief description of the Buddhist worship of Tārā.

(77.4) The heterogeneous example or heterologue (*vaidharmyavati dṛṣṭānte*) customarily given in support of certain demonstrations is of diminished importance to Ratnakīrti's proof, because here pervasion (*vyāpti*) is a logical relationship of 'inner' concomitance between two concepts.[4] Hence the actual conjoint presence (in a homologue) of the two attributes functioning as *hetu* and *sādhya* in our proof (or their conjoint absence in a heterologue) has a psychological or corroboratory value, but its logical significance is nugatory.

(77.6) 'Whatever exists is momentary.'[5] This is the cornerstone of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda philosophy, here expressed in a verse which is a variant of one appearing in *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*, p. 5, where everything that is is said to be momentary, just as an ever-changing cloud is.[6] Upon a basis of momentary bursts of energy (*svalakṣaṇa*)[7] whose very essence or 'substantiality' consists in their capacity for causal efficiency, all the 'objects' of the phenomenal world are grounded. When correctly analyzed, reference to each phenomenal object can be shown to involve a conceptual construct indirectly related to a series of ineffable dynamic flashes. A given concept of a phenomenally real object does not 'correspond to' or 'directly reflect' any *svalakṣaṇa*; rather a relationship of negative co-ordination obtains between the two.[8]

In the direct version of the proof of momentariness (as presented in *KB*I), a jug – qua series of extremely similar (but nonetheless distinct) ever-changing momentary existents – is cited as a homologue, an exemplification of the momentariness of all that exists.

According to Dharmakīrti, in a valid deduction the connection between a reason (*hetu*) and its probandum (*sādhya*) is based on (1) existential identity (*tādātmya*), (2) causation (*tadutpatti*), or (3) negation (*anupalabdhi*).[9] The statement quoted in (77.6) can be subsumed under case (1). More explicitly, the *hetu* construed intensionally (extensionally) contains (is contained in) the *sādhya*.

(77.8) The Buddhist proof cannot be impugned on the grounds that it involves one of the three standard fallacies.[10] It is not an inconclusive proof

[4] See p. 12.
[5] $(\Pi x)\ (E(x) \supset 0\ (k\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x))$, where '*kṣaṇikatva*' $=_{df}$ 'momentariness'. This is equivalent to: $(\forall x)\ (0(k\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, x))$. See p. 9. For a definition of '$E(x)$' see p. 8.
[6] '*Yat sat tat kṣaṇikam yathā jaladharaḥ ...*'
[7] Note that Stcherbatsky sometimes renders '*svalakṣaṇa*' as '*Ding an sich*' because he feels the *svalakṣaṇa's* role in Buddhist epistemology bears some resemblance to that of the thing-in-itself in the Kantian system. This rendering turns out to be more misleading than helpful.
[8] See *KB*II, (85.22) plus my comments on p. 76, footnote 94.
[9] See, e.g., *BL*I, p. 254; *BL*II, p. 116. For more about (3), see *BL*I, part IV, chapter I.
[10] See p. 13.

(*asiddha*). Neither is it uncertain (*anaikāntika*) nor contradictory (*viruddha*), as will be shown in (77.10).

Note that Buddhist epistemology admits of only two means of valid knowledge – perception and inference.[11] I.e., legitimate evidence for ordinary knowledge must be either perceptual or inferential.

Rejecting the Platonism of their Naiyāyika rivals, who construe reality as participation or coinherence in a subsistent universal called '*sattā*'[12], the Buddhist logicians espouse a criterion of reality reminiscent of that of Leibniz.[13] ('*Esse*' is defined as '*efficere*' by Ratnakīrti and the other members of his school.)

(77.10) The reason or probans is not uncertain (*anaikāntika*).[14] I.e., the generalization that whatever exists (in the sense of being a causally efficacious entity) is *ipso facto* momentary is not uncertain. Nor is the probans of this generalization logically incompatible (*viruddha*) with its probandum. In the present case, showing that the probans is logically incompatible with the probandum would be tantamount to the establishment of the *contrary* opposite of the original assertion (viz., to proving that whatever exists is nonmomentary).[15] But there is evidence (viz., nonperception of a pervader)[16] which (1) serves as a basis for refuting the contrary opposite and (2) is

[11] '*pramāṇa*' =df 'means of valid knowledge'. See p. 10.
[12] '*sattā*' may be translated as 'Existence' or 'absolute existence'. For a critique of both '*sattāsambandha*' and '*sattāsamavāya*' (participation in and co-inherence in Existence, respectively) see S. Mookerjee, *BF*, p. 6.
[13] With proper reservations, the resemblances between the metaphysics of Leibniz and Ratnakīrti are worth noting. See, for instance, B. Russell's *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 45, wherein Leibniz is quoted as saying: "Wherefore I regard force as constitutive of substance, since it is the principle of action which is characteristic of substance." Of course it is a gross misunderstanding of Leibniz to say that he identified substance with a mere sum of forces passing into action. Rather, he regards substance as the *ground* or *substratum* whose essence is activity. Hence, although Leibniz would agree with the Buddhists in construing substantiality dynamically, he does differ from them in that he regards a substance as a self-identical subject (defined in terms of the persistence of a certain law) which is really distinguishable from its predicates. Another suggestive remark of Leibniz (*New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*) is noted by Russell on p. 233: "It must be known, to begin with, that force is indeed something truly real, even in created substances; but space, time and motion are of the nature of rational entities and are true and real, not of themselves, but in so far as they involve divine attributes – immensity, eternity, operation – or the force of created substances." Again (Russell, p. 88): "Leibniz thought, however, what the Calculus was likely to suggest, that the momentary increment was real in some way in which the whole sum of increments was not real."
[14] See p. 13.
[15] But (77.6) presents jug as a homologue (an instance of the co-occurrence of probans and probandum) – and this constitutes a counterexample to the contrary of the original assertion.
[16] This is not to posit nonperception as an additional (and independent) means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). See (78.3). For an explanation of the role of nonperception in the formulation of a negative judgment, see the notes to (85.15).

relevant to ruling out the *contradictory* opposite (to showing that there cannot be even a single instance of an objectively existent nonmomentary entity) as well. And, as will become clear below, to rule out the possibility of an instance contradicting a given general statement is logically equivalent to establishing the truth of that statement by establishing its contrapositive.[17]

(77.11) The remainder of the treatise is devoted to a detailed examination of the contraposed (*vyatireka*) version of the proof. All causal efficiency is either successive or nonsuccessive. Now, since anything real must be capable of either successive or nonsuccessive operation, a permanent or nonmomentary entity (lacking in capacity for either successive or nonsuccessive operation) is accorded the ontological status of a hare's horn.[18]

(77.12) Is nonperception of a pervader probative or not in the case involving a phenomenally unreal permanent entity as subject or substratum? It is hardly pertinent to point out that neither succession (*krama*) nor nonsuccession (*akrama*) has – *as a matter of fact* – been observed to pervade a permanent or nonmomentary (*akṣaṇika*) substratum. For such a substratum is, *ex hypothesi*, nonexperiential – wholly unobservable. Hence the proof cannot rest on the mere denial (on observational grounds) of the co-occurrence of nonmomentariness and the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession. The very *possibility* of their conjoint presence must be ruled out. Accordingly, Ratnakīrti shows that by its very definition, a nonmomentary (qua unchanging) entity is incompatible with either succession or nonsuccession. But the disjunction of this pair of mutually exclusive attributes characterizes all real objects.[19] Hence the nonoccurrence of either successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency in a nonmomentary entity serves as *hetu* or reason for Ratnakīrti's concluding that a nonmomentary entity – totally lacking in the capacity for activity – is not a real object. Ratnakīrti employs the standard philosophical arguments to force his opponents to jettison the notion of a really existent nonmomentary agent. He shows such an agent to be doomed to eternal iterated production on the one hand, or, on the other, to permanent barrenness, in case it fails to produce in any given moment.

[17] See (77.20)–(78.3).

[18] In Indian logic a hare's horn, a sky lotus, and the son of a barren woman are stock examples of unreal entities. Most authors make no clear distinction between (a) that which *does not* as a matter of fact exist at any time (e.g., a hare's horn) and (b) that which *cannot* exist because it is not self-consistent (e.g., the son of a barren woman). Is a nonmomentary entity to be construed in sense (a) or in sense (b)? Strictly speaking, it is assimilated with apparent indifference to examples of both kinds in this treatise, but several remarks of Ratnakīrti give the impression that a nonmomentary entity is not inconsistent, merely nonempirical. See the notes to (87.13).

[19] See p. 43.

(77.18) Permanence or self-identity (characteristic of nonmomentariness) and change or nonidentity (associated with successive or nonsuccessive causal efficacy) are mutually contradictory attributes.

(77.20) The argument is conclusive not merely because of the perception of extrinsic homogeneous or heterogeneous examples. Rather, its validity rests on the logical relationship between the intrinsic natures of the concepts concerned.[20] And these concepts are mutually incompatible. Hence one can make the *apodeictic* assertion that a nonmomentary entity is incapable of either successive or nonsuccessive production.

(78.1) According to the definition given on p. 13, a reason is *viruddha*, and therefore fallacious, if it is present in certain cases dissimilar (*vipakṣa*) to the probandum and absent in all similar cases (*sapakṣa*). Such a reason serves to establish the opposite of the original probandum (*sādhya*).

The reason or probans in the *anvaya* version of the proof is not logically incompatible with its probandum, as is clear from the notes to (77.10). Ratnakīrti goes on to cite a hare's horn (77.11) as neither successively nor nonsuccessively efficacious and therefore objectively unreal, as is a nonmomentary entity.[21] Hence we have an instance in which the *hetu* and *sādhya* of the *anvaya* proof coincide (viz., the jug) and another in which the two are conjointly absent (the hare's horn). *Mutatis mutandis* if one begins by considering the *vyatireka* proof, where the hare's horn might be construed as homologue[22], the jug as heterologue.

(78.2) Next Ratnakīrti must give detailed attention to the following consideration. In the case of a nonmomentary or permanent entity – unperceivable according to the Buddhists – nonperception of a pervader can at

[20] In other words, the pervasion in question is a relationship of inner concomitance (*antarvyāpti*). See p. 12.

[21] For some of Ratnakīrti's critics, the use of a momentary entity to exemplify the joint presence of attributes is inadmissible. Moreover, as S. Mookerjee notes (*BF*, p. 394): "In 'All that exists is momentary' ... 'momentariness' is predicated of all existents without exception and as such there is no homologue external to and apart from the subject, where the agreemental aspect could be verified." But the preceding (and other) objections to the proffered *sapakṣa* (and *vipakṣa*) are of very little consequence to our present proof. For, in his analysis of universal momentariness, Ratnakīrti presages Ratnākaraśānti in relying on an *internal* logical relationship between the *hetu* concept and the *sādhya* concept, rather than on examples in which the two relata co-exist.

[22] Except, of course, that in the traditional Indian systems an *unreal* homologue is considered inadmissible. Note, however, that the use of an unreal entity as *heterologue* is sanctioned by earlier members of Ratnakīrti's school (though not by the Naiyāyikas). Stcherbatsky (*BLII*, p. 114, footnote 1) cites the following rule governing the choice of heterologues: *"vastu avastu vā vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta iṣyate"*.

best yield a problematic or doubtful result. For, since a permanent entity is supposedly nonexperiential, nothing in experience can license a conclusive assertion of its real existence (or lack thereof). How, then, can one defend the derivation of the unreality of a permanent entity from the mere non-perception of its successive or nonsuccessive operation?

(78.3) Ratnakīrti reiterates the conclusion established in *KB*I that (1) whatever is capable of causal efficiency must act successively or nonsuccessively.[23] But if (1) is a theorem, then its equipollent contrapositive is also logically necessary.[24] Hence (2) whatever is incapable of successive or nonsuccessive production cannot be said to possess the capacity for causal efficiency. I.e., the disjunction of the occurrence of succession and nonsuccession exhausts all possibilities for causal efficiency. And from the nonmomentary entity's incapacity for either successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency, its unreality *necessarily* follows.

(78.10) The possibility of *indirect* or *reductio ad absurdum* proof (*prasaṅgahetu*) is excluded – Ratnakīrti's method of procedure obviously does not involve deriving a contradiction as a result of incorporating the negation of the desired conclusion among the premisses.[25]

But, to employ an unreal entity as locus or substratum in a *direct* proof is, according to Ratnakīrti's opponents, to commit the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhi*. A nonmomentary entity is therefore logically unacceptable as subject.

(79.1) The real crux of the objection to a nonmomentary subject is that a nonmomentary entity is either wholly unknowable, or, if we assume access to it by the usual avenues of cognition, it turns out to be a self-contradictory

[23] Where '*arthakriyāsāmarthya*' $=_{df}$ 'capacity for causal efficiency', and '0', '*krama*' and '*akrama*' are as defined above, we have: (1) $(\Pi x)$ (0(*arthakriyāsāmarthya*, $x$) $\supset$ (0(*krama*, $x$) $\vee$ 0(*akrama*, $x$))).

[24] "*na ca vyatirekaprasādhakamanyat pramāṇaṃ vaktavyam. tataśca sādhyābhāve sādhanasyaikāntiko vyatirekaḥ. sādhane sati sadhyasyāvasyamanvayo veti na kaścidarthabhedaḥ. tadevaṃ viparyayabādhakapramāṇamantareṇāpi prasaṅgāprasaṅgaviparyayahetudvayabalād-anvayarūpavyāptisiddhau sattvahetoranaikāntikatvasyāmāvādataḥ sādhanāt kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiranavadyeti.*" *KB*I, p. 65, lines 20–23. See also *KB*II (86.26) of this translation, where the assertion that no additional *pramāṇa* is needed in the contraposed proof is repeated and reinforced.

[25] The term '*prasaṅgahetu*' means literally 'a falsely assumed reason'. The term '*prasaṅgānumāna*' is the Indian analogue (with minor qualifications) of 'reductio ad absurdum proof'. According to Mookerjee (*BF*, pp. 402–3): "The requisite conditions of *prasaṅgānumāna* are that (1) the probans (*hetu*) is false and assumed for argument's sake on the statement of the opponent and is not accepted as true by the arguer (*vādin*) himself, and (2) consequently the probandum is a false issue which is forced upon the adversary; (3) the main implication of such argument is of course the truth of the contradictory position, which decisively invalidates the assumption of the adversary."

concept. For, suppose that a nonmomentary entity has causal efficacy – at least to the minimal extent that it produces knowledge of itself by perception or inference. It is therefore a cognizable object. But cognizability is too inclusive an attribute to function as a reason (*hetu*) in a valid demonstration. Since cognizability characterizes all heterogeneous (*vipakṣa*) as well as all homogeneous (*sapakṣa*) cases, it cannot provide justification for any definite conclusion.

Moreover, the capacity to produce cognition is simply a special case of efficacy in general. As such, it can only be exerted successively or nonsuccessively. But both succession and nonsuccession are logically incompatible with a nonmomentary locus.

(79.4) And, if one imputes a merely conceptual status to a nonmomentary entity, this amounts to condoning the arbitrary conjuring up of merely conceptual substrata, whenever and wherever they are needed. The force of those rules which comprise the critical apparatus for distinguishing logically sound subjects from those which are unsound would thereby be lost.

(79.6) The Buddhist theory of concept formation will be elaborated in (85.22). For now Śaṃkara's[26] discussion of conceptual cognition vis-à-vis a nonmomentary entity continues.

(79.8) Is the concept of a nonmomentary entity based on perception or inference? But each of these, in turn, presupposes the real existence of its object. Hence it is inconsistent to conceive of a nonmomentary entity as not really existent if alternative (i) or (ii) obtains.

(79.9) And memory (alternative (iii)) is a source which is, in the long run, based on the prior occurrence of cognition through (i) or (ii).

(79.10) If the ontological status of a nonmomentary entity is in doubt, how can anything be predicated of it?

(79.11) If the term 'nonmomentary' refers to the concept of an absolutely unreal entity, then neither perception nor inference will suffice to inform us with certainty of its nonexistence.[27] So we are left in a quandary.

[26] Here the reference is to Śaṃkarasvāmin, a post-Dharmakīrti Naiyāyika, whose works seem to be lost. See A. Thakur, *JN*, p. 19.

[27] "When there are altogether no means of cognition, the nonexistence of the object cannot be established" (T. Stcherbatsky, *BL*II, p. 107).

(79.14) There is a further objection to the contraposed version of the Buddhist proof of universal momentariness. Śaṃkara disallows the absence of the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession as a *hetu* in a proof whose substratum is a nonmomentary or permanent entity. He avers that a nonmomentary entity is indeed capable of successive or nonsuccessive production and that, consequently, the denial of the attributes succession and nonsuccession is incompatible with a nonmomentary entity's intrinsic nature. In this passage, Śaṃkara's cavalier replacement of '*kramākrama*' by '*krama-yaugapadya*' shows that for him '*akrama*' and '*yaugapadya*' are mere stylistic variants for one another.[28]

(79.17) In *KB*I, p. 69, lines 9–11, this passage is repeated verbatim.

(79.20) Trilocana's[29] theory of innate vs. adventitious causal efficacy is also taken up in *KB*I (p. 70, lines 18–20), wherein the assumption of auxiliary co-operating factors is subsequently shown to be gratuitous.

(79.24) The *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* is the Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña's autocommentary on the *Nyāyasāra*. For further particulars, see A. Thakur, *RN*, pp. 24–26.

(79.26) The notion of a *permanent* inherent disposition, which produces its effects at some later time and only then, will be examined and rejected as inconsistent in (84.13)–(84.21).

(80.1) Vācaspati[30] counters the charge that a permanent entity, since its nature is unchanging, is under constraint to produce all its effects in any given moment of its existence or remain forever barren.

(80.4)–(80.8) According to Vācaspati, the nature of any given real entity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the production of its effects. Auxiliary factors also come into play.[31] Hence, given a 'cause', its effects

[28] The term '*akrama*' is the proper contradictory of '*krama*'. The two are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of all modes of causal efficacy. Since Śaṃkara supplies no arguments for his treatment of '*yaugapadya*' ('*yaugapadya*' $=_{df}$ 'simultaneity') and '*akrama*' ('*akrama*' $=_{df}$ 'nonsuccession') as intersubstitutable, it is probable that he makes no distinction between the two.

[29] Trilocana is the Naiyāyika author of the *Nyāyamañjari.* See A. Thakur, *JN*, p. 20.

[30] See *RN*, p. 27, for additional information on Vācaspati Miśra, the Naiyāyika, said to be a '*sarvatantrasvatantra*' (independent authority in all the systems of philosophy). See also Stcherbatsky, *BL*II, pp. 257–308.

[31] "Things possess duration and (during the time their existence lasts) they gradually produce their results, by successively combining with the totality of causes and conditions which create together a (stable) result" (*BL*II, appendix i: 'Vācaspati Miśra on the Buddhist Theory of Perception', p. 297).

need not inevitably follow. A cause can exist without its effect(s) but not conversely. Vācaspati's position is strikingly reminiscent of those arguments directed against the Spinozistic conception of cause and effect as mutually implicative.[32]

(80.13)–(80.18) The gravamen of Vācaspati's argument in this passage is that the contraposed (*vyatireka*) version of the proof is doubtful because the uncontraposed (*anvaya*) proof has never been conclusively established. In the direct proof, the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession is said to exhaust all possible modes of causal efficacy (and hence of reality). But perhaps there is still another kind of causal efficacy in which case reality (defined as causal efficacy) will not be pervaded by the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession. Ratnakīrti's rebuttal is found in (84.23)–(85.4).

Note that I have used the neutral word 'term' to translate '*prakāra*', an expression which is rendered as 'chief qualifier' or 'mode' by some translators, and as 'class' by others. A term construed intensionally is an attribute or qualifier – extensionally, it is a class. The extent to which Indian logic as a whole is intensional is still a moot point, pending the careful study of a vast corpus of texts.[33] As it happens, Ratnakīrti's treatment of logic is, in the main, intensional, though this does not reflect an act of conscious choice on his part, for he has no clear-cut intensional-extensional dichotomy in mind.[34] To affix the label 'non-extensional' to Ratnakīrti's system is to tidy things up at the expense of a genuine understanding of those nuances of his analysis which make the label not wholly appropriate.

(80.19) There is a further objection that if both succession and simultaneity are unperceivable, then *a fortiori* so is that which they pervade (i.e., the *vyāpya*). By way of illustration, consider first a less problematic case. Let 'tree' be the pervader (*vyāpaka*) and '*śiṃśapā*'[35] the pervadendum (*vyāpya*). Then, if no tree is perceived in a given place, it follows that no *śiṃśapā* is perceived there. But what is the status of a deduction in which both *vyāpaka* and *vyāpya* are not only unperceived, but also unperceivable? It is argued

[32] See, e.g., Spinoza's *Ethics*, Proposition XXXV and his *Short Treatise* I, 4, § 1. See (84.6)–(84.21), this translation, for a further discussion of this point.
[33] For recent and penetrating discussions of this matter, see B. K. Matilal, 'The Intensional Character of Lakṣaṇa and Saṁkara in Navya-Nyāya', *Indo-Iranian Journal* **8** (1965) 85–95, and J. F. Staal, 'The Theory of Definition in Indian Logic', *JAOS* **81** (1961) 126.
[34] The conclusions reached by Ruth Barcan Marcus in her 'Classes and Attributes in Extended Modal Systems', *Acta Philosophica Fennica* **16** (1963) 123–36, are germane to our present discussion.
[35] A kind of tree (viz., the Dalbergia Sissoo).

that neither perception nor inference will suffice to establish invariable concomitance in such a situation.

(80.22) Next, Ratnakīrti's opponent plays on the equivocation arising because in the Sanskrit *dvandva* compound '*kramākrama*' (which expresses the concatenation of succession and nonsuccession), the exact logical relationship between 'succession' and 'nonsuccession' is not explicitly indicated. Rather, as is usually the case with such compounds, the connective between the relata is to be contextually determined.

Moreover, the lack of an instrument refined enough to indicate scope as precisely as a quantifier[36] (with its attendant parentheses) does, merely compounds the ambiguity. But it should be obvious that neither Ratnakīrti nor any able Indian logician ever entertained the mistaken belief that fire is pervaded by smoke.[37] Examples of smokeless fires are easy enough to come by. Nor would Ratnakīrti have committed the equally serious error of supposing that fire is pervaded by the *absence* of smoke, since many fires are obviously smoky. I.e., Ratnakīrti would certainly deny that either all fiery things are smoky or else that all fiery things are not smoky. On the other hand he would surely want to assert that every fiery thing is either smoky or not smoky.

Bringing the 'fire-smoke' illustration to bear on the central case involving the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession, it is clear that the line of attack against Ratnakīrti presented in (80.22) is ill-conceived. For Ratnakīrti's assertion that causal efficiency is pervaded by succession or nonsuccession may be symbolized as follows:

(1) $(\Pi x)\,[0(\textit{arthakriyākaritva}, x) \supset [0(\textit{krama}, x) \vee 0(\textit{akrama}, x)]]$.

And since *arthakriyākaritva* is the hallmark of existence[38], (1) may be rewritten as:

(2) $(\Pi x)\,[E(x) \supset (0(\textit{krama}, x) \vee 0(\textit{akrama}, x))]$.

But (2) in turn is equivalent to:

(3) $(\forall x)\,[0(\textit{krama}, x) \vee 0(\textit{akrama}, x)]$.[39]

[36] For a concise discussion of the significance of Frege's introduction of the quantifier to modern Western logic, see W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, pp. 485ff, p. 511. See D. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, p. 50, also pp. 59–61, for comments on the Navya-Nyāya use of abstract properties to express some of the facts which Western logic expresses by quantification.
[37] The converse is, of course, true in Indian logic. I.e., the truism 'Where there's smoke, there's fire' is commonly used for purposes of illustration by both Buddhist and Nyāya logicians.
[38] See p. 8.
[39] See p. 9, footnote 32.

Now Ratnakīrti's opponent either ignores or blurs the distinction between (3) and:

(3′) $(\forall x)\, 0(krama, x) \vee (\forall x)\, 0(akrama, x)$.[40]

I.e., to say that all causal efficacy is operative either successively or nonsuccessively (which is the import of (3)) is *not* logically equivalent to asserting that either all causal efficacy is operative successively or else that all causal efficacy is operative nonsuccessively (which is the import of (3′)). Consequently, since (1) does not yield (3′), Ratnakīrti is not guilty of asserting (3′), either explicitly or as an implicate of (1).

(80.26) Less obliquely put, since successive and nonsuccessive causal efficiency are held by the Buddhists to be attributes inconsistent with nonmomentariness, are we to conclude: (1) that a nonmomentary entity does not exist at all, (2) that it exists, but only as a concept – a mere logical fiction – or (3) that whatever is real is necessarily momentary?

(80.28) In (80.28)–(81.2), Trilocana presents objections to the three immediately preceding interpretations of the Buddhist conclusion. Each of these adverse arguments will be refuted in turn by Ratnikīrti in (85.4)–(85.11). The first is the familiar charge of *āśrayāsiddhi*.[41] If a nonmomentary entity is (by the Buddhist's own admission) nonexistent, how can it function as the subject or locus of an inference?

(80.29) Recall that in a direct proof the pervader (*vyāpaka*) is entailed by (or pervades) the pervadendum (*vyāpya*). I.e.:

(1) $(\Pi x)\, [0(vy\bar{a}pya, x) \supset 0(vy\bar{a}paka, x)]$.

Thus in the contraposed proof being analyzed in this treatise, the denial of the pervader functions as *hetu* or reason, while the denial of the pervadendum acts as *sādhya*. In symbols:

(2) $(\Pi x)\, [\sim 0(vy\bar{a}paka, x) \supset \sim 0(vy\bar{a}pya, x)]$.

Now it is assumed by Trilocana (and by the Naiyāyika logicians in general) that to deny something presupposes the autonomous reality of that which is denied. It follows that the foregoing denial of the occurrence of the pervader is somehow tantamount to the positing of a *real* reason. And such a reason will be incompatible with a nonmomentary locus which, according to alternative (2) is *unreal*, because it is merely conceptual.

[40] Via a trivial demonstration it can be shown that: $[(\forall x)\, 0(krama, x) \vee (\forall x)\, 0(akrama, x)] \supset (\forall x)\, [0(krama, x) \vee 0(akrama, x)]$. But the *converse* relationship does not hold.
[41] See p. 13.

(81.1) The same inferential anomaly[42] which obstructs the progress of the *contraposed* proof will also render inconclusive the corresponding direct assertion of the concomitance of momentariness with reality, since the two are logically equivalent.

(81.2) Still another critical comment notes that knowledge of the absence of succession and nonsuccession is contingent on the perception of a real locus or substratum which lacks the attributes in question. It is contended that the wholly unperceivable nonmomentary entity is unfit for the role of substratum.[43]

(81.4) The charge of *āśrayāsiddhi* has already been made above. The vicious circle arises as follows: "The nonmomentary cannot be a reality because causal agency in succession or nonsuccession is incompatible with it and the latter is incompatible, because the nonmomentary is unreal."[44]

The three faults are the three fallacies of the reason described on p. 13. Any argument whose reason (*hetu*) is either inconclusive (*asiddha*), uncertain (*anaikāntika*), or logically incompatible with its *sādhya* (*viruddha*) is logically unsound.

(81.6) "As was said before...". This refers to (77.18).

What exactly constitutes a contradiction or is entailed by it? Ratnakīrti explains in (87.21) and (88.2).

Note that no distinction is made in the present passage between the pair 'snow', 'fire' (contrarily opposed terms) and the pair 'dependent being', 'independent being' (contradictorily opposed terms).

(81.8) A nonmomentary entity, known as an object of negation or counterpositive (*pratiyogin*)[45] is, according to Ratnakīrti's opponents, an entity, but not a really existent entity. This may be explained as follows. Traditionally, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system classified individuals into seven categories: (1) substances, (2) tropes, (3) motions, (4) universals, (5) inherence, (6) individuators, (7) absences.[46] Now, "'*sat*' means literally 'that which is', but the

[42] Viz., the above-mentioned fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi*. See (80.29). See also p. 13.
[43] Ratnakīrti's reply to this criticism begins at (85.13).
[44] S. Mookerjee, *BF*, p. 27, footnote 1.
[45] On p. 55 of his *Materials*, Ingalls defines the 'counterpositive of an absence *x*' as 'any entity negated by absence *x*'. For example, a pot is the counterpositive of the absence of a pot.
[46] The classical Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system based on seven categories (*padārthās*) was accepted by most members of that school until it was revised by one Raghunātha. For details, see K. Potter's *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi*, especially pp. 1–20.

older Nyāya limits this term to the first three categories, substances, tropes, and motions".[47] This means that only substances, tropes, and motions exist in the strict sense that the universal called '*sattā*'[48] resides in them. Categories (4)–(6) are said to have presence (*bhāva*) but not absolute existence (*sattā*), while the seventh category, absence (or negation) lacks both absolute existence and presence.[49] Hence an object of negation is construed as an entity or individual which '*sat+na+iva+syāt*'.

For the Buddhist account of how knowledge of nonmomentariness is generated, see (82.27) and (85.5), plus the notes to these passages.

(81.10) Strictly speaking it is the real (*vastu*) and its proper contradictory, the nonreal (*avastu*), which when taken together comprise a pair of mutually exclusive alternatives whose disjunction is exhaustive of all possibilities. However, Ratnakīrti's critic avers that a nonmomentary entity must be either real (*vāstava*) or fictitious (*kālpanika*).

(81.12) The supposition that a nonmomentary entity is real conflicts with Ratnakīrti's earlier characterization of it as unreal.

(81.14) On the other hand, it is difficult to see how an *unreal* or fictitious entity can figure in a *real* contradiction. And if it turns out that there can be no real contradiction between a fictitious nonmomentary locus and successive or nonsuccessive causal efficacy, then causal efficacy will be possible for a nonmomentary entity. But in that case, since causal efficacy is the touchstone of real existence, it follows that real existence cannot be categorically denied of a nonmomentary entity. Hence the thesis that all real existents are necessarily momentary must be rejected. The literal meaning of the last sentence is that universal momentariness is as the extended hollow palms filled with water for the purpose of making obeisance to one's ancestors (*dattajalāñjalir*). This is an idiomatic statement meaning that universal momentariness is something which has to be given up.

(81.17) For the Buddhist logicians, proofs transpire wholly in the conceptual sphere and all conceptions, qua logical fictions, are relative (*śūnya*) – neither existent nor nonexistent in the strictest sense. Now surely the nonmomentary, albeit the conception of a phenomenally unreal object, cannot

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 60–1.
[48] '*sattā*' $=_{df}$ 'absolute existence'.
[49] The Nyāya proclivity for hypostatization is nowhere more evident than in the doctrine of a special subsistent but nonexistent object of negation (*pratiyogin*). The *pratiyogin* is at least as prolific as Meinong's *irrealia*, if productivity be measured by the capacity to generate insuperable philosophical difficulties.

be, when considered in itself, a pure nonentity.[50] Otherwise it would transcend all modes of linguistic representation and therefore be unable to function in any assertion.

(81.23) To say that a real entity is an acceptable locus for attributes (i.e., may figure as subject in certain statements) is to say that, for example, *motion* may be legitimately affirmed of a horse. Ratnakīrti's theory would sanction a paraphrase to the effect that the concept of horse-ness is not incompatible with that of motion. I.e., a 'locus' in which horse-ness and motion co-occur is possible. This may be symbolized as follows (where '*turagatva*' $=_{df}$ 'horse-ness', '*gamana*' $=_{df}$ 'motion', and where '$0(x, y)$' is as defined on p. 8):

$$(\Sigma y)\,(0(turagatva, y).0(gamana, y)).$$

This is in keeping with Ratnakīrti's 'internalist' bias, according to which the subject-attribute relationship is based primarily on an inner consistency between subject and predicate concepts. Of course Ratnakīrti would certainly also concede in this case the existence of a real locus, 'in' which the two attributes co-occur. In symbols:

$$(\exists y)\,(0(turagatva, y).0(gamana, y)).$$

Likewise an unreal entity may serve as subject of predication for a suitably restricted class of predicates – viz., the so-called 'unreal' predicates. The text is equivocal on this point, but what Ratnakīrti seems to mean is that one may significantly (indeed *truly*) deny the occurrence of various attributes in unreal subjects without assuming the existence (or 'subsistence' in the Naiyāyika sense of the word) of these subjects. Let us unpack the example to the effect that *sharpness* cannot occur in a nonexistent hare's horn. The correct analysis of this truth does not require positing an actually existing (or even a subsisting) hare's horn. The statement that *sharpness* and *hare's horn-ness* do not co-occur in any possible locus may be symbolized as:

(1) $\sim(\Sigma y)\,(0(\acute{s}a\acute{s}avi\d{s}\bar{a}\d{n}atva, y).0(t\bar{\imath}k\d{s}\d{n}atva, y)).$[51]

In so symbolizing the statement, the ambiguity inherent in the negative assertion has been resolved by denying the quantified conjunction of putative occurrences of attributes in loci. But we have not categorically denied (since Ratnakīrti clearly would not have done so) that there is a possible (albeit purely fictitious) locus of *hare's horn-ness*. I.e., from (1), one *cannot* derive:

(2) $\sim(\Sigma y)\,(0(\acute{s}a\acute{s}avi\d{s}\bar{a}\d{n}atva, y))$

[50] I.e., it cannot be transcendent, wholly unamenable to discursive formulation, as is, for instance, Nirvāṇa.
[51] '*śaśaviṣāṇatva*' $=_{df}$ 'hare's horn-ness'; '*tīkṣṇatva*' $=_{df}$ 'sharpness'.

in the absence of further information which is not forthcoming from Ratnakīrti. In fact, the import of various remarks of Ratnakīrti is that attributes such as *hare's horn-ness, nonmomentariness,* etc.[52] are capable of 'occurring' (in an extended metaphorical sense of the word 'occur') in purely conceptual 'loci', although Ratnakīrti's insistence on this leads him into difficulties which he does not adequately resolve.

All of the foregoing constitutes Ratnakīrti's defensive analysis of statements whose subject terms refer to concepts of 'unreal' entities. And the case of ascription of attributes to an *ex hypothesi* nonexistent nonmomentary entity is to be treated analogously to the above example of a hare's horn. That is, one need not (in fact, one *must* not) presuppose some nonmomentary *object* to which the *negation of the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession* is ascribable. To assert that a nonexistent nonmomentary entity is incapable of either successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency presupposes only the concept of nonmomentariness – and this concept, according to Ratnakīrti, is a mental construction analyzable in terms of repelled succession and nonsuccession. To be nonmomentary is simply to be incompatible with either successive or nonsuccessive causal efficacy.[53] I.e.

(1) $\sim(\Sigma y)\,(0(ak\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, y).[0(krama, y) \vee 0(akrama, y)])$.[54]

Equivalently:

(1′) $(\Pi y)\,(0(ak\d{s}a\d{n}ikatva, y) \supset \sim[0(krama, y) \vee 0(akrama, y)])$.

But on p. 60 we have:

(2) $(\Pi y)\,(E(y) \supset [(0(krama, y) \vee 0(akrama, y))])$

[52] Even a self-contradictory attribute – viz., *son of a barren woman-ness* – is regarded by Ratnakīrti as capable of 'occurring in' a purely conceptual locus – i.e., is conceivable.
[53] See (86.6).
[54] '*akṣaṇikatva*' $=_{df}$ 'nonmomentariness' and (as has already been noted) '*krama*' $=_{df}$ 'succession', '*akrama*' $=_{df}$ 'nonsuccession'. Ratnakīrti does not regard the disjunction of the nonoccurrences of succession and nonsuccession as equivalent to the conjunction of the occurrences of succession and nonsuccession. I.e., while

(A) $\sim[0(krama, y) \vee 0(akrama, y)]$

is (by DeMorgan's Law) equivalent to

(A′) $\sim 0(krama, y). \sim 0(akrama, y)$,

(A) and (A′) are not, in turn equivalent to:

(A″) $0(akrama, y).\ 0(krama, y)$.

See p. 10, footnote 35. For Ratnakīrti to equate (A′) and (A″) would amount to his conceding that the concept of a nonmomentary entity is inherently inconsistent. On this matter, see also the notes to (87.13).

which by contraposition yields:

(2′) $(\Pi y)\,[\sim[0(\textit{krama}, y) \vee 0(\textit{akrama}, y)] \supset \sim E(y)]$.

(1′) and (2′) yield:

(3) $(\Pi y)\,[0(\textit{akṣaṇikatva}, y) \supset \sim E(y)]$,

which by contraposition is equivalent to:

(3′) $(\Pi y)\,[E(y) \supset \sim 0(\textit{akṣaṇikatva}, y)]$.

And (3′) is equivalent to:

(3″) $(\forall y)\,(\sim 0(\textit{akṣaṇikatva}, y))$.[55]

Given a bare handful of paradigms exemplifying the legitimate ascription of attributes to various sorts of subject terms (where even these examples are not worked over in sufficient detail), Ratnakīrti's theorizing is sketchy and indeterminate, to say the least. If it is true that the son of a barren woman cannot speak[56], is it also true that the son of a barren woman is male (and simultaneously not male as well)? Ratnakīrti is silent! And is a hare's horn identical with itself? Is it the case that a nonmomentary entity is nonmomentary? (It would seem so.) Can a nonmomentary entity be characterized by various other (albeit 'unreal') attributes? (Also likely, but not explicitly articulated at this juncture.) Is there one such nonmomentary entity or are there finitely many or infinitely many distinguishable 'unreal' members of Ratnakīrti's universe of discourse?[57] And if one assumes a plurality of different 'unreal' entities, then Ratnakīrti has failed to stipulate precise criteria of identity for these diverse 'intensional' entities.

In any case, at least this much is clear: the significance of (1) is not in the least imperilled by the 'unreality' of nonmomentary entities. Nor need an explanation of the ascription of attributes to a nonmomentary subject involve the proliferation of dubious entities.

(81.27) The Naiyāyika insists on denying the legitimacy of ascribing any attribute whatsoever to an unreal entity. Such a sweeping denial, as Ratnakīrti astutely points out below, is antinomic, since it involves a contradictory self-reference.[58] Rather one should ask how a properly *restricted*

[55] See p. 9.
[56] As Ratnakīrti avers at the beginning of our present passage.
[57] Sanskrit does not employ articles, nor does Ratnakīrti comment explicitly on this matter.
[58] Nyāya logic includes a rule which precludes asking questions involving self-reference. Sophistry of this sort is called '*nityasama*'. See H. K. Ganguli, *Philosophy of Logical Construction*, pp. 201, 245.

class of attributes may be properly ascribed to unreal entities. At this point Ratnakīrti provisionally bifurcates the problem into two separate subcases: (1) the problem of ascribing *real* attributes to unreal subjects, and (2) the problem of ascribing *unreal* attributes to unreal subjects.[59]

If $x$ is unreal, then to say that $x$ is not characterizable by any real attribute is analytic. But to deny that an unreal $x$ may be characterized as unreal is self-contradictory.

(82.1) The preceding statement – viz., the statement which denies subjecthood of an unreal entity – is disallowed. Ratnakīrti argues as follows: to ascribe *nonsubjecthood* to an unreal $x$ is to deny that such an $x$ can function as the subject for any attribute. But to deny all attributes of $x$ is clearly to ascribe the *nonascribability of all attributes* to $x$ – which is to make a self-refuting statement.

I.e., symbolizing the property of *nonascribability with respect to an unreal subject* by '**N**'[60], by hypothesis **N** is ascribable to all attributes, $P$. In symbols:

(1) $(P)\,\mathbf{N}(P)$.

Now let '$A$' stand for the *nonascribability of any attribute*. The question arises as to whether or not $A$ may be truly ascribed to an unreal subject. If $A$ is an attribute, then as an immediate consequence of (1) we obtain:

(2) $\mathbf{N}(A)$.

But $A$ is an attribute only in virtue of its having been ascribed to a subject which is unreal. Hence, also:

(3) $\sim\mathbf{N}(A)$.

Ratnakīrti sees that the denial of all attributes is itself an attribute, one which generates a vicious circle; and this vicious circle can be avoided only by adherence to the rule that whatever involves all of a collection must not be a member of that collection.[61] The paradox arises not from the use of a null subject but from the illegitimate reference to an unrestricted totality of attributes. For, as has already been shown above, predication is permissible even with respect to a subject whose denotation is null, provided certain precautions are observed.

[59] Reconsidering the matter on p. 38, Ratnakīrti treats, instead, three separate subcases: predication of (1) real, (2) unreal, and (3) partly real and partly unreal attributes, respectively. See also p. 69, footnote 66.

[60] I have used boldface capital letters to symbolize properties of properties of individuals, in order to avoid ambiguity.

[61] The prohibition was expressed in this form by Russell in his reply to a letter of Poincaré (*Mind*, 1906, 143).

(82.6)–(82.8) Concerning the substratum *in* which the alleged *nonsubjecthood* is to be established, three alternative loci are given. ("Either nonsubjecthood is established (1) in an unreal entity, (ii) or elsewhere, (iii) or nowhere at all.") Here the reference to loci *in* which an attribute inheres must not be interpreted literally, because the notion of a real and enduring substantial locus or substratum – prominent in realistic Nyāya contexts – ill accords with the more nominalistic tenets of Buddhism. According to the Buddhist logicians there is, in reality, no self-identical substratum in addition to the totality of a thing's attributes.[62]

Turning to the next point, just as the existence of an object of knowledge is a necessary condition for a *pramāṇa*, etc., so a necessary condition for the assertion of a meaningful statement is that there be a subject or substratum for that statement. Exactly what the nature of that substratum must be, in those cases involving ascription of attributes with respect to a nonmomentary entity, will have to be shown. The fact remains, however, that ascription of *nonsubjecthood* to a nonmomentary subject has been proved to be self-contradictory. I.e., a categorical denial of a nonmomentary entity's subjecthood is logically impossible.

(82.11) This passage ends on a Wittgensteinian note, enjoining (in effect): "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."[63] An interesting precedent for the injunction of (82.11) (as well as that of Wittgenstein) is to be found in the dialectical procedures of early Buddhism. "Vasubandhu (*Ab. Kośa*, V, 22) reports that it was a rule of dialectics at the time of Buddha to answer by silence those questions which were wrongly formulated, e.g., all questions regarding the properties of a non-existing thing."[64]

(82.15) Speaking or not speaking, the consequence would seem to be intolerable in either case.

(82.17) Away with dogmatic prohibitions! Ratnakīrti insists that a nonmomentary entity – notwithstanding its problematic ontological status – can function as a subject in a proof whose probans or reason (*hetu*) is the absence

[62] To assert, as the Buddhists do, that the criterion for an entity's real existence is its capacity for causal efficiency is *not* to posit, in each case, a distinct and persistent intensive substantial basis whose essence is causal activity. In this the Buddhists differ sharply from Leibniz. The view of the Buddhist logicians is: "The substance and quality relation is logical, it is not ultimately real; the ultimate reality is something unique, undivided" (Stcherbatsky, *BLII*, p. 291).

[63] "*Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen*" (L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, London 1922, p. 188).

[64] T. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 22, footnote 3.

of the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession, and whose probandum is the absence of (empirical) reality. Taken together, the details in (82.22) consolidate this position by ramifying Ratnakīrti's earlier analysis.

(82.22) The purely conceptual or ideal nature of the relationship between a subject and its attributes must be borne in mind throughout the following.[65] Ratnakīrti avers that while one may not legitimately ascribe (1) a real attribute to an unreal subject, one may truly ascribe either (2) an unreal[66] or (3) a quasi-real, quasi-unreal attribute[67] to an unreal subject. For, as he has just shown, to forbid the ascription of attributes in all three cases is to engender a paradox.

And if it is logically permissible to construct premisses which ascribe unreal or quasi-real, quasi-unreal attributes to unreal subjects, it follows that arguments which utilize such premisses are not thereby fallacious.

(82.27) As has been demonstrated, the use of a nonmomentary subject cannot be impugned on logical grounds. Moreover, its epistemological credentials are equally sound. For, while a nonmomentary entity is not objectively real[68], neither is it an absolutely unknowable, unrepresentable transcendent entity. Rather, cognitive access to a nonmomentary entity is provided by conceptual construction.[69] Hence it exists in the Pickwickian sense of being a mere concept or logical fiction. Yet this concept of a nonmomentary entity has undeniable pragmatic value in that it affects human behavior.[70]

[65] For details, see (85.27).

[66] See the analysis on p. 65, especially footnote 54. See also (83.6). Here Ratnakīrti's language is suggestive of that of contemporary Western many-sorted logics.

[67] *anupalabdhi* is said to be a quasi-real, quasi-unreal attribute in the sense that to speak of the nonperception (*anupalabdhi*) of a pervader with respect to a given substratum is to make an affirmation and a denial simultaneously. I.e., nonperception has a dual character, because while it is the nonperception of an imagined or hypothetically entertained $x$, it is at the same time the apprehension of that which is other than $x$. N.B. Speaking more strictly, of course, even a 'pure' affirmative (negative) proposition contains an admixture of negation (affirmation), since the meaning of each of its component substantives is at once both positive and negative.

[68] A nonmomentary entity is one which is not, as a matter of fact, existent in any time, past, present or future.

[69] See pp. 75ff.

[70] Stcherbatsky distinguishes (1) contingent unrealities (such as an absent jar) from what he calls (2) absolute unrealities (i.e., those which are nonempirical but imaginable, such as a hare's horns or a sky lotus), and from (3) metaphysical entities (wholly unimaginable entities – e.g., Nirvāṇa in its Mahayanistic conception). (See T. Stcherbatsky, *BLII*, p. 119.) He goes on to say that, according to Dharmakīrti, "even absolute unrealities are representable and have some negative importance in guiding our purposive actions, this being the test of reality. It is real absence, it is not nothing (*tuccha*), because nothing could not guide our actions even negatively. But it is not a reality sui generis (*vastvantaram*) as the realists maintain, it is imagining (*dṛśya*)."

(83.4) The polemic in this passage is obviously aimed at the Naiyāyika realists for whom each negation rests on the cognition of some particular negatively real individual.[71]

(83.6) "And because negation is invariably connected with its subjecthood..." The negation (*pratiṣedha*) alluded to is of the relative (*paryudāsa*) rather than of the absolute (*prasajya*) variety.[72] I.e., a nonmomentary entity is *other than* momentary (and hence, according to Buddhist tenets, other than a dynamic point instant of reality). But this is not to say that a nonmomentary entity is an *absolute* nonentity, for the notion of nonmomentariness possesses the relative reality proper to a mere concept or logical fiction.

(83.9) A merely conceptual entity is defended against the charge of triviality, for such an entity cannot be conjured up at will as a locus for any reason (*hetu*) whatsoever.[73]

(83.10) Under pain of contradiction[74], a purely fictitious substratum cannot serve as locus for a real attribute. Hence some alleged proofs will still be discredited because they lack *definite real* loci. The fallacies of *sandigdhāśraya* and *āśrayāsiddha hetu* are no less fallacious as a consequence of Ratnakīrti's analysis.

(83.11) and (83.14) In the first case considered, the substratum is the *ātman*.[75] The reason (*hetu*) or proving instrument (*sādhana*) is the fact that the attributes of the *ātman* are universally apprehended.[76] Omnipresence of the *ātman* is the probandum (*sādhya*). This is an instance of *āśrayāsiddhi*.

The second example considered (that of the peacock) involves the fallacy of a *doubtful* subject, for a positive real attribute (*the sound of crying*) is

[71] See p. 73. The realists' reification of nonexistence, as is well known, leads to the existential paradoxes – those indecorous smudges on the history of both Indian and Western philosophy. Yet E. Toms (*Being, Negation, and Logic*, Oxford 1962) claims, after an examination of various conceptions of nonexistence, that it is precisely the paradoxical notion of nonexistence which is the root meaning of all the other seeming alternatives.
[72] See the notes to (86.19).
[73] Ratnakīrti is far from exhorting that there be no holds barred on the use of terms which refer to concepts of unreal entities. But the question is whether the vague and ad hoc restrictions he imposes on such terms suffice to ward off inconsistency. See the notes to (87.13).
[74] See (81.27) and (82.22).
[75] The soul (*ātman*) is imaginary, according to Buddhist ontology (whereas in the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, *ātman* is a nonelemental all-pervasive substance).
[76] The self and its attributes are the objects of an internal perception or introspection, and not the objects of direct sense perception, according to the Naiyāyikas. See S. C. Chatterjee, *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, Calcutta 1939, pp. 182–3.

predicated as *hetu* with respect to a substratum whose exact location is unknown. This is an instance of *sandigdhāśrayatva*. The passage concludes with a final vindication of predication of *unreal* attributes with respect to *unreal* subjects.

(83.20) The reason or *hetu*, it will be recalled, is the absence of successive or nonsuccessive causal efficacy. The assumption that a nonmomentary or permanent entity has the capacity for either successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency is shown to lead to the absurd conclusion that all that entity's effects must then be produced in any given moment of its existence or else not at all.[77] Hence successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency is impossible in a nonmomentary substratum, whence it follows that the absence of successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency is perfectly compatible with such a substratum.

(83.22) The realists demur. They say that the capacity or potency of a nonmomentary entity must be triggered by the presence of co-operating factors. Without these catalytic agents, the nonmomentary entity cannot produce its effects.

(83.24) and (83.29) Ratnakīrti does not wish to deny the empirical evidence in favor of production by a combination of factors. Rather he questions the relevance of an aggregate of co-factors to a supposedly permanent cause. For, (1) if these co-factors alter the 'cause' it is *ipso facto* not permanent; and (2) if they fail to alter it, the permanent entity either produces identically the same effects again and again *ad infinitum*[78] or it remains eternally barren (that is, properly speaking, it is not a cause at all). In either case, then, the real productive agent must be the changing totality of factors, and the assumption of an immutable permanent cause is gratuitous.

And finally, should the recalcitrant realists wish to defend the indefensible, the vacuous statement they proffer on behalf of their view of causality provides neither support nor elucidation.

(84.3) As the counter-example shows, 'recognition' from one moment to the next is no sure indication that what is allegedly recognized endures as a self-identical individual. Clearly, if recognition is to constitute proof of self-identity, what is recognized must be recognized *as self-identical* throughout different moments. But then permanence (in the sense of endurance as a

[77] It is illogical to suppose that the potency of an *unchanging* permanent entity can be held in abeyance.
[78] I.e., the impossible situation of (83.20).

self-identical individual) is a necessary precondition for recognition, whence recognition cannot constitute proof of permanence. To refute permanence (a pre-requisite for recognition) is at the same time to rule out the possibility of recognition.[79]

(84.6) In the face of Ratnakīrti's argument of (83.24)–(83.29), the realists attempt to reinstate the theory that the permanent cause is able to utilize auxiliary factors in production and still remain *the* cause. As has been pointed out by Vācaspati in (80.4), the presence of co-factors does not detract from the role of the permanent causal agent – it still remains the true cause. For its existence as a cause is wholly independent of the presence or absence of auxiliaries. The effect alone *requires* these co-factors.

(84.8) Ratnakīrti redargues this view on the grounds that the supposed cause's nature – qua permanent – is (and remains) immutably what it is, and hence is sempiternally productive or not. If an entity fails to produce in a given moment and subsequently does produce – albeit in the presence of co-factors – just this change constitutes that entity's impermanence.

(84.11) There is a further implausibility in the realist's account of production. The nascent effect – since it does not yet exist – cannot be said to require or depend on the co-factors. And the cause is really no cause at all if of itself it is incapable of producing its effect. For the Buddhists, the 'cause' is under constraint to produce its effect in order to be a cause in the true sense of the word. They construe the relationship between a cause and its effect(s) as one of bilateral necessitation. The two terms are co-extensive (*samavyāpti*).[80] In contrast, the Naiyāyikas maintain that a cause can exist independently of its effect, from which it follows that the correlatives 'cause' and 'effect' are not necessarily coextensive.

(84.13) It is self-contradictory to define an *immutable* or permanent cause as exercising its function at time $t+k$ but not at time $t$.

(84.21) Nor will it suffice to interpret the causal relationship as the mere *absence* of the effect consequent upon the *absence* of its 'cause'. According to the Buddhist interpretation of causality, one must also ascribe the *presence*

[79] All the standard arguments against 'recognition' as a proof of permanence were known to Ratnakīrti and employed by him or his predecessors. See, e.g. *Indian Idealism*, p. 146, where S. Dasgupta presents Śāntarakṣita's arguments against recognition as proof of permanence.
[80] See S. Mookerjee, *BF*, p. 11, footnote 1.

of the effect to the *presence* of its cause (notwithstanding the presence or absence of co-factors) – else the effect cannot truly be said to follow from or depend upon that 'cause'. But if the cause is assumed to be permanent – and thus permanently present or absent – the old conundrum re-emerges.

(84.23) Ratnakīrti redoubles his efforts to prove beyond all peradventure that the capacity for causal efficiency is pervaded by the disjunction of succession and nonsuccession. He points out that – as a matter of empirical fact – all causal efficiency is exercised either successively or nonsuccessively.[81] And – as a matter of logic – the two mutually exclusive alternatives (succession and nonsuccession) are jointly exhaustive of all varieties of real causal efficiency.

Now Ratnakīrti admits that a nonmomentary or permanent substratum, qua bare logical fiction, is nonperceptible. But he does not therefore concede that such a substratum must be relegated to an indefinite position, suspended, for sheer lack of sensory evidence, in a Limbo somewhere between the two mutually exclusive attributes, succession and nonsuccession. Rather, it has been demonstrated in (77.12) that the concept of a nonmomentary entity is logically incompatible with either successive or nonsuccessive production. And, if both these modes of production are excluded as impossible in a nonmomentary substratum, it follows from the foregoing that all causal efficiency must likewise be excluded.

(85.4) This passage refers to (80.28). Trilocana contends that even if the Buddhists succeed in exhibiting opposition between a nonmomentary entity and successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency, the fact that there is such opposition does not prove the nonexistence of nonmomentary entities. For, if a nonmomentary entity were proved to be nonexistent, no use could be made of it without engendering the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhi.*

By clearing an empirically inexistent nonmomentary entity of the charge of *āśrayāsiddhi*[82], Ratnakīrti is able to refute this first counter-argument.

(85.5) Referring to (80.29) (Trilocana's second objection), Ratnakīrti judiciously administers Occam's razor to the 'entities' promulgated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of negation of presence, i.e., absence (*abhāva*). An assertion of absence does *not* require a corresponding independently objective *pratiyogin*[83] to render it significant. Rather, an adequate explanation of absence or negation (of presence) can be given in terms of 'repelled sug-

[81] See, e.g., p. 60, (1).
[82] See the discussion culminating in (87.9).
[83] '*pratiyogin*' $=_{df}$ 'object of negation', 'counterpositive of an absence'.

gestion'[84], without positing additional entities. In the present case Buddhist ontology secures itself from a population explosion as follows. A certain object is imagined as being present in a particular locus, which object is, in fact, not present in that locus. "Thus in order to deny its presence we mentally construct the relation between the imagined object and the locus. For it is not the reality which we deny, but its relation – merely a logical construction."[85]

(85.9) See (81.1). Ratnakīrti will show that the contraposed (*vyatireka*) version of the proof (based on nonperception or a pervader) is indeed conclusive. But, since an assertion and its contrapositive are logically equivalent, the original or *anvaya* version of the thesis (viz., the assertion that reality is pervaded by momentariness) is likewise unassailable.

(85.13) I have translated '*upalabdhi*' as 'apprehension' (i.e., 'cognition in general') rather than giving it the more specific meaning 'perception' which it sometimes bears.[86] (Thus a nonmomentary or permanent entity, which has the status of a mere logical fiction and is consequently *not* amenable to direct sense perception can nonetheless be 'apprehended' as a mere concept.[87])

(85.15) The words 'Our proof's being established by means of nonperception elsewhere is tantamount to the apprehension of a substratum' simply mean that in the contraposed version of the proof of momentariness a permanent substratum is apprehended, and this as a *concept* in the following sense. The concept of a nonmomentary entity is a synthetic construction imposed on the nonperception of either successive or nonsuccessive causal

[84] The locution is Stcherbatsky's. See *BL*II, p. 82, footnote 5.
[85] P. 81 of an unpublished translation of and commentary on Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhiḥ* by D. Sharma (now published under the title *The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic*). See too the commentary to (81.8) on p. 62, and the explanatory notes apropos of (83.4) and (83.6) on p. 70. Part IV, chapter I of Stcherbatsky's *BL*I is also illuminating on this matter. Thus an explanation of negation (or absence) requires neither the positing of nonperception as an *independent* source of knowledge (this point will be driven home in (86.26)) nor the positing of a subsistent nonentity as object of negative cognition or negatum (vide (85.15) and (86.19)).
[86] "*upalabdhi* is cognition in general, but *anupalabdhi* is non-cognition or negation conceived as the absence of sense-perception (*dṛśya-anupalabdhi*)" (T. Stcherbatsky, *BL*II, p. 62, footnote 3). While 'apprehension' accurately conveys what Ratnakīrti means by the word '*upalabdhi*', his realist opponent here seems to construe '*upalabdhi*' more narrowly, equating it with 'perception'. (But just the realist's failure to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the broader sense of the word constitutes the reason for the apparent difficulty which arises in this passage.) In any case, I have made uniform use of 'apprehension' as a translation for '*upalabdhi*'.
[87] See (86.6) and notes.

efficiency. Now all objectively real 'loci' are successively or nonsuccessively efficacious. But our hypothetically entertained nonmomentary entity *is never* (upon analysis it is clear that it *can never be*) perceived as efficacious in either of these modes. Hence 'nonmomentariness' merely signifies denied objective reality. As such, the concept of a permanent entity is no more than a concept of denied objective reality.

Concerning 'the mere grasping of a permanent subject (ascertained through cognition of a concept) in relation to successive or nonsuccessive production' (*nityasya dharmiṇo vikalpabuddhyavasitasya kramikāritvākramikāritvāpekṣayā kevalagrahaṇādeva*), the word '*grahaṇa*' (from '*grah*' $=_{df}$ 'to grasp', 'to seize') is capable of a great many nuances of meaning. Depending on context, its possible translations include 'grasp', 'receive in sensation', 'perceive', 'be aware of', 'recognize', 'comprehend'.[88] Here 'grasping' connotes awareness (or entertainment of) a bare conceptual construction, which construction, upon analysis, proves to be logically incompatible with the disjunction of the attributes succession and nonsuccession. But, since all causal efficiency operates either successively or nonsuccessively, it follows that the *mere awareness of the concept* of a nonmomentary entity suffices as a basis for ascribing the incapacity for causal efficiency to that entity.[89]

(85.22) In this passage, Ratnakīrti alludes to his account of noetic judgmental synthesis – in other words to his account of judgment, which is the synthetic activity of consciousness in its cognition of the phenomenal world. Compare the words 'And an act of judgmental synthesis ought to be recognized as the potency for noetic construction even when nothing is grasped in sensation' with Stcherbatsky's translation of a similar passage from Dharmottara's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Nyāya-Bindu*[90]: "But constructed knowledge is not produced by the object (actually apprehended) and therefore it is not a (narrowly) restricted mental reflex, since the factor

[88] That 'grasping' is not, in the present context, to be equated with 'receiving in sensation' or 'perceiving' is clear from Ratnakīrti's insertion of the qualifying phrase: 'ascertained through cognition of a concept'. (And, of course, it has already been noted above that an 'unreal' permanent entity is *unperceivable*.)

[89] Stcherbatsky's gloss on this passage would characterize both 'All absences of trees are absences of *śiṃśapās*' and 'All absences of momentariness are absences of the capacity for causal efficiency' as contrapositives whose respective direct (*anvaya*) counterparts are expressive of judgments 'analytic' in the Kantian sense. (See Stcherbatsky, *BL*II, pp. 66, 76, and 120.) Instead I prefer to say that each of the two statements is the result of an inference which has identity as its reason (*hetu*). For one thing, there is my reluctance to revive that tired old bugbear, the 'analytic-synthetic'. But, more important, while there are tempting similarities between the Buddhist and Kantian positions in this regard, Stcherbatsky's proclivity to Kantianize Buddhist epistemology proves, especially in the present case, to be quite misleading in the long run.

[90] *BL*II, p. 21.

corresponding to it does not exist (it is created by the synthesis of productive imagination)".[91]

The following is the epistemological basis (subscribed to by Ratnakīrti, Dharmottara, Dharmakīrti, and most of the other Buddhist logicians) which will serve both to support and to explicate the foregoing remarks. A general term, according to later Buddhist epistemology, corresponds to a concept and refers to the synthesis comprised by that concept – this is true, alike in a case involving a phenomenally real entity (e.g., a deer) and in a case involving a phenomenally unreal entity (e.g., a nonmomentary or permanent entity). Although the constructive activity of consciousness in the formation of concepts is ultimately coordinated with sense data, conceptualization, according to Ratnakīrti and the members of his school, does not involve a direct contact with or reflection of either a particular *extra-mental* sense object[92] or a subsistent universal class character. Rather, a concept is a mere logical fiction constructed by consciousness and as such is, in a manner of speaking 'illusory'.[93] And each concept, qua synthetic act of differentiation, is properly analyzable in terms of its function – not in terms of its supposed ontological correlates.

For instance, 'deer' refers to a concept which is a logical synthesis comprising a positive aspect – deer – qualified by the exclusion (*apoha*) of what is other than nondeer. *Mutatis mutandis* 'nonmomentary entity' refers to a concept comprising a *prima facie* aspect or substratum qualified by the exclusion of a common counter-correlate – in this case, what is excluded is any successive or nonsuccessive operation.

Now, under certain circumstances, a conceptual construct may be projected 'outward' and the reality proper to a phenomenal object may be imputed to it. This is done by the indirect or negative correlation of the construct with a dynamic momentary flash of energy (*svalakṣaṇa*).[94] Such

[91] I.e., the 'particular present mental image' which Ratnakīrti mentions (85.23) as a crucial factor, since it is the product of constructive activity is (as is clear from Dharmottara's comment) no mere passive reflex – no copy slavishly depicting a pure sensum.

[92] A dynamic point instant of reality (*svalakṣaṇa*), qua pure sensum, is transconceptual. It is not amenable to discursive formulation – cannot enter directly into the language game.

[93] The concept bears no positive similarity to what is experienced, but is related indirectly by a neglect of the difference between concept and experiential datum.

[94] A conceptual construct and a *svalakṣaṇa* correlated with it do not bear a positive relation of similarity to one another; we merely neglect the difference between the two. More precisely, a concept stands in an indirect logical relationship to a *svalakṣaṇa* if and only if that *svalakṣaṇa* is differentiated from those which comprise the counter-correlate of the concept in question. E.g., the term 'jug' refers to what is other than nonjug and, as such, serves to mark off in our minds the distinction between the causal efficacy of the series of dynamic momentary flashes which form the basis for the conceptual construct referred to by 'jug' and those which do not. The term 'nonmomentary entity' refers to

a construct may figure as the subject of a true perceptual judgment. (See, e.g., the example of the deer given in paragraph (85.27).)

However, in the absence of an immediately given *svalakṣaṇa*, a conceptual construct is a bare logical fiction which is capable of functioning as subject with respect to the ascription of 'unreal' attributes.[95] Such is the case with a phenomenally unreal nonmomentary (or permanent) entity.

In keeping with the pre-eminently pragmatic tenor of Buddhist epistemology, an account of the constructive activity of consciousness would be incomplete without noting the obvious goal of a typical act of cognitive synthesis. In Stcherbatsky's fifth appendix, the Buddhist describes his position as follows: "Thus it is that the function of our empirical conceptions is to call forth human activity with its various aims, by imputing efficiency to an unefficient (image) with its extensions and distinctions. (And because our empirical conceptions, constructions though they be), are indirectly related to reality, (they are to a certain extent real), they therefore lead to successful action in regard of a causally efficient reality, thus bringing about (the efficacy of thought and) producing consistent human experience."[96] Hence even the concept of a phenomenally inexistent nonmomentary entity has pragmatic value in guiding purposive activity in that, in conceiving of this concept, we act with the knowledge that the terminus of a purposive action can never be an objectively realized nonmomentary entity.

*Adhyavasāya* is discussed at greater length in *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda*.[97] The notion is also prominent in Ratnakīrti's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ-anvayātmika* (*RN*, pp. 62–76) and in his *Apohasiddhi* (*RN*, pp. 53–61). And for a meticulous analysis of what Stcherbatsky describes in Kantian terms as "the problem of the gap between a simple reflex of sensation and a constructed mental image" see Stcherbatsky *BL*II, Appendix III. The more recondite details of the relation described therein between 'outer sensation' (aroused attention), 'mental sensation' (a postulate of the later Buddhist epistemological theories), and constructive imagination are interesting enough in themselves but not essential for an understanding of *KB*II. Although the same appendix raises significant questions about the *svalakṣaṇa*'s capacity

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what is other than successively or nonsuccessively operative (and thus to what is wholly lacking in causal efficacy). But, by definition, no *svalakṣaṇa* lacks causal efficacy. Hence the term 'nonmomentary entity' refers to a bare construct, a concept of the absence of objective reality. For a fuller discussion of how a conceptual construction is formed and coordinated with objective reality, see Stcherbatsky, *BL*II, Appendixes IV and V. See also D. Sharma's translation of and commentary on Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhiḥ*.

[95] See (81.23).

[96] Stcherbatsky, *BL*II, pp. 425–6.

[97] See especially *RN*, p. 124 (lines 1 and 2), p. 130 (lines 25–27), and pp. 132–3 (lines 30–33 and lines 1–2, respectively).

to affect our sensibility[98], the Kantianism endemic to Stcherbatsky's interpretation of Buddhist logic slants his very formulation of these key issues in a deceptive manner – the more so his attempts to sort out possible means of resolving them.

(85.27) Attributes are not really distinct from their respective substrata[99]; thus the 'relation' of a substratum to the attributes which qualify it is not real. Rather, the substratum-attribute relationship is a logical connection between concepts[100] (not an objectively existing linkage between one *svalakṣaṇa* and another).

For instance, the first example cited gives explicit expression to two unseparated aspects of a single particular perception. Quite simply, horns are ascribed to a deer's head. Now, in the principal case being considered, no positive datum is given in perception. Rather, the bare concept of a nonmomentary entity – as framed by the constructive activity of consciousness – is seen to be logically incompatible with the concept of successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency.

(86.6) To 'apprehend' a permanent entity is merely to form the conceptual synthesis of all nonoccurrences of successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency. Thus '*pratiyogin*' is to be understood in Buddhist epistemology not in terms of the hypostatization of an independent object of negation, but in terms of a construction comprising repelled suggestion.[101]

Note that from (86.10) to (87.9) inflected occurrences of '*kramākrama*' assume singular endings instead of the dual endings assumed by this compound throughout the rest of the treatise. This may indicate that lines (86.10)–(87.9) are not authentic.

(86.13) Three alternative interpretations of the requirement that a *pramāṇa* have a real basis are considered.

(86.16) Certainly knowledge of the successive or nonsuccessive causal efficiency of all real entities is grounded in empirical data – and this fact has obvious relevance to the truth of the assertion that such successive or nonsuc-

[98] E.g., is the *svalakṣaṇa* really amorphous? If so, how is its coordination with a structured concept possible?

[99] Reality is not bifurcated into subjects and their attributes, nor is any one dynamic real particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) really related to any other. Differentiation comes about merely because of the mind's constructive activity.

[100] "... that predication, affirmative or negative alike, refers to the concept psychologically felt as an objective fact – in other words, to the hypostatized concept" (S. Mookerjee, *BF*, p. 134).

[101] See notes to (85.5).

cessive causal efficiency is invariably absent in the case of an 'unreal' nonmomentary entity.

(86.18) Proving that a nonmomentary entity cannot be empirically real can be a means of proving (via the principle of contraposition) that whatever is real is momentary.

(86.19) Concerning the words 'real merely qua *concept* of that permanent entity', Prajñākara says in his commentary to Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārtika*: "Even a *vikalpa*, or logical fiction, is not a fiction in itself, but a definite datum in so far as it is entertained in thought".[102]

'*Paryudāsa*' here signifies the *relative* exclusion of reality from a permanent entity. A permanent entity is nonmomentary in the sense that it is *other than* momentary – i.e., it is other than an objectively real dynamic point instant of reality. '*Paryudāsa*'[103] is here to be distinguished from '*prasajya-pratiṣedha*' which is synonymous with 'denial in the absolute sense'.[104] Indeed a nonmomentary entity is not absolutely nothing – as has been noted, it has the noetic reality proper to a concept and, as such, is perfectly capable of functioning as substratum under the conditions outlined in (81.23) and (82.22).

(86.23) Likewise in the case of the son of a barren woman, etc., the '*paryudāsa*' variety of negation is to be understood.

(86.25) The discussion of the avoidance of *āśrayāsiddhi* – a leitmotiv throughout this treatise – culminates in (87.9).

(86.26) Although absence or negation is not an 'entity' directly perceived by any sense organ, it is an inferential construction ultimately based on sense perception.[105] Hence no *pramāṇa* in addition to perception and inference need be posited in order to account for negative judgments. Attempts of

[102] H. Ganguli, *Philosophy of Logical Construction*, Calcutta 1963, p. 175.
[103] More explicitly: '*paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*'.
[104] For a full analysis and formalization of the distinction between *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* and *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, see J. F. Staal, 'Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought: A Comparative Study', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* **25** (1962) 52–71. See especially pp. 58–61. It is interesting to compare Staal's exposition with the writings of late mediaeval Western logicians who differentiate between logical operators applied '*de dicto*' (or 'divisively') and those applied '*de re*' ('compositely'). See, e.g., the present author's Ph.D. dissertation, *The Assertoric and Modal Propositional Logic of the Pseudo-Scotus*, p. 49.
[105] "... that the negative judgment receives its practical significance (through an inference) from challenged imagination, although it is really produced by sense-perception and only applied in life (through a deductive process of an inference whose logical reason consists in the fact of) a negative experience" (Stcherbatsky, *BLII*, p. 85). See also the notes to (85.15) for details of the role of nonperception in the case of negative judgments concerning nonmomentary entities.

various Buddhist logicians and their adversaries to cope with the problems arising in giving a coherent account of the distinctive character of negative judgments can be found in the chapter entitled 'Negative Judgment' (S. Mookerjee, *BF*).

In any case, given the proof of an assertion of concomitance, its contrapositive necessarily follows, so that this passage is essentially a recapitulation of the line of argument presented in (78.3) and (84.23), strengthened by Ratnakīrti's intervening defense of the admissibility of an unreal nonmomentary entity as subject of that contrapositive in the special case being examined.

(87.7) and (87.9) Ratnakīrti eschews the Naiyāyika exclusion[106] of unreal entities from subjecthood. He has provided a defense of the principle of contraposition even when the resultant contrapositive has an 'unreal' subject. True, ascription of attributes in a case involving the concept of an unreal entity differs from ascription of attributes in a case involving the concept of an empirically real entity.[107] But provided we keep this fact in mind, there need be no insuperable difficulties in either case.

(87.13) The context (see especially the remarks of the paragraphs immediately preceding and following the present one and also the query of (81.10)–(81.14), to which (87.13) constitutes an answer) justifies my translating '*virodhin*' as 'contradictory' or 'incompatible with'[108] rather than as 'self-contradictory'. The rather interesting ambiguity of the passage – if it were resolved in favor of the latter translation – would taint much of Ratnakīrti's analysis with inconsistency and would call for an interpretation differing radically from our present suggestion (and, indeed, from any standard consistent Western system I know of).[109] For, if the concept of nonmomentariness is, in fact, not self-consistent, Ratnakīrti does not have the right to

[106] The Naiyāyika stance in this regard is not without parallels in contemporary Western philosophical literature. E.g., in view of the fact that the contrapositive of '$p$ entails $q \vee \sim q$' would yield one of the strict implication paradoxes, A. R. Lacey advocates a noncontraposable entailment relation. See his 'Necessary Statements and Entailment', *Analysis* **22** (1962) 101–6.

[107] See (81.23) and (82.22).

[108] I.e., incompatible with succession and nonsuccession.

[109] Alternatively, one can of course conclude that his solution is irreconcilable with any Western theory, and that it ought thus to be evaluated solely on its own terms. (This conclusion has a false ring in the light of Ratnakīrti's demonstrated ability to wield 'Western' standards of consistency as weapons against his Naiyāyika adversaries.) Even so we stand in need of far more than the rough explanation he has provided before we can reasonably be expected to evaluate the soundness of his proposal. In short, if the concept of a nonmomentary entity is not self-consistent, Ratnakīrti's arguments do not, as they stand, warrant a verdict in favor of his (inconsistent) position over that of his opponents.

ascribe, e.g., the lack of both succession and nonsuccession to a nonmomentary subject, without thereby also assenting to the occurrence of both these attributes in that subject. And this is a step he decidedly does not wish to take.

In other words, if the concept of a nonmomentary entity is logically inconsistent, Ratnakīrti has provided no defense against the Naiyāyika's charge that such a subject is trivially available as a locus for any attribute whatsoever – except, of course, his fiat to the contrary.

Next, the ascription of attributes to the inconsistent son of a barren woman is again mentioned as similar in certain respects to our central case. This certainly does not allay our suspicion that the concept of a nonmomentary entity might be inconsistent as well. However, I can urge on Ratnakīrti's behalf that he has never explicitly averred (in fact, he would wish to deny) that a conjunction of inconsistent attributes comprises the concept of a nonmomentary entity.[110]

(87.21)–(88.2) Occam's razor again! The relationship between two contradictory attributes ought not to be hypostatized. There is no need to posit a third attribute or individual superadded to the two mutually opposed attributes.

(88.7) This completes the contraposed version of the proof that whatever exists is momentary.

[110] See p. 46.

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# INDEX OF SANSKRIT TECHNICAL TERMS

(The English translation of a term is given in parentheses)

*akrama* (nonsuccession), 10, 14–17, 19, 22–26, 46, 54, 56, 58, 60, 61, 65, 66, 78
*akṣaṇika* (nonmomentary, permanent), 9, 10, 14–20, 22–26, 54, 65, 66
*ati* + √*pat*[1] (to circumvent), 18
*atīndriya* (transcendent), 22, 43
*adhyavasāya* (noetic judgmental synthesis, thought construction, judgment), 23, 45, 77
*anāśraya* (locusless), 16, 20, 31
*anitya* (impermanent, momentary), 23
*aniścaya* (uncertainty), 17, 34
*anupalabdhi* (nonperception, the negation of the hypothetically assumed presence of something), 10, 19, 23, 24, 39, 46, 52, 69, 74
*anumāna* (inference), 10, 14–16, 20, 25
*anaikāntika* (uncertain because the alleged *hetu* is capable of cooccurring in loci other than those of the *sādhya*), 13–15, 17, 18, 29, 34, 53, 56, 62
*antarbhāva* (internal image), 24, 26, 46
*antarvyāpti* (inner concomitance), 5, 12, 55
*anyonyatva* (mutual dependence), 16, 32
*anvaya* (the assertion that the pervadendum entails [i.e., is pervaded by] the pervader), 5, 14, 28, 51, 55, 56, 59, 74, 75
*apoha* (negation, discrimination from, exclusion)[2], 76
*abhāva* (absence, nonoccurrence), 14–26, 35, 37–39, 43, 47–50, 56, 73
*arthakriyākāritva* (causal efficiency, dynamism), 4, 8, 9, 14, 16–18, 22, 28
*arthakriyāsāmarthya* (capacity for causal efficiency, causal efficacy), 15, 56
*avastu* (unreal), 16, 18–20, 22–26, 55, 63
*asattā* (nonexistence), 17, 18, 21, 25, 26, 34
*asattva* (unreality, lack of real existence), 18, 21, 22, 25, 40, 42, 48
*ākṣipta* (implicitly suggested, referred to)[3], 14, 28
*āgantuka* (adventitious), 16, 21, 32
*ātman* (soul), 20, 40, 70
*āropa* (imposition), 24, 46
*āśraya* (locus, substratum, foundation), 11, 15
*āśrayāsiddha* (inconclusive because of an unreal locus), 15, 17, 18, 20, 26, 30, 34, 36, 39, 40, 50
*āśrayāsiddhi* (inconclusiveness of a proof because its locus is unreal), 13, 16, 19, 22, 24, 25, 31, 35, 37, 44, 47, 48, 51, 56, 61, 62, 70, 73, 79
*itaretarāśraya* (vicious circle), 18, 25, 35
*upalabdhi* (cognition in general, apprehension), 23, 24, 45, 74
*upādāna* (material basis), 24, 47
*ubhayasādhārana* (having something of both), 19, 39
*ekatva* (unity, self-identity), 14, 21, 29, 42
*kalpanājñāna* (conceptual cognition), 16, 31

[1] √ denotes a root.

[2] A denotative term, according to Buddhist epistemology, refers to a mere concept, a logical synthesis based on the *exclusion* of a common counter-correlate. E.g., 'cow' refers to the exclusion of non-cow.

[3] From the verb '*ā*√*kṣip*' (to point to, to refer to).

*kāraṇa* (cause), 14, 15, 17, 21, 22
*kārya* (effect), 14–17, 21, 22, 24, 26
*kālpanika* (fictitious), 18, 36, 63
*krama* (succession), 10, 14–19, 21–26, 46, 54, 56, 58, 60, 61, 65, 66, 78
*kramayaugapadya* (succession or simultaneity), 16–18, 25, 26, 32, 58
*kramākrama* (succession or nonsuccession), 14–17, 19, 20, 22–26, 46, 58, 60, 78
*kṣaṇa* (point instant, moment), 14–16, 20–22, 24, 26, 51
*kṣaṇabhaṅga* (universal momentariness, constant flux), 14, 15, 18, 24, 25, 27, 28, 36, 56
*kṣaṇika* (momentary), 5, 9, 10, 14, 17, 19, 22, 25, 26, 33, 52
*kṣati* (defect, flaw), 16, 18, 20, 26, 41
*grahaṇa* (grasping), 23, 24, 45, 75
*tadutpatti* (causation), 52
*tadvat* (having or containing that, locus of that), 16, 32
*tādātmya* (existential identity), 52
*trirūpaliṅga* (three-aspected logical mark), 34
*-tva* = *tā* (-ness, -hood), 8, passim
*dṛṣṭānta* (example), 14, 16, 20, 22, 41, 52, 55
*doṣa* (logical flaw), 15–20, 22, 24, 25, 31, 40
*dharma* (attribute), 18–20, 24–27, 36, 37
*dharmatva* (intrinsic nature), 18, 24, 25, 35
*dharmitva* (subjecthood), 18, 19, 20, 37
*dharmin* (subject, substratum)[4], 14–18, 20, 23–25, 28, 36, 45, 75
*nija* (innate), 16, 21, 32
*nitya* (permanent, nonmomentary), 14, 15, 18, 23–26, 75
*nirāśraya* (locusless, having no locus), 19, 38
*nyāya* (logical rule), 15, 19, 23, 24
*pakṣa* (thesis, substratum), 11, 15–19, 22, 26, 32
*padārtha* (object, denotatum), 14, 28, 62
*paribhāṣā* (interpretative rule), 19, 38
*paryudāsa* (rule of exclusion), 24, 47, 70, 79
*prakāra* (qualifying term, qualifier, class), 15, 17, 22, 30, 34, 43, 44, 59
*pratibaddha* (invariably concomitant), 16, 17, 24, 31
*pratibandha* (invariable concomitance), 15, 17, 30, 34
*pratiyogin* (object of negation, counterpositive of an absence), 18, 24, 36, 62, 63, 73, 78
*pratiṣedha* (negation), 20, 25, 40, 70, 79
*pratīti* (knowlege), 15, 18, 20, 23, 26, 39
*pratyakṣa* (perception), 10, 14–17, 20, 25
*pratyaya* (cognizance), 17, 23, 45
*pramāṇa* (means of valid knowledge, evidence), 10, 14, 15, 19, 22, 24, 25, 28–30, 47–49, 53, 56, 68, 78, 79
*prasaṅgahetu* (a falsely assumed reason [as employed in a *reductio ad absurdum* proof]), 15, 30, 56
*prasanganumana* (*reductio ad absurdum* proof), 56
*bandhyāputra* = *bandhyāsuta* (son of a barren woman)[5], 18, 24, 25
*bāhya* (external), 23, 24
*buddhi* (cognition), 23, 24, 44, 45, 75
*bhāva* (presence, occurrence), 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 24, 26, 49, 63
*bheda* (nonidentity, change), 14, 15, 29
*bhedābheda* (identity and nonidentity), 14, 29
*yogavyavaccheda* (distinction with dependence), 17
*yaugapadya* (simultaneity), 16–18, 33, 58

[4] Same as *āśraya*.
[5] This is the Indian counterpart of the Western 'square circle'.

*rājadaṇḍa* (absolute authority), 19, 38
*rāsi* (class, aggregate), 26, 50
*lakṣana* (definiens)[6], 14, 15, 21, 24, 25
*liṅga* (logical mark, reason), 11, 16, 17, 31, 34
*laukika* (everyday experience, ordinary language, common usage), 50
*vastu* (real, that which is real), 16, 18–20, 22–25, 36, 39, 42, 45, 47, 55, 63, 69
*vastubala* (real potency), 20, 39
*vāstava* (real), 18, 26, 36, 63
*vikalpa* (conceptual construction, idea, horn of a trilemma), v, 15–17, 20, 22–25, 30, 34, 35, 39, 45, 47, 75, 79
*vipakṣa* (dissimilar case, heterogeneous example), 12, 27, 55, 57
*viparyayabādhakapramāṇa* (evidence refuting the opposite), 14, 56
*viruddha* (contradictory, logically incompatible), 13, 14, 16, 18, 24, 26, 29, 53, 55, 62
*virodha* (logical opposition, contradiction), 14–16, 18, 21, 24–26, 29, 36
*vaidharmya* (or *vaidharmyavat*) (heterogeneous), 14, 27, 52, 55
*vyatireka* (contraposition, negation as the assertion that the absence of the pervader entails the absence of the pervadendum), 11, 14, 17, 18, 22, 27, 28, 33–36, 44, 51, 54–56, 59, 74
*vyavaccheda* (distinction, exclusion), 17, 22, 33, 43
*vyavahāra* (use, empirical applicability), 18, 20, 22–24, 26, 36, 39, 47
*vyāpaka* (pervader), 11, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23–25, 35, 38, 51, 59, 61
*vyāpakānupalabdhi* (nonperception of a pervader), 23
*vyāpakānupalambha* (not perceiving a pervader, nonperception of a pervader), 14–18, 20, 22–24
*vyāpāra* (performance, operation, production), 17, 22, 23, 33, 44
*vyāpti* (pervasion, necessary concomitance), 5, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 25, 27, 51, 52, 56
*vyāpya* (pervadendum, that which is pervaded by the pervader), 11, 15, 17, 19, 23, 25, 30, 35, 38, 51, 59, 61
*śaktatva* (potency, efficacy), 14, 29
*śakti* (capacity), 15, 23, 24, 46, 50
*śūnya* (relative reality, relativity), 2, 18, 23, 24, 26, 36, 47, 63
*saṃvṛti* (phenomenon, illusion, phenomenal veil), 2, 3, 10, 18, 36
*sat* (that which is, existent entity), 18, 26, 35, 56, 62, 63
*sattā* (Existence [qua genus], absolute existence), 16, 18, 25, 26, 50, 52, 63
*sattva* (reality), 14, 15, 17–19, 22, 25, 26, 34, 38, 56
*sandigdha* (doubtful), 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 33
*sandigdhāśraya*, (having a doubtful locus), 13, 16, 20, 31, 40, 70, 71
*sapakṣa* (similar case, homogeneous example), 11, 14, 18, 26, 29, 36, 55, 57
*samāropa* (superimposition), 24, 46
*sambandha* (relationship), 17, 25, 49, 53
*sarvopākhyāviraha* (negation of all that is discernable), 19
*sahakārin* (cooperating agent), 16, 17, 21, 22
*sādhana* (probans, proving instrument), 11, 14, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28, 37, 50, 56, 70
*sādhāraṇa-hetu* (overwide reason, reason pervading all similar and dissimilar cases), 16, 30
*sādhya* (probandum, that which is to be established), 11, 12, 15, 19, 21–23, 25, 27, 30, 41, 52, 55, 56, 62, 70
*sādhyānuvādamātra* (mere explanatory repetition of the thesis to be proved, having what is to be proved as predicate already assumed as subject), 21, 41
*sāmagrī* (totality), 17, 21, 22
*sāmarthya* (capacity [for causal efficiency]), 15, 16, 20, 21, 32, 39, 56
*siddhi* (proof), 14, 15, 18, 19, 23, 25–27, 56

[6] '--- is the *lakṣana* of ....' is synonymous with '.... is defined as ---' or '.... in its very essence consists of ---'.

*sthira* (permanent), 21
*sthiravādin* (advocate of permanence), 21, 41
*svatantra* (independent), 15, 30
*svabhāva* (inherent disposition, nature), 16–18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 48
*svabhāvahetu* (having existential identity as a reason)[7], 14, 23, 45
*svabhāvānupalambha* (nonperception of the inherent nature), 18
*svarūpāsiddha* (unproved with regard to its own nature), 13, 16, 20, 31, 62
*svarūpāsiddhi* (a proof inconclusive because the nature of the reason is incompatible with that of the locus), 17, 31, 35
*svalakṣaṇa* ('point instant' of reality, uniquely specific dynamic 'point instant', momentary dynamic flash), 1, 2, 8, 21, 42, 52, 76–78
*hetu* (logical reason, cause), 11, 12, 14–18, 20–23, 25–27, 31, 32, 40, 44, 45, 52, 54–57, 62, 68, 70, 71, 75

[7] I.e., *hetu* and *sadhya* coinhere in the self-identical inherent nature of a single point instant of reality.

# FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE

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